THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE CAMBRIDGE CONFERENCE, 1950

By the Editor

THE Thirty-third Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Girton College, Cambridge, August 14—18, 1950. *Towards Christian Reformation: Reassessment and Re-statement* was the theme of the Conference introduced by Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., in his presidential address. Dean Inge in his ninety-first year preached the Conference sermon to the great joy of the members of a society of which he had been in days gone by its president for ten years, in succession to Dean Rashdall. The titles and readers of the twelve Conference papers were as follows:

'The Christian Religion and Contemporary Thought,' by Prof. A. D. Ritchie.

'The Christian Religion and Contemporary Science,' by Prof. C. A. Coulson.

'The Legacy of Hebrew-Jewish Religion,' by Prof. S. H. Hooke.

'The Religion of the New Testament Writers,' by Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford.

'The Place of Jesus Christ in the Christian Religion,' by W. L. Sperry, D.D., Dean of Harvard Divinity School.

'Jesus and His Gospel, since Schweitzer,' by Rev. T. F. Glasson, M.A., D.D.

'Jesus Christ and the Religion of Mankind: the Wider Christology,' by Dr. A. C. Bouquet.

'The Trinity: Meaning or Mystery,' by Rev. L. B. Cross, M.A., Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall.

'Dogmatic Reform in the Light of To-day,' by C. J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D.

'Christian Worship in the New Reformation,' by Canon R. D. Richardson, Principal of Ripon Hall.

'The Church: Its Office and Function,' by E. C. Dewick, D.D.

'The Outlook for Christianity,' by Rev. T. Wigley, M.A.

All these papers, together with the Presidential Address and the Conference Sermon, are published in this issue of the *Modern Churchman*.

The Conference audiences were large and appreciative: the discussions lively and informative: understanding harmony between speakers and audience characterized the sessions. Those who had attended the last Girton Conference held in 1939, and abruptly terminated by the German invasion of Poland, could not but contrast the optimistic spirit of the 1950 Conference with its Cambridge predecessor.

'I must have a religion, but not father's,' was the keynote of the Conference—prompted not by youthful revolt but by enlarging experience and reverence for truth. It was affirmed that an increasing number of our leading scientists are convinced that 'Science is not enough,' and that even the purveyors of second-hand science engaged in national education are beginning to arrive at the same conclusion.

A definite movement towards the re-valuation of religion is increasing in strength and profundity. It is clear to a growing number of thinking people that we must have a religion and that it must be essentially Christian. But it is equally clear that we must have—we speak for the Anglican communion—dogmatic reassessment and restatement. Failure by the Church authorities to achieve this is producing a widening gulf between modern Christian-minded Englishmen and their Church. A student of the contemporary situation writes: 'A mysterious barrier divides modern man from his church.' Another has cited the remark of a modern Jew to a modern Christian: 'We both of us have one thing in common, you don't attend your church and I don't attend my synagogue.'

Our religious authorities are agreed on the need for a religious reformation, by which they mean bringing the people back to their churches, but they do not see that this can only be brought about by a preliminary dogmatic reassessment and restatement of the Christian Religion. This demand is evaded or derided or denounced by our Church authorities. It is not surprising that this should be the case, for the task is one of extreme difficulty and danger. The Church, if it is to be effective in the modern world,

has got to deal with fundamentals — the dogmas of the Christian Faith as formulated by the Apostles' Creed.

This is emphasized in the striking phrase of Prof. Herbert Butterfield: 'Trust in Christ and accept no other commitments.' To do this is not so simple a matter as it seems. Much has happened to the Christian Religion since Jesus proclaimed His good news of the Kingdom of God. When we study the New Testament critically we discover that it has two Christian Religions in it or, more correctly, two stages in one religion.

(1) We have the Religion *of* Jesus and (2) the Religion *about* Jesus. The apostles were both witnesses to and apologists for the Christian Religion. The Religion about Jesus is in some measure based upon apostolic experience, but even more on apologetic needs. This apostolic apologetic was developed under the pressure of Jewish attacks made on the apostolic claim that the crucified Jesus was the Messiah (or Christ) of Israel.

In their apology the apostles appealed (*a*) to the testimony of divinely-wrought miracles, (*b*) to the testimony of Old Testament oracles fulfilled by Jesus, (*c*) to predictions attributed to Jesus that He, after His ascension, would shortly return to judge mankind.

It is this apostolic apologetic which has become a most important part of the Christian dogma. Although eminently effective as it was in pre-critical and pre-scientific periods of Church history, it has now ceased to be so for many educated modern-minded people. Moreover, we have good reason to doubt whether this apostolic apologetic would have received the sanction of Jesus Himself. He appealed not to 'mighty acts of God'—in other words, divinely-wrought miracles, as giving authority to His Gospel, but to the prophetic quality of that Gospel itself. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away.

To-day it seems only too clear that we are being compelled from many quarters to go back to Jesus and to the essentials of His Gospel of the Kingdom of God as our supreme spiritual and moral authority for mankind. But is it possible to win the Church authorities to this policy of reassessment and restatement?

Was George Tyrrell justified in saying with a groan:

> 'They've got so far away with their theologizing — will they ever be able to get back to the Gospel of Christ?'

Unhappily, what is happening to-day in the Papal Church in its Holy Year by the proclamation of the bodily assumption of the Virgin Mary as a *de fide* dogma which all Roman Catholics must believe under peril of excommunication, justifies Tyrrell's pessimism, so far as the Roman Church (which excommunicated him)

is concerned. The following comment published in the *Spectator* of August 25 (p. 230) justifies Tyrrell's gloomy forebodings:

> 'Yet to-day, with an almost incredible indifference to historical evidence, belief in the bodily assumption of the Virgin Mary is to be prescribed as an essential part of the faith of all Roman Catholics. That, it may be said, after all, concerns only Roman Catholics themselves. It is not so. The common man does not draw distinctions that ought to be drawn. The whole Christian faith is brought into discredit if not derision by such action as this.'

We are glad, however, that on August 17 the Archbishops of Canterbury and York issued the following declaration (for full statement cf. *The Guardian*, August 18):

> 'We must at once state publicly that the Church of England does not and cannot hold this doctrine to be a necessary part of the Catholic Faith, belief in which may be required of members of the Church.
>
> The Church of England renders honour and reverence to the Mother of Our Lord Jesus Christ. But there is not the smallest evidence in the Scriptures or in the teaching of the early Church of belief in the doctrine of her bodily assumption. The Church of England refuses to regard as requisite for a saving faith any doctrines or opinions which are not plainly contained in the Scriptures.*
>
> We profoundly regret that the Roman Catholic Church has chosen by this act to increase dogmatic differences in Christendom and has thereby gravely injured the growth of understanding between Christians based on a common possession of the fundamental truths of the Gospel.'

This declaration by our two Primates is most gratifying, not simply because it rejects absolutely the incredible dogma of the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but because their public declaration recognizes the disasters incurred in promulgating as Christian, dogmas which are not essential to the Christian faith. This point is stressed by their emphatic statement:

> *'We profoundly regret that the Roman Catholic Church has chosen by this act to increase dogmatic differences in Christendom and has thereby gravely injured the growth of understanding between Christians based on a common possession of the fundamental truths of the Gospel.'*

Unfortunately this liberating utterance of our Archbishops was followed a week later by a public statement by the Archbishop of Canterbury condemning Dr. C. J. Wright for a statement made by him at the Modern Churchmen's Conference at Cambridge:

> 'that scholarship does not support the historical basis of a belief in the virgin birth of our Lord.'

* Article VI adds another condition, but omitted by the Archbishops, 'whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation': *'Nor may be proved thereby'* is a most important condition as it prohibits our Church authorities from demanding as *de fide* Biblical Statements which have been rendered incredible or doubtful as the result of Biblical critical study. [Ed. M.C.].

The result of the Primate's statement has been such as to lead our British public to conclude that Dr. Wright, because of his statement about the Virgin Birth, is regarded as unfit to hold any teaching post in St. Augustine's, Canterbury, when that college will be re-opened as a central college of the Anglican Communion for the higher education of Anglican priests from overseas.

The Primate's declaration runs as follows:

> 'All those who are looking forward eagerly to the establishment of the Central College may be satisfied that Dr. Wright in no way reflects the theological outlook of the future College with which he will have no connexion at all. Nor does Dr. Wright's statement about the Virgin Birth in any way represent the mind of the present corporate body of St. Augustine's of which, indeed, he is not a member. Neither does it represent the mind of the Church of England, which holds and proclaims the doctrine of the Virgin Birth as portrayed in scripture and the Creed to be a fact of history, by means of which our Lord Jesus Christ came down from heaven and was made Man for our salvation.'
>
> (*Church Times*, August 25th, 1950).

Although this declaration by the Primate, if not of such a kind as to 'increase dogmatic differences in Christendom' is yet of such a kind as to create acute dogmatic differences within our Anglican Communion and so 'gravely injure the growth of understanding between Christians based on a common possession of the fundamental truths of the Gospel.'

If it be asserted, in defence of the Primate's action, that the Virgin Birth is *a fundamental truth of the Gospel* we would recall the statement of Dr. Armitage Robinson, Dean of Westminster, in an Open Letter to Archbishop Davidson in 1903:

> 'If the Bishops were asked to declare that the Incarnation is a cardinal doctrine of the faith, such a statement would be superfluous indeed, but it would be true. But to say that the historical fact of the Virgin Birth is a cardinal doctrine of the faith is to use language which no Synod of Bishops, so far as I am aware, has ever ventured to use.'

To this statement ought to be conjoined passages cited by the present Bishop of Coventry from the *Doctrinal Report* defending his refusal to condemn one of his clergy who had stated that from the historical point of view, the Virgin Birth is a myth.

> 'There are, however, some among us who hold that a full belief in the historical Incarnation is more consistent with the supposition that our Lord's birth took place under the normal conditions of human generation. In their minds the notion of a Virgin Birth tends to mar the completeness of the belief that in the Incarnation God revealed Himself at every point in and through human nature.
>
> 'We are agreed in recognising that belief in our Lord's birth from a Virgin has been in the history of the Church intimately associated with its faith in the Incarnation of the Son of God. Further, we recognise that the work of scholars upon the New Testament has created a new setting

of which theologians in their treatment of this article are obliged to take account. We also recognise that both the views outlined above are held by members of the Church, as of the Commission, who fully accept the reality of our Lord's Incarnation, which is the central truth of the Christian faith.' (*Doctrinal Report*, p. 82).

Modern critical study indicates two things about the Virgin Birth.

(1) That the Pauline Epistles and St. Mark's Gospel (our earliest Gospel) know nothing of the Virgin Birth. It is only the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke (published after the Fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.) which contain conflicting narratives of the Virgin Birth.

(2) Canon Peter Green, an orthodox stalwart, pointed out in 1946 in the *Manchester Guardian* that from the first and all down the ages there had been in the Christian Church two doctrines of the mode of the Incarnation. The one is represented by the Virgin Birth Christology mode and the other by the Logos Christology mode.

It is the second mode which is held by Dr. Wright, as may be seen in his able exposition of the Gospel of St. John, and there is strong reason to believe that as modern science influences Christian thought, it is this Logos doctrine of the Incarnation which will become increasingly widely held in the Church of the future. It is on this account that, most unwillingly, we are compelled publicly to deplore the hardening and narrowing of Christian doctrine which the Primate's public condemnation of Dr. Wright supports. But we fear we must go further.

The condemnation of Dr. Wright and those who share his views by our Church authorities is not a remedy but an aggravation of the existing dogmatic situation. We are facing a doctrinal crisis which is fostering the silent desertion from the Church services by multitudes of Church people, and furthermore is creating an increasingly intolerable position for the modern-minded clergy. These clergy are distinguished from the laity in that they realize the breadth of reinterpretation of the Church's dogmatic formularies which has been conceded to them during the last hundred years by a series of liberating decisions. Because the laity as a whole know nothing of this, when they hear their clergyman reciting the creed, they condemn him for asserting that he believes what he does not believe.

We received a letter this morning from a learned and universally respected clergyman (not a bishop) from which we cite the following:

'What is of *vital* importance is to safeguard liberty on that point [the Virgin Birth] which was expressly recognized by the Archbishops'

Commission on Doctrine, 1938 (pp. 82, 83), but which the Archbishop now seems to repudiate.'

'I suppose that no member of the M.C.U. really holds the Creeds literally, in the sense in which they were drawn up: but as long as the tendency seemed to be *towards* a larger liberty most of us were content to let things be. Now the Archbishop's action comes as a sharp check to this; and we ought to know where we stand in the eyes of our bishops.'

'I do think the time has come when some of us ought to ask the bishops whether they really do regard people of our views as entitled to a place in the Anglican ministry, or whether they would prefer us to resign our Orders — *and* state publicly our reasons for doing so.'

'The constant suspicion of disloyalty and dishonesty is to me very painful; and I would like to see the matter cleared up.'

We are convinced that what our correspondent demands from the bishops is not enough. The Church authorities must authorize simple, practical, truthful, unifying Confessions of Christian Faith which, subject to the consent of the parochial laity, may be used in our churches as alternatives to our traditional creeds. In the cause of Christian veracity, Christian freedom, Christian love and Church comprehensiveness, we plead for this.

Modernists do not desire to have the ancient traditional creeds removed from the Prayer Book, nor do they desire to prevent church congregations from reciting them where they wish to continue to do so. All that Modernists plead for is the inclusion of alternative Confessions of Faith in our Prayer Book and their use in public worship where congregations desire it.

If this liturgical freedom were conceded by the Church authorities the moral and intellectual tension between conscience, criticism and the creeds would be greatly reduced in the Church of England.

Whilst the Papal Church is steadily adding to its dogmatic incredibilities (three within a century) the Church of England, in view of the contemporary situation, ought, in the interests of comprehensiveness, unity and loyalty, to be courageously engaged in eliminating all dogmatic demands which are not essential for the truth of Christ's Religion.

Such a policy resolutely undertaken and pursued would secure ultimately three incalculable benefits. First, it would assist the return of Englishmen to practising membership in their church worship. Secondly, it would constitute a basis for the reunion of Christendom. Thirdly, it would create an effective Christian missionary ideal for the spiritual and moral fellowship of mankind.

Is it not worth trying, and at once? Modern Churchmen have been pleading for this for at least a quarter of a century.

TOWARDS CHRISTIAN REFORMATION

By Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E.

I. The Present Situation

THE title given to me for this opening address to the 1950 Conference of the Modern Churchmen's Union is 'Towards Christian Reformation.'

The title could not be more apt at the middle point of the twentieth century after a harassing half-century which suggests by bitter experience that something is sadly amiss with the outlook of humanity. Since the Christian Church claims to be the voice of spiritual life in this country, first enquiry must obviously be addressed in that quarter in attempting a diagnosis of the distressing situation which is universally recognized as such.

It is in the conviction that such a preliminary enquiry will show the Church itself to be in serious confusion of thought and practice that the theme of this Conference has been directed towards the need for restatement of the Christian position, reformulation of its practice and purposeful vindication of its function and destiny.

'The word 'reformation' means precisely what its face value suggests. When this country broke with Rome and freed its national Church from external control, the process inevitably went far and deep in the revision of basic thought and practice. The suggestion is that a like reformation is as necessary to-day, although the present threat comes not from the Roman Church but from a far more serious danger, *viz.* general apathy towards the claims of Christianity itself. The world is lacking a spiritual motif, but there are no signs of eagerness to re-accept Christian dogma as the vehicle of spiritual principles.

This situation might suggest that man is less religious to-day than in the past, despite the appalling experiences of two world wars inside the half-century with all their aftermaths and upheavals. But such a suggestion would be false: there is to-day, in the judgment of people of unprejudiced discernment, a far greater sense of spiritual values and a stronger call for spiritual revival than has existed throughout this century. Man to-day is religious, but he has learnt from the research and developments of the last hundred years that he must not prostitute his intelligence on behalf of archaic and outmoded dogmas; rather than do this he will resign himself to an unhappy agnosticism only made

endurable by wistful yearning which expresses itself in art, music, and allied forms of spiritual enterprise.

The reference to the events of the past hundred years is both practical and intellectual. On the practical side the intensity of human endurance within a furnace of concentrated experience and bitter strife has shaken the complacency and smugness engendered by unquestioning acceptance of dogma, itself stemming from the nineteenth-century gospel of inevitable progress towards happiness and evolutionary Utopias. The disillusionment has been deep and unalterable: humanity in 1950 is not prepared to go back to the Victorian combination of industrial aggression supported by religious dogmas based on authoritarian certainty.

On the other hand, the intellectual half of the situation has been aggravated by the progress achieved in the world of science during the same period. To-day the scientist is the least assertive of the many claimants to prophetic revelation. The scientist by his success has become increasingly humble in his assertions because his very success has only been possible by recognition of the purely mental status of his methods and conclusions. Science at its best appreciates that its operations are directed to the data expressive of experience within an environment which eludes direct assessment. That experience can only be interpreted through mental symbolism which is suggested by the mind as explanatory of the results of observation and experiment. The fact that the process and its results enable man to live within, and adjust himself to his environment, provides a guarantee of kinship of some sort between man and the universe in which he lives. But the precise relationship between his science, his life, and his world are beyond his present understanding, and he patiently accepts the fact with real humility in pursuing his efforts towards increasing knowledge through his processes of symbolic reference.

In short, science knows how little it knows and how little can be known except by patience and undogmatic submission to the facts of experience. Those facts must be lived, registered, classified, interpreted and then re-formed in association with ever-widening orbits of associated experiences. In this way great progress has been achieved and the general run of men to-day are increasingly appreciating the methods by which such achievement has been possible. This in itself turns them instinctively against dogmatism even in the field of religion.

There is the further difficulty which it is unnecessary to develop in detail, to wit, the clear incompatibility between the universe as conceived in scientific thought and the parallel conceptions advanced by fundamentalist dogmas. Man revolts at

being asked to say, 'I believe in the resurrection of the body.' It is idle to suggest to him that the word 'body' does not mean what it says. He knows perfectly well that the disposal of molecules, atoms, protons, electrons, etc., must be such that a purely physical body could never be re-collected even if the enterprise were worthwhile. The issue is a trivial one because of the certainty that the most pious repetition of these words to-day can scarcely imply the full physical notion. Yet despite this, the point illustrates the affront which such terms make to the mind of the ordinary man who thinks at all on the subject — and men think far more in this way than the ordinary divine imagines. But when such a point has to be coupled with a host of other and much more difficult anachronisms, it is not surprising that the credal statements required by Church practice estrange the bulk of religious-minded men to-day.

A notable conference was held here in Girton College in 1921 which included the pioneers of the Modernist movement and caused great public consternation by the thoughts then expressed in regard to certain supposedly fundamental tenets of the Christian religion. Yet to-day bishops, deans, archdeacons, and priests of the Church of England are members of this Union which still maintains the same views and methods as were affirmed in 1921. It is thus possible for the very custodians of the Christian faith to subscribe whole-heartedly to the views of this Union and that, despite the clamour of 1921 and the gloomy picture then foreshadowed by the reactionary critics. Views denounced as heretical in 1921 are now accepted without any distress as fully compatible with the true tradition of the Church of England.

In 1928 there was a very interesting conference of the Union, also in this hall. At that conference there was considerable press publicity given to a challenge which was thrown on the floor of the meeting to the following effect:

> 'The Modern Churchmen's Union has now completed much of its critical work in the destruction of outworn dogmatism; has not the time arrived for attempting a restatement of Christian faith and practice in terms which will in fact meet the needs of spiritual progress?'

It will be recalled that the rejoinder came to the effect that a further ten years' thinking would be necessary before that could be done. In the meantime, and shortly after the ten years had elapsed, there came the war of 1939—1945. It is idle to speculate what difference there might have been in the situation if the Christian Church had

ut re-expressed its faith and practice in modern terms in the year 928.

Now we are assembled for the third time this century in this all at Cambridge and the question inevitably arises, 'Are we oing to attempt the task which was implicit in the 1921 conference nd which was shelved at the 1928 conference?' So far as we have ulled down rusted and dilapidated framework, we have rightly cted; but by having pulled down that framework wherever it was ast fulfilling its original purpose, surely it is our bounden duty attempt the rebuilding?

In my judgment the time has now come for all who value the adition of the Church of England to join in an effort at giving to e world the Christian message in its proper form and with its true rinciples stated in terms that anybody can understand to-day. oo long has there been this policy of watching and waiting, unady to cut through the strands of uncertainty and lack of convicon, yet leaving semi-authoritarian movements and fundamentalist ropaganda to develop further misguided efforts to divert the hurch from its duty to the world at large. We cannot with any al sense of responsibility stand apart and watch the current drift wards general apathy, tempered by sporadic but reactionary ovements of Christian minorities.

The suggestion in short is that we have to take hold of the basic rinciples of the Modernist movement and, in default of such tion by the ecclesiastical authorities themselves, give the best rmulation we can to the essence of the Christian faith as it has en tested and proved within living memory and thereafter reved in heightened experience. Thereby it should have been rought to expression in the form which would enable our generaon to accept it as the present stepping-stone of forward develop ent.

The situation is in effect a challenge to faith at a very dark our in the history of humanity. We cannot afford to let the uncerinty and doubts of the times dim the basic belief of all true reliion, that life is worthwhile and has a spiritual destiny passing eyond this present life which must not be allowed to be an end in self. There can be, to the discerning spectator of current world fairs and national policies, no other conclusion than that humanity quires a new inspiration of faith. But this is not to regard faith belief in dogma, but as an attitude of mind — a belief in life as adventure with a purpose which is so supremely worthwhile as justify the trials and tribulations of this mortal existence. It is is approach which I regard as covered by the title of this paper, Towards Christian Reformation.'

II. The Need for a Modern Philosophy of Religion

The argument as so far developed postulates the possibility of a modern philosophy of religion framed in the light of Christian principles and traditions, themselves re-lived through critical phases of human history, found valid in their essentials and re-expressed in terms related to other fields of human enterprise under modern conditions. This is the need which must be satisfied if Christianity is to maintain its claim to be the religion of the future as well as of the past. Equally such a philosophy is essential if men are to be able to go forward in the adventure of faith grounded in the conviction that the universe has meaning and purpose.

There can be little doubt that the current failure of the Christian philosophy of religion derives originally from the wrongful emphasis developed during its initial periods on the unsuitability of present existence to give scope for the realization of the Christian ideals. This undue emphasis first showed itself in eschatological forecasts of the 'End of the World' and the endeavour to limit hopes for life and achievement to the 'hereafter.' Such early prognostications, after repeated adjustments to frustrated expectations, became increasingly shallow, with disappointment after disappointment. The emphasis then progressively transformed itself into a growing divorce between the Christian claims for a transmundane destiny and the dawning ideas of secular thought directed towards some understanding of man's physical environment and the improvement of his lot in it. This led to increasing distortion of the Christian creeds and a 'turning-in' by the Christian community upon itself within its spiritual life as something apart from the world. The sequel was no better manifested than during the monastic age when the endeavour to retreat into mystical contemplation and religious isolation itself forced upon the monks an inevitable interest in scientific possibilities. It was the monks who kept science alive during the Dark Ages and thereby demonstrated that man cannot turn aside from the world and seek salvation solely in isolation here and concentration upon the postulated blessedness hereafter.

This experience of the Dark Ages passed into the antagonism between authoritative revelation and scientific knowledge which developed during the Middle Ages, despite the supreme endeavours of St. Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries to bridge the two. So long as the emphasis of the Church rested upon the supposed radical corruption of human nature consequent upon a 'Fall,' which was by many associated with a parallel dogma as

the fallen condition of Nature itself, there could be no hope of philosophy of religion which included within itself an adequate planation of this world in due subordination to the spiritual ilosophy of a controlling and transcendental order. We have -day reached the clear manifestation in human history of the in-itable need for a philosophy of religion which embraces within elf not only a philosophy of the transcendental spiritual realm its relationship to man, but also a developing philosophy of this rld and man's relationship to it. The all-embracing character the philosophy needed is reflected in the title adopted by the e Archbishop Temple in his Gifford Lectures, *viz.* 'Nature, an and God.'

The need for this all-embracing philosophy of religion is ident in all fields of human life. For example, national and ternational policies have demonstrated over the past fifty years e impracticability of framing adequate schemes which are solely rected to the betterment of man's life in this world. It is un-cessary to recall the basic failure of the doctrines of Karl Marx d his successors upon this very point. The conflict fundamentally tween the Marxian philosophy and other creeds seems to centre on the belief of the former that human destiny is to be conceived d worked out exclusively in terms of this world. But equally the licies, underlying national and international affairs generally, il also for this very reason.

The inevitable tendency of well-intentioned plans resting upon lief in the progressive evolution of an ideal human society in an eal human environment here must fail to fit human needs because their fundamental misconception that life here is the basic pur-se for which humanity exists within the far-reaching universe sclosed by modern physics. It is relevant to ask how such a cture can be reconciled with the fact of cycles of life and death. ow can successive generations avoid reliving the past in some itomized fashion before they can experience the future, or hope attain perfection except by struggle and endeavour? Struggle d endeavour against difficulties are the essence of human pro-ess and of the world in which we find ourselves; yet struggle and deavour are not compatible with present perfection. The theme nnot be developed in detail here; one must be forgiven a bald atement of the conclusion which the argument would produce; wit, there can be, on the facts as we know them, no possible hievement of a perfect humanity living within a perfect environ-ent on this planet under conditions as we experience it. The nclusion allows the further thought that life within the human an must, if it is based on purpose, be intended to operate both

as a crucible and an incinerator. The crucible will serve to forge the jewels of living spiritual values knit into the fabric of human personalities, whilst the incinerator will fuse away the dross of egotism and its associated evils. If this be so, then life here must be a preparing period for that which is to come.

Given such a basic theme, national policies may rightly direct themselves to the improvement of social conditions and human existence, but they should be associated with basic ideals which lay an even greater emphasis on the wisdom of providing for the growth of personality in overcoming difficulties and handicaps which, when so overcome, reveal their training status and value. No longer would there be danger of the welfare state over-emphasizing the desirability of security and the material means of existence at the expense of individual endeavour and enterprise.

The same consideration applies in terms of the individual or the group private life. The old conception of ' sin ' as equivalent to the Greek ' hamartia ' has pointed significance here. The Greek term means ' missing the mark ' ; just as in the national and international policies, so equally in the individual life is there this grievous danger of ' missing the mark ' by undue emphasis on the status of life here as against the claims of life hereafter, for which the former should be a preparation. It would mean the complete and erroneous reversal of the early Christian eschatological pessimism : the true position lies half-way. We seek a philosophy of *both* worlds, not of either to the exclusion of the other.

The theme thus centres again and again upon the fact of a transcendental and spiritual background to this living universe and a relationship between the two steeped in purpose and animated by mutual revelation. Otherwise how can we explain the appeal of music or the achievement of the artist in his expression of his insight into the inner meanings of life?

The lesson is still further emphasized by the modern developments in the world of science. It is not without significance that in May this year there appeared the first volume of *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. This volume is typical of the new developments within scientific circles where the realization is developing that the scientist reads into the universe an explanation of his experience in relationship with it. But this is not to say that the scientist regards his explanation as invalid but rather to emphasize that he recognizes its true nature and the consequent restrictions on its field of application. The knowledge so represented by these explanations is valid for the purposes which have led to its expression in terms of mental symbolism appropriate to that particular branch of science.

For example, the Euclidian geometry was valid in its application to the explanation of scientific experience up to and including the Newtonian era. Subsequent experience both in the microcosmic and the macrocosmic regions suggested, however, limits to the application of that geometry and the need for other geometries which permit explanations more fully expressive of the developing experiences. And so science passed on into the era of Einstein based on other geometries, whether those of Riemann or of other geometers who are ready to postulate the necessary axioms and principles to co-ordinate the mental symbolisms; these are expressed in terms of mathematical equations of the most general order and therefore applicable to possible universes of many more, or even different, dimensions to those obtaining in our immediate field.

The scientist appreciates all this but he has no lack of faith in the validity of his endeavours and the assurance of increasing knowledge if he remains true to the basic principles of the mental framework which he has created. He may read into Nature what he expects to find in it, but that is only to emphasize his status as a mind acting in accordance with the basic principles of mind in its relationship to a physical environment. How could it be otherwise? The engineer through his formulae and his drawings employs mental processes to co-ordinate connections observed within his physical environment and so to plan means whereby that environment will be adapted to his purpose. With his emergence from the drawing office, his drawings and his plans are translated into physical existence, and the operation is justified by the results. This is an overwhelming testimony to the status of mind in its relationship to Nature; yet always that status demands that mind shall operate according to principles tested continuously, and adjusted as shown to be warranted by developing experience. The parallel lesson for our philosophy of religion is obvious.

As a final check on the situation we turn briefly to the field of Comparative Religion. The record as reviewed from Lao-Tze and Confucius in China, or through the Upanishads and the Buddha in India, or through Zoroaster in Persia, or through the Greek poets and philosophers, or through the Hebrew prophets, or through the absolutism of Mahomet — all these movements witness in their own way to the certainty and validity of religious experience. But they also testify equally to the fact that such experience crystallizes out in great spiritual leaders who are usually so far ahead of their times that their only reward is to be deified after death as a popular ' compensation ' for the perversion of their most precious principles and teachings within the strait-jacket of

dogma and prejudice. Despite this, the classification of the thoughts and teachings of these men, as revealed by the highest methods of historical criticism, discloses underlying lines of continuity and development which again assert beyond doubt the fact of continuous operation of revelation according to the measure of human progress and understanding. In all cases the further developments have been conditioned by the ability of the disciples to re-live and find for themselves the true meaning of the experiences of their leaders. The histories of such religions, however chequered, all manifest the fact that dogmatism piles up in phases and has again and again to be overcome if the living spirit is to be transmitted from generation to generation.

Nowhere is that thesis better revealed than in the history of Christianity itself. All the lessons that the foregoing suggests are caught up in supreme form within Christianity, and we find in its history the surest guide to the validity of our argument. It is upon this argument that the case exists for a new call to a perplexed and anxious world for a venture of faith towards the achievement of spiritual life as the transcendental counterpart of worthwhile existence here.

III. The Case for Christian Reformation

As already indicated, there is emerging to-day a new school in the philosophy of science based on the realization that ' the theory of relativity has made necessary a new conception of the nature of physical science . . . Formerly science was regarded as the study of an external world, independent of the observer whose experiments and observations were simply means of finding out how the world was constructed and by what laws its behaviour was governed. The emphasis has now shifted from the nature of the world to the operations of experiment and observation . . . Any world that we may contemplate is no longer an independent existence whose nature demands or determines them but rather a logical construct, formed and shaped and modified so as to afford a true picture of the relations which the observations exhibit ' (Professor H. Dingle, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, May, 1950).

This conclusion seems to me to be as apt for the philosophy of religion as it is for the philosophy of science. Such a philosophy is concerned with the evidence and implications of religious experience in the attempt to ' afford a true picture of the relations ' which the experience exhibits. In short, religion is concerned primarily

ith ' relations ' discerned within experience as operating between an and the spiritual background to his life, both private and as a ember of the human community.

This is particularly true of Christianity, which as the Religion Jesus Christ is supremely not only the religion of right relations th the Divine Being, but also in subordination to this — right lations to our fellow human beings. It is this fact which makes ristian reformation so essential to-day. Not merely is there no lequate appreciation of man's relationship to the Divine among e vast majority of thinking men to-day, but the present confused d precarious position of the so-called civilized world itself is early the result both of this failure to conceive man's true status ithin the universe and also of the grievous distortion of the lationships which should obtain within the human family.

It has been suggested to me that some treatment of these pects is necessary as being basic to the case for Christian refor- ation to be undertaken as a matter of urgency and as a challenge a world drifting on dangerous and uncharted seas. It is surely e particular concern of Modern Churchmen to promote the fectiveness of the Christian Church in its efforts to secure better- ent in all these phases of human relationships. I venture to make e following brief survey with that purpose in view.

First, in regard to man's relationship with the spiritual back- round. The Christian conception of God and His revelation in e Person of Jesus Christ are central to Christian doctrine and ould be proclaimed fearlessly. These alone can combat the ndency so clearly visible towards a neo-Pelagianism, despite the ssons of two world wars and the perpetual recurrences of human ailties. There is increasingly prevalent the belief that man ands on his own feet within an environment which will ultimately e amenable to his control. In the more extreme circles, particu- lrly among certain psychological and biological schools, he is garded as the master of his own fate, if not as the captain of his wn soul. It is irrelevant to such theorists that such destiny only xists for the race with nothing for the individual but to work for e unearned comfort and material welfare of succeeding genera- ons. It is implied in all this that man's strength is equal to the chievement of his ends. I have previously referred to the dangers f the heresy of the radical corruption of man and Nature; it would erefore be fitting equally to disown the heresy that man is suffi- ient in his own strength. It is still as true to-day as ever that those ings which ' we would, we do not.' Any destiny founded on such rinciples must in the nature of the case prove illusory and it is

highly probable, in the light of past stupidities and present controversies, that man in pursuit of a self-appointed destiny would end in self-executed destruction. The doctrine of God and man's relationship to Him as revealed in Christian experience is a cardinal necessity for the world to-day.

Turning to the field of human relationships, we have first to consider that between the scientists and the supporters of religion. There is no need to fear to-day that the mood of scientists is akin to that of Laplace in his belief that God is a hypothesis with which he could dispense. The scientist who knows current developments is extremely critical of all scientific dogmatism and is really humble in his desire to bring scientific theory into its proper setting. Among the more advanced scientific thinkers, any belief that scientific hypotheses directly reveal the objective nature of an external physical world has long since given way to the conclusion that such hypotheses are merely logical constructs serving to relate the concepts framed in explanation of observation and experiment. Such concepts are in themselves instruments of mental symbolism and have to be reshaped or replaced, as proved necessary with the development of the general scheme of symbolic explanation. Coupled with this is the realization that such a scheme is only a specialist representation which is the more partial in direct proportion to the increased exactitude sought in the symbols employed. For instance, mathematical physics has made the greatest progress by the use of its powerful machinery to give tentative and symbolic expression to the operating principles of pattern and structure, suspected to function within the physical universe. But, while such mathematical treatment is the most exact among the sciences, it is equally the most particularistic of them all.

By this movement towards a new philosophy of science which is taking such encouraging shape, particularly in London and Cambridge, there is every reason to hope for wider recognition that the philosophy of religion similarly seeks to bring out the inner relations within an equally valid sphere of human experience. Science and religion are parallel enterprises of human nature and a new collaboration may reasonably be expected between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion from a standpoint which sees them as complementary and not in conflict—providing that both shed their dogmatisms and prejudices. Both carry a heavy load of past guilt in this respect and each must be ready to meet the other without desire for intellectual conquest on the one side, or patronizing mysticism on the other. It is the Christian religion which provides the ideal philosophy of religion and recognizes the true status of this world in its relationship to

e spiritual : it is, therefore, legitimate to claim full status for the hristian philosophy of religion in the interplay between the arallel searches for a living philosophy of religion and an ex- anding philosophy of science.

Next I venture to turn to the ' humanists ' who are so anxious hat culture should be pursued, always provided that such pursuit divorced from any religious implications. The out-of-date dog- atisms of the Church have added to the numbers of such gnostics, in so far as they have forced men of intellectual sin- erity to repudiate religion and find compensation in culture; but he ranks of agnostic ' humanism ' include many who are hostile o religion as such. There has always been and will continue to e a strand in man's nature which makes the agnostic reaction to fe inevitable for the limited few.

The remedy is not to quarrel with the pursuit of culture for its wn sake; this religion should warmly endorse and promote ecause it is in its higher forms just as much a manifestation of the piritual nature of man as his religious and scientific endeavours. he real plea is that the Church should seek to demonstrate that ultural development is not complete, and cannot be, without the omplementary inspiration of a valid religious experience. It is hus essential for the Church, which has increasingly contributed y its ineptitude and dogmatism to the numbers of ' humanists,' ow to reproclaim its gospel in terms which meet with modern nderstanding. Only in this way can we hope to integrate the piritual life of man and bring it into co-ordinated activity, ocused upon true spiritual values.

Equally the Church must put itself right in the national and nternational spheres. Humanity is being harassed by ideologies, whether political in character or otherwise, which are so mutually destructive as to be clearly divorced from valid relationship to the central principles of human existence. There can be no over- coming of human antagonisms based on distorted ideologies except through the proclamation by the Christian Church of the basic principle of human life which was revealed in the Person of Christ. That principle proclaimed that man must find his destiny, whether individually or in the group, on the basis of service and not on that of aggression. It is cardinal to the future of mankind that this lesson shall be recognized as having been revalidated by the events of this century. Aggressors have waxed, waned and perished; imperialistic pretensions and acquisitions are now being voluntarily relinquished : nations seek to regulate their relations by harmonious discussions and agreement in council; these are some

of the strands of recent history which should reveal the fundamental truth that pursuit of selfish interests is the path of degeneration. The true road to destiny equally for nations as for the individual, is the road of self-integration and service for the common weal. Such a message can only come with driving force if proclaimed by the Christian Churches with a full realization of the parallel implications for their own internal relationships.

Thus we turn to the final strand in human relations stressing the urgency of Christian reformation. How can Christians proclaim such a reformed philosophy as the basis of human salvation if they manifest so grievously the sectarian divisions between themselves? It has often been the case that there has been more bitterness between the groups within a Church or between the Churches themselves than between non-religionists without. Christianity can never function effectively in the world at large so long as there remains disunity within its ranks — and a disunity based mainly on relative trivialities. It is the insistent appeal of Modern Churchmen, and the supreme justification for their activities, that the reformation of the Christian philosophy and the re-expression of its gospel in modern terms would not only meet the crying needs of humanity but would also provide a real possibility of Christian reunion with a common faith and complete collaboration on all basic issues, yet without loss of that individual uniqueness which would rightly be preserved by the continuance of the several Churches.

The foregoing are but some of the strands among human relationships which demonstrate the case for Christian restatement and reformation. It is evident that the clergy of the Church of England, in particular, have been unable for many years past to resolve their own uncertainties as to the nature of the message that should be given. These uncertainties have been fully justified and can only be overcome by the reformation so strongly urged. The Modern Churchmen's Union is seeking through this Conference not only to bring this into general recognition but also to develop the background of thought necessary by way of a preliminary : it will have abundantly fulfilled its purpose if it serves to focus attention on the critical urgency of the need.

But this is not the whole of the story. The Union has among its members an active group of parish priests who have been engaged in private conferences over a long period directed towards the very task of reformulation of certain parts of the Liturgy of the Church of England which they have found from direct experience to present the greatest difficulties. That group has made considerable progress and is organizing, with the support of the

nion, a special conference this autumn to try and focus the uation and make some definite suggestions. The conference ll be a gathering of ordained priests of the Church because they e the men who can speak from first-hand experience and are ose who feel the greatest need.

Moreover, they rightly feel that Christian reformation must me at all levels. The call ought to come from the top, but the ive, to be effective, must be made through the parishes. The rish priests generally are the men who must be convinced of e need — and then of the possibility and nature — of effective hristian reformation, because it will only be through their efforts at the revivified Gospel will be spread among the people.

IV. The Long Future

In conclusion, I appeal for special attention to the difficulty of ersuading the twentieth century that the Christian faith has any dequate historical basis to serve as the religion for the long future ead. It is sufficiently difficult to answer as to its relevance for e present century, when it failed to prevent two world wars, and at despite an unchallenged status in Western civilization for 600 years. How then can it hold any hope for the long-term ture in which man has every expectation of achieving scientific rogress of dazzling possibilities and of so organizing his earthly xistence as to make the present seem prehistoric by comparison?

This is a challenge which must be faced. For my own part, I elieve the answer lies in the elucidation of the full implications f the Logos Theology as the crux of the Christian philosophy. his I ventured to mention in broad outline in my presidential ddress to this Conference last year, and I will not attempt to evelop the case further to-night. But the full theology will have o be thought through in modern terms if it is to find acceptance – and especially will it be necessary to drive home the fact that inality is the hallmark of Revelation. As in Art, the manifes- ation of Genius stands for all time and provides an eternal focus f Value. If Jesus Christ be the Logos manifest within human xperience, His Person must be the focus of human personality or all time. The only proviso is that the individual must relive ne experience and so find for himself that destiny for which he xists in time.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

By A. D. Ritchie, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Edinburgh University

AT the outset I ought to explain why this paper contains no useful recommendations or hopeful conclusions. I am endeavouring to speak from the point of view of the philosopher, whose rôle in society was described, once and for all, by Socrates in his parables of the Gadfly and the Midwife. When people are not taking the trouble to think the philosopher should irritate them into the process, and when they are thinking he should bring their thoughts to birth and if they are genuine introduce them as members of the intellectual commonwealth. The philosopher has, strictly speaking, no thoughts of his own; they come to him from all spheres of human activity, but specially from science, politics and religion. To practical problems the philosopher has no answer, because the proper answer is successful practice; he can do no more than display the alternatives for choice, and indicate obstacles and opportunities.

I cannot do better than begin by quoting a paragraph from an admirable small book published in 1949 by Professor H. A. Hodges, called *Christianity and the Modern World View*. He is pointing out that the Christian is in the peculiar position of living a double life, half in the ordinary world of material things and secular aims, half in another world.

> 'We Christians of to-day,' he says (p. 17), 'are living on both sides of the cleft. We are modern people, which means not merely that we live in this year and not five centuries ago, but also that we take an active part in the work and life of that society *whose mind is dominated by scientific ideas and whose living conditions are determined by industry*. But we are also Christians, members of an institution which stays in the organisms of present-day society like a foreign body, inheriting a tradition whose relevance to life is less and less obvious, and talking among ourselves a language unintelligible to the non-Christians who surround us. They know we are Christians, in the sense of knowing that we belong to this institution and talk this strange language, but they do not know what we mean by it, and for various reasons we are not making them see it. Our Christianity is not something which our non-Christian contemporaries have seen and rejected. They have never seen it. We have failed to make it visible to them in the first place. Or sometimes a few of them get a glimpse of it from afar, but find that they cannot understand what they see. Or they understand, or think they do, but yet fail to be interested. One hears of people saying that they see what we mean, but find it irrelevant or a bore.'

I wish to emphasize specially and comment on the clause I put italics, but should like also to expand the phrase 'scientific eas' to read 'ideas which at various times for various reasons ve been supposed to be scientific.'

Professor Hodges here states the predicament of the Christian nority in the world of to-day; for I am sure it is a minority, ough not necessarily a diminishing one, in a world dominated secular aims and beliefs. Many who are not completely minated by secularism are inclined to say: 'The trouble is that ristian belief is intellectually shaky and confused and quite un-entific, though of course Christianity is useful practically because makes people behave better.' That is to put things the wrong y round. I contend that Christians are far more securely based tellectually and far less divided in their views than secularists, nose many and conflicting 'isms' are masterpieces of confusion. he secularist, even if he does not 'think with his blood,' like the azis, fails to use effectively the organs with which God has pro-ded him. But whether the Christian Church (or Churches) can t successfully in the modern world or whether they can improve e behaviour of more than a very few is doubtful. The predica-ent of Christians to-day is like that of the prophet Jeremiah in s day; but they are more bewildered and less able to prophesy.

Before I put my case a few words of explanation about 'secu-rism' are needed. The terms 'secular' and 'secularist' are less kely to mislead than the related terms 'material' and 'material-t.' Moreover, any form of 'idealism' which denies the value and ality of the material world is open to the gravest suspicion. daism and Christianity (and Islam, which is derived from them) e the most materialistic of the great religions. The distinguish-g characters of the secularist are that he refuses to recognize any ort of experience outside everyday common experience derived rough the five senses; refuses to recognize any aims or satisfac-ons beyond social power and prestige and individual sensual njoyment; refuses to recognize the infinite, eternal or transcen-ent. The lowbrow secularist cannot see beyond the suburban reet, the cinema, the pub, the evening paper and the football ools. The highbrow secularist is even more myopic but has a pply of high-sounding language to conceal the fact.

This attitude is not new. Many who listened to Jesus in alilee were thinking only of the loaves and fishes. Jeroboam, ing of Israel, and Amaziah, High-priest at Bethel, were per-ectly content with their material prosperity and deaf to the warn-gs of Amos. True, they treated him with some courtesy and id not 'liquidate' him in twentieth-century fashion. What is new,

since the end of the seventeenth century, is the idea that secularism is intellectually respectable and vouched for by science. Previously it was supposed to be confined to the perverted and the illiterate. In ancient times practitioners of magic or witchcraft borrowed the prestige of religion; now they borrow the prestige of science. The Marxists, for instance, have magic spells to transform society and cast them in the name of science.

Christian faith, as I understand it, implies an attitude to and assertion about the universe as a whole; it starts with a cosmology. The Christian has to begin by saying, 'The whole universe is of such and such a character, whatever the details may be like.' In this sense of cosmology, science has none, because it is the very process of examining these details piecemeal. Piling detail upon detail or studying each in greater detail can never give you the whole of anything. The results of scientific work are expressed in abstractions, and no amount of abstraction or further refinement of abstraction can give you the concrete, the individual or experience itself. Christian faith is not concerned directly with details or abstractions.

The question whether the earth goes round the sun or the sun round the earth is a question of detail. The history of the question shows that the detailed observation at any stage is incomplete and further observation of detail may change the balance of evidence, so that what was the reasonable and scientific conclusion at one stage may be equally reasonably and scientifically rejected at another. But whichever way the question is answered about this or any other problem of locomotion of material bodies, it can make no fundamental difference to conclusions about the relations of man to God and man to man. These truisms apparently still need to be repeated, for only a few years ago a distinguished philosopher (who ought to have known better) said in a broadcast talk that there was no room for God in a Copernican universe, with the implication that there might be room in a Ptolemaic one.

The whole universe can be considered under the terms Nature, Man and God. The natural sciences are concerned with the relations of man and nature only, not even nature as such; for we are acquainted with the natural world only as it is related to us. The man of science uses many ingenious technical dodges so as to frame his conclusion in such a way as to leave man, including himself, out of the picture for the moment. If he forgets that they are dodges he is liable to fall into error. The characteristic error of the man of science who starts philosophising, as he often does without knowing it, is to forget the special, technical, abstract, fragmentary nature of his studies and to suppose that

ence can produce cosmology as something complete out of its n resources. As Whitehead pointed out, all the general ideas the nineteenth-century man of science, which he held as articles faith, have now been abandoned in principle — the universal ner, absolute conservation of matter and of energy, absolutely iversal causal law, and so on. While these general ideas are andoned all the special conclusions remain untouched or else ined and improved upon. Over and over again men have said, lieving they spoke in the name of science, 'We can now give sketch of everything, in outline at least, though of course we do t know all the details and some of our detailed conclusions may ed modifying.' On the contrary, the details have always been od enough; the general sketch simply was not there.

The Christian has nothing to fear from the secularist on the ellectual side, and can take all legitimate scientific ideas in s stride. Certain Christians of the fundamentalist type, Protestant or Roman, can be accused of narrow and arbitrary presuppositions, but granted these the rest of their argument is clear and m enough. The secularists are even narrower and more arbitrary, and muddled as well.

On the practical side the position of the Christian is not so ppy, because the whole organization and way of operation of e Churches was designed to deal with a human situation which is passed away or is rapidly passing, and with habits of thought hich belonged to the old situation. Here the key word in the assage quoted from Prof. Hodges is 'industry.' In the last two nturies large-scale industry with an elaborate scientifically controlled technique has developed, and with it large, complex and mplexly interdependent, but also unstable, rapidly changing man aggregations, of which previous ages only saw a few slight ticipations. Human society, human relations have changed and th them human needs and ways of thought. The origins of the ange are material; the effects are also spiritual.

A census of the population of Scotland was made in the middle the eighteenth century, before the industrial revolution. It ows that Edinburgh was the only town of any size, and that nall by modern standards. The population was spread pretty renly throughout the fertile areas, mostly in villages and in small wns of a few thousand inhabitants. We know that industry was en carried on in the household and by the family, and the tisans were scattered throughout the towns and villages. The llage was not then inhabited solely by farmers; and some of e townspeople would have some connection with farming; eople of all classes and occupations lived together. Most people

lived and died within a few miles of the place where they were born. Such culture as there was, was common culture, notwithstanding widespread illiteracy. In the countryside everybody knew everybody else personally, and even in the towns nearly everybody. The pattern of life in Scotland in 1750 followed the universal pattern found everywhere since the beginning of permanent settlement and agriculture, except for a few large capital cities and seaports. Under those conditions men lived in communities in the full sense; now community is hardly possible.

In such communities a man had no excuse for not knowing his duty to his neighbour, and it referred literally to the man who lived near and whom he knew personally. The man living at a distance he could know nothing about and do nothing for, except occasionally under unusual circumstances. Everyone had a naturally acquired understanding of the affairs of the whole community. The sufficient and necessary moral rules were the ancient ones well known to everybody. The sinner knew when he sinned, as did all his neighbours (even better). The saint was recognized as such, even if his example was little followed. There was plenty of wickedness in such communities; there was plenty of scope for it. For the same reason there was goodness too.

The Christian Church organized in parishes and congregations is fitted to work in the ancient community. The priest, minister or pastor can be the shepherd of his flock; he knows them and they him; they have common interests, common knowledge, common standards. They speak the same language. The moral problems follow the ancient pattern and are simple, directly personal and closely related to ordinary material life. There was no essential difference between Ecclefechan in 1750 and Capernaum in 30 A.D. Even those anomalies, London, Paris and New York, were one with Athens, Tyre and Nineveh.

There is now little left of community. People are rootless. The home is a place to sleep in; work is done elsewhere; food and amusement are sought somewhere else again. A quarter of waking life is spent jolting about between these various places, and no one has any time or place in which to live at all. Classes and occupations are segregated, and no one has any complete understanding of the meaning and function of his work. The countryside is inhabited solely by farmers (week-enders do not count) growing produce to be marketed elsewhere for what purpose they do not know. Colliers live in places inhabited solely by colliers; cotton workers in places inhabited solely by cotton workers; the middle classes in places inhabited solely by those with similar incomes. Hardly anyone knows more than the strict

nimum about the technique of the work he does (and how much is paid). What results it produces and why anybody pays him r it he does not know, but he is quite sure he is not being paid ough. It is possible to keep alive in a modern town through onomic or, rather, mechanical relations with others yet without mmunication with any living soul.

I have exaggerated in order to make clear a predominant and ly faintly opposed tendency, not yet complete but working itself t, first in Europe and North America, but now all over the brld. It cannot be checked by going backwards, only by going rwards with a deliberate purpose. This is no question of apitalism *versus* Socialism; the errors of the two systems are entical. Governments of all political complexions go the same ay, or, more precisely, are pushed.

Simple, stable, nearly self-sufficient communities based on nall-scale agriculture and industry require very little govern-ent or organization of any sort. (There was a time when the ws of Rome were comprised in Twelve Tables and every citizen uld see and understand them.) But large-scale industry and nse urban aggregations depending on world-wide exchange of mmodities require a great deal, and a mass of rules which are chnical and not moral in any obvious way. It is easy to see that moral reason underlies the rule 'Thou shalt not steal,' when eft deprives another man you know of reasonably expected nefits. It is not easy to find any corresponding reason under-ing the rule 'Thou shall not park thy car on the left-hand side the road on even days of the month.'

Our moral ideas have been based on direct personal dealings man with man. Most of the relationships of modern life are not this sort and are morally indifferent, or at least appear to be. ence many people acquire a purely prudential morality. The ew that theft is wrong gives way to the view that the prudent an only steals when it is safe to do so, and punishment appears the arbitrary act of authority. Thus the government of the .S.S.R. (the advance guard of twentieth-century civilization) as abolished the death penalty for murder and introduced it for e offence of pilfering goods from railway trucks.

The old moral evils sprang from direct personal malice or in-fference; it is clearly wrong to stab your neighbour because you ate him or let him starve on your doorstep because you cannot e bothered with him. Now our legal systems have to use the ea of culpable negligence in a manner that introduces the otion of collective responsibility; a difficult notion that ramifies

everywhere. The man who drives a car with ineffective brakes is culpably negligent even if nobody has been hurt, because he shares in the collective responsibility for road-safety. Is it culpable negligence for the designers of cars to ignore the fact that they are producing lethal weapons which cause more deaths than pneumonia?

Thanks to medical science the severe infections, which previously caused a high mortality in early life, can now be dealt with; this has produced new unforeseen consequences. One of these is that in a number of tropical countries population is now increasing much faster than their economic resources are expanding. In fact, world population as a whole is increasing faster than world food production, in spite of wars and all other disasters. At home another less acute problem has appeared. Medical science has been much less successful with the chronic diseases, the diseases of the elderly, and can only produce palliatives, often of an elaborate kind. The population of this country is now increasingly elderly and increasingly invalidish, and more and more of the technical skill of the medical profession and of our economic resources are being devoted to keeping alive chronic invalids. (Plato foresaw the problem and pronounced the harsh judgment — Kill or cure.) If these problems are not dealt with there will be negligence. Will it be culpable negligence? The problems are collective and have to be dealt with collectively; yet they cannot be dismissed as morally indifferent, for they are questions of life and death. But ancient moral rules and moral ideas are no help, for the situation is new. The Hippocratic oath defined once and for all the duties of the individual physician to the individual patient, but on these questions Hippocrates has nothing to say. Has the Christian anything to say either? Has he any insight not granted to pagan reason and good sense? Can the Church (any Church) speak effectively? The Vatican might, were it not badly compromised by past and recent indefensible claims, more particularly the claim to temporal power, never renounced. Those who claim the things that are Caesar's have to be content with the kingdom of this world and the glory thereof. Some Christians seem to be content with expressing pious horror at the wickedness of the world, protesting according to taste against drink, gambling, birth control, divorce, and other symptoms, but paying no attention to causes. If these protests were all that could be done, then those who dismiss Christianity as unintelligible or irrelevant would not be far wrong.

Christian teaching has been and can be effective through individual persons creating communities united in brotherly love.

there are any other means they are indirect and incidental. In e modern world few Christian bodies have so effectively wit-ssed to Christian truth and so conspicuously displayed the uits of the Spirit as the Quakers. One reason at least is that ey are actually what they profess to be — a Society of Friends. hey have gone far towards attaining the ideal of 'the priesthood all believers.' They have avoided the snares of political or iasi-political organization. They can do all this because they main a small body whose members are all known to one another, id therefore at a cost; at the cost of remaining a sect. A church at aims to be universal, to call all men, or even all men within me region, needs a more rigid framework, rules, discipline, a dy of professionals, and so on. And then it suffers the defects political organizations. Perhaps these defects are not neces-rily fatal and the risk has to be taken.

In conclusion, the Christian Church requires both Law and rophets. It requires its tradition, but that has to be interpreted terms of the contemporary situation and the needs of men in at situation. For this purpose it requires prophets; and to-day e prophetic voice is not heard or is indistinct. Could it be heard ove the clamour of false prophets and mechanical noises of the dustrial age?

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

By Professor C. A. Coulson, F.R.S., King's College, London

Introduction

RELATIVELY few scientists are philosophers. During the last hundred years, so significant for the development of the odern scientific habit of thought, there have been practically ne; even to-day, although their number is increasing, there are vious and distressing signs, whenever they speak, that no cognized philosophy of science has yet been devised. And when ey address themselves to problems of interest to the theologian the layman, such as the wider implications of modern cosmo-gical theories, there is plenty of evidence, as a recent popular ries of broadcasts showed, that they are very far from seeing ther the deeper significance of their own discoveries or the lations between their scientific ethos and other great beliefs that fect and stir the spirit of man.

This does not mean that contemporary science has nothing to contribute to that Christian Reformation which is our theme this week: in the reassessment and restatement about which we are thinking, a considerable attention must be paid to the scientists, muddled as their thinking often is. Did not the Master of Trinity, less than a year ago, write that

> 'There is too little about science in our histories, considering that science has been the chief factor in human affairs, and particularly English affairs, during the past 200 years'?

Remember that these are the words, not of a scientist but of a historian: and shortly I shall have occasion to remind you of some other words of a similar kind, also by a Cambridge historian.

But first a word of warning: science as she is most frequently portrayed to the general public bears little or no resemblance to science as she is understood and followed by the scientists themselves. To my mind it is one of the major cultural tragedies of these times that one result of the inchoate character of contemporary scientists has been the development of the pseudo-scientist, or the semi-scientist, whose official job is to make known to the many the discoveries of the few. No one who has had any experience with provincial newspapers, or with most of the national press, will deny that every possible attempt seems to be made by these people to prevent the serious discussion of scientific views and their genuine implications: rather is there the building up of some mysterious aura around any leading scientist whose work possesses news value. If you doubt this, think of the melodramatic way in which Einstein's recent theory was publicized. So the scientists are the High Priests of the New Order, even though their real beliefs and feelings are unknown to most of those who worship in their temple.

The Present Programme

It may help a little if I begin with a short outline of what I shall later expand in more detail. My intention, then, this morning is first to trace the schism which appears to exist between the Christian religion and certain aspects of scientific belief; second to show how these scientific beliefs have modified whole reaches of human behaviour — this will show us some of the inadequacies of a purely scientific view of life, inadequacies which I think are beginning to become recognized even among scientists; finally we shall be led to think of the future, and of the part that Christian apologetics may play in the great synthesis of thought, belief and knowledge which is our concern at this conference.

The Schism

I begin with the schism, or conflict, between traditional religious faith and the developing scientific interpretation of the world and man's place in it. This schism is fairly clear to us, and nearer still to the world outside us. But we shall not properly understand it till we recognize how recent it is. Trevelyan has reminded us that up till the times of the Stuarts everyone who thought seriously about the world was Christian of one kind or another, and William Temple has pointed out the significant fact that the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century took place almost completely within a Christian community. But there is more in it than that. For almost wherever we look among the early scientists, we find convinced Christians; and, moreover, Christians convinced that their enquiry into the universe around them was of a piece with their spiritual faith, so that, in the words of John Ray, the study of the physical world 'was a fit exercise for a Sabbath day.' There is no hint here of conflict, as Raven has said. When this same John Ray, an early member of the Royal Society and the founder of systematic botany and zoology, wrote *The Wisdom of God Manifested in The Works of Creation*, he quoted Cicero and the Bible with equal facility. Isaac Newton himself, following a long line of physicists which included Galileo and Copernicus, remained a convinced Christian all his life.

I have just mentioned the Royal Society. It was founded at this time (1645), and to its growth and importance much of the dissemination of knowledge, without which science cannot live, is due. Among its most influential members were John Wilkins and Seth Ward, both bishops; and John Wallis, mathematician and doctor of divinity, besides Robert Boyle and Christopher Wren, devout Churchmen. It is true that religious discussions as such were not permitted at its meetings. But any doubts regarding the relation between the Society and the Church were to be dispelled by its first historian, Sprat, who wrote:

> 'I do here in the beginning most sincerely declare that if this design (of a Royal Society) should in the least diminish the reverence that is due to the doctrine of Jesus Christ, it were so far from deserving protection that it ought to be abhorred by all the politic and prudent, as well as by the devout, part of Christendom.'

And so, you see, in those early days when, largely in England, the foundations of modern science were being laid, there was no sense of conflict with religious truth. It is important that we should recognize this, or we shall get our judgment out of balance. It is important, too, that we should recognize that the early tradition thus founded has never wholly been repudiated; that there

have always been men like Clerk Maxwell, Cavendish Professor at Cambridge and a devoted Christian even in the hey-day of Victorian determinism; that Dr. Hort, in the same year that he delivered the Hulsean Lectures on 'The Way, the Truth and the Life,' was an examiner in the Natural Sciences Tripos at Cambridge: and that in these latter days there are men like Eddington the Quaker, the Abbé Lemaître and Sir Edmund Whittaker.

Herbert Butterfield has said that

> 'the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century is the outstanding landmark in European history, outshining everything since the rise of Christianity and reducing the Renaissance and the Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements within the system of Mediaeval Christendom.'

This revolution was cradled in the Christian faith. How was it, then, that as it grew up the scientific movement was responsible for the growth of a good deal of non-Christian and even anti-Christian thought? We can see this most easily if we follow the three main lines along which science has developed — that is, the physical, the biological and the psychological.

In the field of physics, historically the first to develop, strict laws were found, with a universality that seemed to have no limits, and which appeared to govern all observable physical phenomena. As Laplace, the French mathematician, said in his Essay on Probability: if there were a wise and sufficiently industrious mathematician, solving all the equations of motion for every particle in the world, then 'nothing would be uncertain for him, the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes.' The world is a great machine; and, as for God, well, 'I have no need of that hypothesis.' The very momentum of discovery carried the discoverers into strange territory. Here is Leibnitz, another of the great mathematical physicists, saying that everything which took place in the mind and body of a man was as mechanical as what went on inside a watch.

Next there came development in biology. First there was Thomas Malthus, with his emphasis on the causes of population change; this was followed by Darwin and Huxley with their account of the development of new species; and so it went on, through vitamins, glands, hormones and genes, until the biological processes of the natural order are 'explained' and brought into control. The scientific work, of its kind, was sound enough. But its general effect was destructive of the old beliefs. Even the nursery rhymes cannot go unaffected:

> 'You do not twinkle, little star:
> Nor do we wonder what you are.'

e primrose by the river's brim is not just a yellow primrose : it a delicate, carefully balanced mechanism requiring potash, psphates and nitrogen in certain definite proportions, and a fit bject, not for a Sabbath day's study but for the laboratory, to if, by suitable cross-pollination, its colour can be changed.

And now there is psychology, with which I include the social iences. The old taboos are invaded, for man is an animal whose in right is to express himself : religion is an illusion, for which re is no future; ego and superego wage unceasing conflict in at would be man's soul, if he had one!

There is one factor that I see running through all this : it may summarized in one word : independence. Think of those three ands in the scientific movement, as I have attempted to describe em. The understanding of physical laws made man largely dependent of his physical environment. I suppose this indendence began with the discovery of fire and of the wheel, long, ng ago; but there is no doubt concerning its impressive growth the last two centuries. For we can travel round the world in ree or four days, our radio crowds the whole world into the ting-room; in large measure flood and wind and heat and cold ave us unaffected. So there is a change in our relationship with r environment. Once upon a time God sent His rain on the st and the unjust : now we delegate that responsibility to the roplane and the manufacturer of solid carbon dioxide crystals. rancis of Assisi claimed that no man was healthy who did not ve direct physical contact with Mother Earth, and that was why s followers were so often digging and toiling in the fields, coperating with God among the elemental forces of Nature. Toy none of us could support ourselves with the spade : most of s who live in great cities know nothing at first hand of such ntural relationships; and as for the sweat of brow that was proised to Adam and his heirs when they left the Garden of den, we are content that it shall be replaced by the petrol mes of some super-combine, which ploughs, harrows, sows and anures all in one great motion. Even the natural resources of e world are there to be 'exploited,' an operation largely financed y people who know nothing of the cycle and economy of nature.

The biological sciences have given us this show of independnce too. The other day I sprayed my tomatoes with a hormone at will make the blossom set quickly and render pollination uite unnecessary : it is quite practicable to get milk from virgin ows if the right chemical is injected : Russia has shown, in the st twenty years, that great herds of cattle may be built up, uickly and of the best stock, by means of artificial insemination,

the time and place being at our own disposal. There was a time when we spoke of children as God's gift — the Lord gave, and sometimes, taketh away. But now sixty per cent. of our population space their children as seems to them best, using contraceptive devices to make them independent of natural processes; and if children 'don't come,' we go to a clinic to find out why, and have it 'put right.' A claim has recently been made in America that we can determine the sex of an unborn child. This may or may not be true—probably it is not true; but the important factor is that no scientist is in any serious doubt but that it will be true some day. From the independence that he already has, man steps out to find even greater. As for the tree to eat of the fruit of which was not allowed, all that is ancient superstition from whose thraldom man is now delivered.

So also with the social sciences. Man and woman must be free from all constraint and taboo. A little while ago there was an account in the papers of the petition for divorce that was filed by a young wife whose husband had come home from the war paralysed below his waist and unable to continue normal physical relations. This was considered, by the woman and by the newspaper that I read, as sufficient ground for divorce. 'When will we learn,' the commentator said, 'that if a thing appears repellent to us, we cannot do it well? Why should this young and vigorous girl be tied to that man?' One could multiply illustrations of this almost indefinitely, but one more must suffice. A friend of mine recently went to America as visiting professor of social relations. He was discussing with the editor of a newspaper out there the scope of some articles that he was about to write for it, and he made the suggestion of one title: 'How to mend a marriage that is breaking.' The editor looked at him in surprise. 'That's no good,' he said; 'it might be interesting to you, but no one bothers about that sort of thing here: if a woman cannot make a man happy, there's no point in trying to patch it up: they'd better break it all off and start again with someone else.'

So there is independence — from the physical world, from the biological world and from the world of social constraint. With it comes the sense of power. This is written large in the scientific community. The largest chemical society — indeed, I believe it to be the largest scientific society in the world — is the American Chemical Society. Every letter, every journal, that I receive from them carries on the envelope, in large block letters: 'Science is power.' And the story of the last war, culminating in the episode at Hiroshima in 1945, is sufficient commentary on its truth. In case you should think that this blunt assertion by the American

emical Society is unique, let me remind you of Bernal's defi-ion of Science: 'Science,' he said, 'is the means of obtaining ractical mastery over nature by understanding it'—words which, owingly or unknowingly, are almost an exact echo of what ngels had said a century before.

How different this is from older interpretations of the function science! Kepler, to whom in the sixteenth and early seven-nth centuries we owe the first satisfactory description of the tion of the planets, insisted that 'the chief aim of all investiga-n of the external world should be to discover the rational order d harmony which has been impressed on it by God.' And lier still, in 1266, the Somerset Friar, Roger Bacon, wrote his *us Maius* in response to the request from a Pope (Clement IV) order to show that Natural Science, far from being a danger Christendom, was intended to

> 'assist the Church in her work of evangelizing mankind by leading the mind through scientific truth to the contemplation of the Creator.'

But now the emphasis has changed. The truth — scientific th — will not just make you free: it will give you the keys Heaven and Hell. Ye shall not be children of God: ye shall as very gods yourselves. This is the wedge, subtle and in-dious, which has now been driven between the functions of entific and religious truths.

adequacies of the present situation

Of course there is much that is good in this scientific tradition. ere is an elasticity of thought, the sloughing off of what is und to be out-moded and insufficient, a willingness to abandon d ideas for new ones when the circumstances require it, an timism and excitement that contrast oddly with the 'couldn't re less' attitude of the generality of people to-day. I have no tience with those, mostly Christians, who decry the scientific ccesses. For modern science is a splendid achievement. And nen I think of some of the qualities that have been essential to development — honesty, freedom to be influenced by experi-ents, lack of self-interest, patience, humility, co-operation—then say that the flowering of man's intellect shown thus in the field science is something for the glory both of God and of man. It certainly not something to be denied.

But it would be equally foolish to remain unaware, as many of r scientists do remain, of the inadequacies and naïvetés that it nceals. Think how the sense of independence has thrown the mphasis away from God on to man. 'Glory to man in the

highest, for man is the master of things' — Swinburne's doctrin is so devilishly near the truth. Here are some recent examples t show what I mean. In a recent series of broadcasts Geoffre Crowther, editor of the *Economist*, spoke of the greatest need fo our present Western civilization, and running through all thre of his lectures there was one insistent note: efficiency, production more efficiency; only by greater efficiency, more production, ca mankind recover its proper status. As I read those lectures, m mind went back to a sentence from a German newspaper of a fe years ago: 'The machine is our Saviour.' That was not meant a a blasphemy, but as a sober statement of faith. Yet what a chasm there is between that and the characteristic utterance of th Christian—'Our Father, . . . give us this day our daily bread.'

Something has been lost from the totality of man's experienc when men talk like this, or in those well-known words of White head as he reflected on the many-sided character of man's know ledge:

> 'Nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves the rose for its scent; the nightingale for its song; the sun for it radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address thei lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulatio on the excellence of the human mind.'

If one once lets the transcendental element in life be lost, im poverishment necessarily ensues. What is wrong is the failur to recognize that we have so far only asked the easy questions. I may be hard enough to make a hydrogen bomb, but that i child's play compared with the deeper mysteries of human destiny 'We shall sooner loose the bands of Orion than compass life an death in a formula.' All this is painfully clear to anyone who ha tried to write a letter to someone just bereaved. We are in dange of over-simplifying things. Power without purpose, independenc without responsibility, these are no fulfilment for mankind. Ther are inner compulsions by which a man lives, given to him fro beyond. As Rabelais has said: '*Science sans conscience n'es que ruine de l'Ame.*' Science without conscience leads only to th soul's destruction. That is why I am so shocked when John Dewe of the U.S.A. can say 'morality is an engineering issue,' or whe in the same country the Chairman of the National Conference o Christians and Jews can write: 'If 600 scientists working togethe could produce the atomic bomb, then 600 scientists could be pu to work on the job of inter-group hatreds.' If there were time, believe one could show that this kind of scientific humanism lead straight to the horrors of Buchenwald and the inhumanities of th Kremlin.

For science is but a means to an end: and it is at our peril, always, that we confound the two. Power must be for a purpose, to fulfil some pattern, large enough to command man's whole allegiance. Without that purpose science will grow rotten. How clearly this was brought out in the recent inquisition into the African ground-nuts scheme! Enormous tractors were there, and all the other implements of modern scientific agriculture. What was lacking was not science — at least in the conventional meaning of that term — but a deeper sense of the relatedness of all things, geological, geographical and human. The wisest comment that I heard on the scheme epitomised all this: 'You can't monkey about with Nature like that.'

The present situation and the future

I cannot leave things there. For if I did you would conclude that there was little hope for the scientists, or from them. This is not true. There are signs — as yet small, but, unless I am much mistaken, quite definite — that scientists themselves are aware of some of the matters of which I have just spoken. I wonder if I may mention a few of them to you. But as I do so, do not read too much into them.

In the first place the era of disintegration is coming to an end. It was a necessary stage in our development that we should specialize more and more in one or other particular field; and that as a result we should act as if not only science and religion, but also each separate branch of science, was distinct, with an autonomy that could not be challenged. This is no longer true. I am a professor of theoretical physics, but in my research group we are studying problems on the incidence and explanation of cancer. More than this, in practically every physics department in British universities there is someone who would call himself a biophysicist, as though admitting that physics by itself was not enough. London University has recently instituted a Chair for the History and Philosophy of Science, and for his inaugural lecture Professor Dingle chose a title 'The Missing Factor in Science.'

In the physical sciences, too, some of the early confident optimisms are now discarded. No reputable physicist still accepts the hard and rigid determinism of Laplace and others. All those questions about the super-calculating mathematician are abandoned: we all realize how irrelevant they are since physics itself has pointed to an essential indeterminacy in all measurements that we make. There are many phenomena in which an apparently rigid law obtains, but there are others where this is assuredly not true, and no deterministic principle exists. Do not think that this

establishes free-will, for that, though often claimed, would b quite inaccurate. The situation is best summed up by the state ment: there are things we do not and cannot know sufficientl precisely to predict the future.

This means that the door is open for those conversations t begin, wherein the scientist and the theologian explore the no man's land that joins their two territories. If you ask me wher those conversations will begin, I can only give you my own feelin on the matter. But I should have said that the great and recen growth of a sense of social obligation, common to almost a scientists and voiced in books like the *Social Function of Scienc* and in organizations like the 'Atomic Scientists' Association' an the new section of the 'British Association,' provides a startin point. For it anticipates a recognition — surely the *sine qua no* of success — that science is not enough.

But I think we can go one stage further: almost all branche of science now recognize the inescapable intervention of the pe sonal element: many of them go beyond this and point to a supe personal element. Recent work by the psychologists on th significance of the guilt feeling goes a long way towards a syn thesis with much that is familiar to the Christian.

Yet there will always be one tension — and this penetrate deep to an essential dual character of man. I think it is a fa comment to say that part of the difficulty associated with th conflict at present being fought in Man's soul is that he sees in a the solid achievement of modern science a progression, or develop ment, which contrasts oddly with the affirmations and creda finalities of a religion that has been once-and-for-all revealed There is here a genuine difficulty for the scientist who tries t understand the religious position. The distinction that I a making is between a closed and an open subject. It is here that believe we have a part to play. For man's nature is always com posite of the immanent and the transcendent, and both must hav justice in the full life. It is one of our jobs to hold the balanc between these opposing tendencies, the brave, intrepid search in the unknown and the safe, sure hold upon what is firmly fixed. is our job, in Aristotle's phrase, to live eternally in the midst time. We must see that both these elements in man's total exper ence find a satisfying expression.

Charles Raven has put this in his own characteristic way. his introduction to the first Eddington Memorial lecture he said

> 'The attempt to interpret man's religion and man's science in ter not only mutually intelligible but also mutually interdependent, remai the great cultural task of our time, if we are to see any stable order.'

the Church cannot do this, it will always appear to the outer to be criminally unresponsive to the conditions of to-day, d he will reject it as obscurantist.

But I do not believe that this is necessary. Indeed, I believe t the time is approaching when we may commence a new synsis, comparable in quality though vastly larger in quantity than t of Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Science has much to ntribute to a new *Summa Theologiae*, a harmony of faith and son. I will go even further and say that only in that harmony ll we really understand our science. I am reminded of a inese Christian who once said that the Bible would never be ly understood until it had been translated into all languages. e analogy with science is quite simple. Not until the power nferred by our new knowledge has been recognized as God's t, enabling His children to grow up into full-grown men and men; not until man's new independence is seen to be but the erty of the children of God; not until man's patient observation the world around has led him on to awe and then to worship; until our science has shown us with what rich lustre the avens declare the glory of God and the firmament shows His ndiwork, not until then can our faith be as full as it is meant be, nor shall we see how all things are summed up in Christ, h things on earth and things in Heaven; and our hearts be so onished at the splendour of God's creation that they grasp rnity in a moment of time, and are lost in wonder, love and ise.

WHAT HAS CHRISTIANITY INHERITED FROM JUDAISM?

By Prof. S. H. Hooke, M.A., D.D., F.S.A.

WHEN Paul said to the Galatian Church, 'But the Jerusalem above is free, which is our mother,' he was stating a fact of history and of spiritual experience. In the deepest sense Christianity sprang from the womb of Judaism, and the birth was accompanied by birth-pangs whose effects might well be symbolized by the rending of the veil of the Jewish Temple. Francis Thompson has written:

> 'Till Time, the hidden root of Change, updries,
> Are Birth and Death inseparable on earth;
> For they are twain yet one, and Death is Birth.'

When Judaism blindly rejected its one hope and slew its Messiah, from that death a new thing came to birth, in Paul's phrase 'a new creation.' But, underneath all the wonder of the new creation lay the inescapable fact of a relationship that could not be denied or ignored. The relationship carried with it an inheritance, and it is the purpose of this paper to consider some aspects of this inheritance.

In the first days of the new movement it was hardly conscious of its own newness. All its original members were Jews, and the majority of them Galilean Jews. To their fellow-countrymen they appeared an heretical Jewish sect. In his address before Felix, Paul said: 'But I admit this to you, that according to the Way, which they call a party, so worship I my fathers' God, believing in all which is written in the Law and the Prophets, having a hope towards God, which they also accept themselves, that there is to be a resurrection both of just and unjust' (*Acts* xxiv, 14-15, Lake and Cadbury's tr.). We cannot be certain that Paul's exact words on this occasion have been preserved, but the speech which the author of *Acts* has put into his mouth is at least good evidence for the way in which the adherents of the new movement saw themselves reflected in the minds of their compatriots. They worshipped the same God, they accepted the authority of the same Scriptures, they were regular in attendance at the Temple, observed the ancestral feasts and fasts, and were sustained by the same hope of a resurrection and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. Hence when the admission of the Gentiles into

ne new community, and the irresistible logic of the new life whose ewness they were slow in realizing, brought about unforeseen anges in the pattern of their beliefs and practices, it was inevitble that much of the Jewish heritage should remain and become n integral part of the life of the Christian Church. How much of is heritage is essential to the very existence of Christianity, not be discarded without fatal loss, and how much must be regarded s a *damnosa hereditas*, is the question which this paper attempts discuss.

But there is a preliminary point of considerable importance nd considerable difficulty which must first be examined. It is the uestion of what and how much the early Church received directly rom Jesus. There is an influential movement of theological nought, very vigorous on the Continent, and not unrepresented n this country, which wholly rejects the life, personality, and eaching of the earthly Christ as in any way relevant to Catholic hristianity. This is partly, as Professor Donald Baillie has ointed out,[1] the result of a healthy swing of the pendulum away rom what might almost be called the cult of the historical Jesus, nd partly the result of an undue emphasis on the somewhat unertain findings of modern 'form-criticism.' But there are signs nat this movement has spent itself, and a renewed and welcome asistence is to be found in several recent books that it is vital for hristianity to hold fast to the fact that there is an essential nexus etween the life of the risen and glorified Lord and the earthly life f Jesus of Nazareth, the life in which the Incarnate Word took esh.

Hence we must not allow ourselves to be debarred from enuiring how far the teaching and experience of Jesus served as a ehicle for the transmission of essential elements in the Jewish eritage. In admitting the possibility of such transmission, howver, perhaps two reservations should be made. First, the transission may not always have been intentional: that is to say, Jesus ay not have intended that some of his sayings or replies to quesions were to have permanent and universal binding validity, even hough the Church subsequently attached such validity to them. his reservation also includes the factor of his human limitations n knowledge; so that while he may have seemed to accept the avidic authorship of the Psalms, or the Mosaic authorship of he Pentateuch, and the early Church may have claimed his uthority for such ascription of authorship, such transmission of

[1] *God was in Christ*, p. 34 *f*.

Jewish tradition need not carry binding authority for us to-day. The second reservation is that much of what was thus transmitted was also transformed. We have to do, not with such a process of transmission as we find in rabbinical discussion and interpretation of the *Torah*, where authority mainly rests on tradition, but with the transmission of elements in Jesus' Jewish heritage which had been transformed by passing through his experience. One of the most important aspects of the Jewish heritage was its wealth of images, or symbols — water, blood, fire, wine, sonship, kingship, and so forth. In the mind of Jesus, saturated with the images of the Old Testament, and in his living experience, all this underwent a vital transformation and was thus transmitted to the early Church. It may be relevant to quote here a passage from Dr. Farrer's recent book, *A Rebirth of Images*:

> 'If it is unreasonable to deny that the primary rebirth of images took place in the thought and action of Christ, it is equally unreasonable to suppose that it was so simply accomplished in him once and for all, as to require nothing but tranquil appropriation on the part of his disciples. The decisive act of transformation had taken place in him, but the whole furniture of images had to be touched and leavened by it, all had to be reborn with Christ.'

And again:

> 'Since, then, we must regard the Christian revolution as essentially a transformation of images, it is not reasonable to leave Christ himself out of the transforming work.' (*Op. cit.*, p. 15.)

This is undoubtedly the most important aspect of the direct transmission of the vital and enduring elements of the Hebrew-Jewish heritage to the Christian Church. But before we begin to discuss in greater detail some of the most important elements which the Church owes to its Hebrew-Jewish heritage, it may be helpful to take a brief survey of the general background and development of this heritage.

It may, very roughly, be considered as falling into three stages. First, it seems fairly certain that, whatever degree of importance may be attached to the early tradition of the Mosaic covenant at Sinai between Jahveh and Israel, during the period of settlement in Canaan and the early monarchy the religion of Israel was in the main assimilated to the general type of agricultural religion which held sway in Canaan, Syria, and Mesopotamia. The broad type of the ritual pattern which characterized this stage of Hebrew religion has been described in the volume entitled *Myth and Ritual*, and need not be repeated here. It had its priesthood, its sacrificial rituals, its cultic prophets, its great seasonal festivals,

s sacral kingship, and all the elements which were considered ecessary for the continued well-being of the community. It reated a wealth of images which passed into the permanent heri- ge of Hebrew religion.

Secondly, about the middle of the eighth century B.C., there rose a class of persons for whom no parallel can be found in the eligious development of any other people. They claimed to have ad a direct experience of God, unmediated by the ritual forms f their time. On the strength of this experience they presented o Israel a new conception of God, a personal God, with a moral haracter, whose power and authority were not limited by local oundaries, and whose purposes gave a meaning to history. The ffect of their activities during a period of about three hundred ears was the complete transformation and spiritualization of the ain elements of the ancient ritual pattern. The priesthood and ne sacrificial system remained and continued to function until the estruction of Jerusalem brought them to an end, but the whole dea of the relation between God and man which they expressed ad been transformed, together with all the images associated ith them. The *Epistle to the Hebrews*, of which more will be aid later, is a witness to the profound influence which this part f the Jewish heritage exercised upon the early Church.

Thirdly, when the prophetic movement appeared to have spent self and a state of things was reached which is expressed in a late ost-exilic psalm, 'We see not our signs: there is no more any rophet: neither is there any among us that knoweth how long' *Ps.* lxxiv, 9), another class of persons arose to whom the name of raditionalists might be given. By their labours the literature and raditions of Israel were collected and given an authoritative form. They set the laws of Israel in an historical framework designed o show that God had revealed himself to and through Israel, nd that the whole of human history from the Creation down to heir own time showed the unfolding of a divine purpose whose limax had not yet been reached but which was nevertheless cer- ain. As the hope of a political revival grew faint they turned with increasing devotion to that possession which no turns of poli- ical fortune could take from them, the *Torah*, eternal as God himself. To them is due the conception of the authority of the written word, replacing the authority of the prophetic oracle, 'thus saith the Lord.' From this was born the vast system of ewish hermeneutics, of which, though it was still in its infancy, esus was forced to say, 'Ye make the word of God of none effect hrough your tradition' (*Mt.* xv, 6).

During the development of this third stage of the religion of Israel, and particularly during the last two centuries B.C. and the first century A.D., two tendencies appeared which call for note in connection with our enquiry. The first was the growth of a new attitude toward the destiny of Israel and the hope of the Kingdom of God which found expression in a new form of literature, generally known as Apocalyptic, of which the book of *Daniel* is the principal representative in the Old Testament. While the apocalyptic writers developed the prophetic interpretation of history as the sphere of divine activity, they may be said to have traditionalized it by forcing history into a deterministic scheme of periods, fixed beforehand by God, and revealed in visions to the seer whose personality is veiled behind a pseudonym. One very important aspect of Apocalyptic, and one which specially concerns us here, is the concentration of all the accumulated wealth of Hebrew and Jewish symbolism into its picture of God's final activity bringing in the consummation of history.

Side by side with this development a parallel tendency appeared, due no doubt to Greek influence, and specially associated with the name of Philo of Alexandria. In his work the difficulties which the traditional view of the Scriptures literally interpreted was already causing, were met by an extreme development of the allegorical method of interpretation. The Rabbis were familiar with the method and often used it, but Philo transformed the whole of Hebrew history in its minutest details into an intricate and subtle system of symbols, representing the interplay of spiritual powers, good and evil, shaping the course of human destiny. The influence of his thought on early Christian theology, especially on the school of Alexandria, was very great.

We have, then, derived from these three stages of development, the following main elements of the Hebrew-Jewish heritage whose influence, direct or indirect, upon the origin and development of Christianity must be considered:

(i) Certain fundamental apprehensions and intuitions which underlie the ritual activities carried out by the community or by sacral persons on behalf of the community. In these are expressed by means of images various ways of apprehending the relation between man and that to which he gives the name of God, a name which, at this stage, is simply a convenient term covering all kinds of manifestations of life and power which man seeks to control, appease, or enter into some kind of satisfactory relation with. The difficulty with which some of these ritual practices were eradicated or transformed, in spite of the

long-continued prophetic protest, might well be taken as an indication that they represented some profound if unconscious and mistakenly expressed sense of man's place in the Universe. It is noteworthy that in the only great New Testament apocalyptic book, all the vital images characteristic of this stage of religious development — creation, kingship, the sacrificial victim, the dragon-combat — the sacred marriage — appear transformed, glorious, and eternal.[2]

(ii) The most important and creative element in our Hebrew-Jewish heritage takes its rise in the period of the prophetic protest, that is, from the middle of the eighth century to the end of the sixth century B.C. The existence of the prophet as a cultural phenomenon, and the psychological characteristics of ecstatic prophecy, are far older than the beginnings of Hebrew history, but with the prophets of Israel something new appeared, something which had power to transform the images of which we have spoken above, and to purge a religion, which was in their time largely an agricultural fertility cult, of most of its grosser features. This new thing was a conception of a holy and righteous God, full of mercy and long-suffering, a forgiving God, the Father of his people, unchangeable in faithfulness. This conception of God passed directly from Judaism into Christianity, in the first place through the experience of Jesus, and secondly through the faith and experience of the early Christian community. Inseparable from this was the conviction that the whole of human history was under the control of God, that nothing happened by chance, and that every event was part of a divine purpose whose consummation was both certain and near at hand. This view of the meaning of history also passed over from Judaism into Christianity, determining the nature of early Christian eschatology, of which more will be said later. A third important contribution from this stage was the appearance in the early Church of the prophetic gift upon whose value for the life of the Christian community Paul laid so much stress.

(iii) The third stage of the development of the religion of Israel made its own characteristic contribution to the new movement. When Paul asked, 'Of what use is it, then, to be a Jew?' he answered his own question by saying, 'chiefly because the Jews had the words of God entrusted to them.'[3] The work of the post-exilic scholars had made the Jews the people of a book.

[2] *cf. The Labyrinth*, pp. 227 *ff.*

[3] *Rom.* iii, 1 (R. Knox's tr.).

In addition to giving Hebrew tradition its final and authoritative form, the scholars of the third century B.C. had made the book available to Hellenistic Jews in the form of the Greek version of the Old Testament known as the Septuagint, a gift which they afterwards bitterly regretted. This Greek version, which contained a number of books which Palestinian rabbinical schools had never admitted into the category of books which 'defiled the hands,' became at once the sacred book of the new community. Indeed, some of the early apologists, *e.g.* Barnabas, denied to the Jews any right to their own book. The collections of proof-texts, known as *Testimonia*, of which the best-known is Cyprian's *Testimonia*, show us how the early Church used the book. In the first place the Old Testament was ransacked for texts which might prove that anything relating to Jesus was already foretold in it; in the second place texts were similarly selected, by no means a difficult task, to prove that the Jews had always been rebels and apostates, by the showing of their own prophets, and had forfeited all right to the covenant and the promises of God. In direct connection with this inheritance of the sacred book must be mentioned the modes of its interpretation. Three aspects of this element of the Jewish heritage call for special note. First there is the way in which Jesus used the Old Testament. In the main this is wholly his own. Very rarely he employs the rabbinical method, as an example of which, perhaps, may be adduced his use of Ps. 110 in dealing with the Pharisees' belief that the Messiah must be the Son of David. But in general his interpretation of the Old Testament, and his application of it to his own problems, is new, profoundly spiritual, and free from insistence on the authority of the letter of scripture. Secondly, in the case of Paul, while, as we might expect from his rabbinical training, he often makes use of rabbinical methods of exegesis, yet much more often it is the mind of Jesus which we can discern in his use of the Old Testament. Thirdly, the allegorical method, inherited mainly from Philo, and occasionally used by Paul, was widely used by the early Fathers and became an accepted method of interpretation. Origen, in his well-known classification of Christians into somatic, psychic, and pneumatic tyes, regards the psychic type who resort to the allegorical meaning of scripture, as being on a higher plane than the somatic who rely only on the literal and historical meaning of scripture, but below the pneumatic whose interpretation is entirely spiritual. In addition to the sacred book and the methods of its exegesis, the Church received from its Jewish heritage one element of

very doubtful value, namely, the doctrine of verbal inspiration of the scriptures. It was largely due to the influence of the famous Rabbi Akiba in the beginning of the second century A.D. that this belief came to dominate the rabbinical interpretation of the *Torah*. Akiba held that 'in a book of divine revelation no smallest peculiarity of expression or even of spelling is accidental or devoid of significance, and evolved certain new hermeneutic rules for the discovery of the meaning thus suggested by the letter' (G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, i, 88). In spite of Paul's warning, 'the letter killeth,' this disastrous element of the Jewish inheritance entered early into the Church's interpretation of scripture, and has never wholly disappeared.

The last inheritance from this third stage of development of Israel's religion to be dealt with here is the most controversial and in some respects the most important. It is the eschatological, and in the narrower sense, the apocalyptic, view of human destiny. Concerning the derivation of the early Church's eschatology there can be no question. It is one of the most characteristic features of the Jewish legacy. With regard to its importance, a quotation from Professor Butterfield's recent book, *Christianity and History*, is relevant:

> 'So far as I can see, the apocalyptic thought that emerged before the opening of the Christian era, and the turn to the kind of speculation which we call eschatological, are in a certain sense a continuation of the same story — a further phase of the search for an intepretation of history which would embrace catastrophe itself and transcend the immediate spectacle of tragedy. Altogether we have here the greatest and most deliberate attempts ever made to wrestle with destiny and interpret history and discover meaning in the human drama; above all, to grapple with the moral difficulties that history presents to the religious mind. The revelation appears not always to have been granted to the ancient Hebrews until there had been a great struggle to achieve the truth. (*Op. cit.*, p. 2.)

The subject is much too large to be dealt with adequately within the limits of a short paper, and only a few of the main issues involved can be touched on here. The first question, concerning which there is a considerable difference of opinion still even among ourselves, is, what was the nature of Jesus' eschatology? The school of thought represented by that well-known book, *The Lord of Thought*, has still many adherents. I think it is not unfair to say that in the main it rejects practically all the apocalyptic sayings of Jesus as unauthentic, representing rather the mind of the early Church than the mind of Jesus. As against this may be cited the judicious words of the late Canon Streeter: after admitting that the Gospel evidence shows that a tendency was at work at a

very early date in the Church to emphasize and even create sayings of our Lord of the catastrophic apocalyptic type, he goes on to say:

> 'The argument, however, must not be pushed to the length of entirely eliminating the Apocalyptic element from the authentic teaching of our Lord. The beliefs of the early Church may have modified and did modify the records of His utterances, but it is too great a paradox to maintain that what was so central in the belief of the primitive Church was not present, at least in germ, in what the Master taught.' (*Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, p. 433.)

Hence, without embarking on a discussion of how much of the apocalyptic material in the Synoptic Gospels may be accepted as the authentic teaching of Jesus, a general acceptance of the following points may perhaps be assumed:

(*a*) While accepting the Kingdom of God as a present and eternal reality, Jesus also envisaged it as a decisive event in the immediate future to be brought about by the act of God.

(*b*) Jesus attached apocalyptic significance to the title Son of Man, carrying Messianic implications.[4] He regarded the 'coming of the Son of Man' as inseparably connected with the coming of the Kingdom. It is impossible to reject the authenticity of the final declaration before the High Priest (*Mk.* xv, 62).

(*c*) Jesus was brought by his experience to accept and declare a wholly new and revolutionary element in Jewish apocalyptic — the will of God that the Messiah should die and rise again.

These fundamental elements in an eschatology which was wholly Jewish in character, together with the central fact that Messiah had actually died and risen again, passed into the heritage of the early Church, there to acquire changing forms and shifting emphasis with the lapse of time, and it is not the task of this paper to follow these changes. But it may at least be said that from Jewish eschatology, transformed in the mind and by the experience of Jesus, Christianity has inherited a moral interpretation of history and of human destiny, a sense of the profound moral crisis arising from the antinomy between the 'present age' and the 'age to come,' and a conviction that God will not rest until the antinomy has been resolved and creation has been redeemed.

The form in which the Church received and has continued to hold the belief in resurrection was, and has remained, Jewish. The

[4] This must not be taken as excluding other implications of the title: cf. *The Kingdom of God in the Experience of Jesus*, pp. 59-63.

Professor H. Wheeler Robinson has well remarked, in this nection:

'It is a life on earth, however new its conditions, and it is a resurrection-life, involving the restoration of the dead body. This form of belief is seen to have been inevitable, once we have grasped the Hebrew idea of personality; a resurrection of the body was the only form of triumph over death which Hebrew psychology could conceive for those actually dead. Even St. Paul shrinks from the thought of bodiless existence.' (*Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament*, p. 101-2).

e Greek doctrine of immortality, which finds its first Jewish pression in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, and which conceives of an mortality of the soul apart from the body, does not occur in the w Testament, nor in the Creeds. Even the Alexandrian thers appear to assume the identity of the 'spiritual body' ken of by St. Paul with the earthly body, without, however, plaining the nature of the identity. The permanent value of this ment of the Jewish heritage is, to say the least, open to ques-n, and the Fourth Gospel seems to represent an attempt to re-erpret early Christian eschatology, and especially the Parousia pectation, in such a way as to remove some of its less desirable pects.

Before bringing this very inadequate paper to a close, some-ng must be said about the bearing of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* our subject. We have already referred to the great transforma-n of images which took place through the experience and action Jesus and was inherited by the early Church. The *Epistle to Hebrews* is a notable example of this process at work. Under Jewish economy, while the prophet represented the possibility an immediate relation with God, based on personal experience d unmediated by ritual, the institution of the priesthood and existence of an elaborate system of sacrificial ritual represented ther conception of the way in which the relations between the mmunity and God must be maintained. The author of the great atise to which we have referred undertook to present a majestic rument in which was set forth the completeness with which the nsformation of images had been accomplished in Christ. He s the one true priest whose intercessory and sacrificial work was rnally valid; he was the one true victim whose offering could ver be repeated, and by whom the work of redemption and nement had been accomplished once and for all. All the details the tabernacle, the priesthood, and the sacrifices, were shown have been the shadows of the perfect heavenly order which had en established in and by Christ. But, largely no doubt through influence of this treatise, the conception of the Christian

ministry and of the sacraments of the Church came to be dominated by this element of the Jewish heritage. Paul's charismatic ministry was replaced by a sacrificing priesthood, and the primitive eucharist became a sacrificial ritual, a dramatic re-enactment of the one Sacrifice, once offered; even the garments of the officiating priest were no doubt intended to represent the garments of the Jewish High Priest, although their form in later times came to be derived from other and non-Jewish sources.

This element of the Jewish heritage, deeply embedded as it is in Christian tradition, is nevertheless one concerning whose value widely differing opinions have been and still are held among Christians, perpetuating the age-long controversy between priest and prophet, a controversy which might be regarded as yet another element of the Hebrew-Jewish heritage. Time will not allow of further discussion of many other points arising from this fertile subject, but it may not be unprofitable to conclude with St. Paul's words of warning to us Gentiles:

> 'Remember, in thy mood of boastfulness, that thou owest life to the root, not the root to thee. Branches were cut away, thou wilt tell me so that I might be grafted in. True enough, but it was for want of faith that they were cut away, and it is only faith that keeps thee where thou art; thou hast no reason for pride, rather for fear; God was unforgiving with the branches that were native to the tree, what if he should find occasion to be unforgiving with thee too?' (*Rom.* xi, 18-21, R. Knox tr.)

HE RELIGION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT WRITERS

AN ESSAY IN RESTATEMENT

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I PROPOSE to narrow down this subject to the Kerygmatic Preaching of the Apostolic Church. The relation between the eaching of the Apostolic Church and the Preaching of Jesus rist will not be considered. Instead, we shall confine ourselves hese two questions:

(1) What was the content of the preaching of the Apostolic Church? and

(2) In what form ought we to present this Preaching to-day?

The New Testament does not, of course, contain an official creed mulated in set terms, but it is possible to reconstruct, with a h degree of probability, the pattern of the main recurring mes of the early preaching. Since this is a commonplace of w Testament scholarship,[1] I shall pass over the evidence and te only the conclusions. In summary form, the kerygma or aching of the Apostolic Church was as follows:

(1) The prophecies of the Old Testament are in process of fulfilment.
(2) The Messiah has come in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.
(3) He was crucified.
(4) He was buried.
(5) God raised him from the dead.
(6) He has been exalted to the right hand of God.
(7) The promised gift of the Holy Spirit has been given.
(8) It is Jesus the Messiah who has been appointed by God to judge the world.
(9) Therefore receive Baptism into the name of Jesus.[2]

These are, of course, only the bare bones of the Apostolic ygma: they represent in a condensed form passages from the

[1] cf., among many others, C. H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and its velopments* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1936); A. M. Hunter, *Paul and his Pre-essors* (Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1940); O. Cullmann, *Les Premières nfessions de foi Chrétiennes*, 2nd ed. (Presses Universitaires de France, 8); and J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (Longmans, 1950), chapters

[2] These articles will be found distributed among such New Testament sages as the following: *Acts* ii, 14-39, iii, 13-26, x, 36-43, xiii, 17-41; *nans* i, 1-5; *I Cor.* xv, 1-8; *I Pet.* iii, 17-iv, 7.

Epistles and the *Acts* which are themselves summaries, reflec tions or reconstructions of the original kerygmatic preaching o the Apostles. Yet even if we could hear the original kerygmati sermons from the lips of St. Peter or St. Paul, we should not b hearing the whole content of the Theology of the New Testamen writers. The intention of Jesus was not to found a new Church but to revivify and to perfect the old nation-church of Israel The first Christians, the followers of the Way, considered them selves to be the true Israel, as opposed to Israel after the flesh Accordingly they incorporated into Christianity a great deal o Jewish teaching about God and morality. It is sometimes allege that to the early Christians morality was merely incidental. Th error is due to a failure to recognize the distinction which exis between what is peculiar to Christianity and what is essential t Christianity; it is therefore falsely argued that because morali is not peculiar to Christianity it is therefore not essential. In poi of fact the New Testament contains not only theological procla mation, but ethical teaching expressed in a similar standar pattern.[5] The phrases which are typical of this ethical teachin occur as early as *I Thess.* (iv, 1-8), where St. Paul exhorts h converts to live according to the manner of life in which he ha instructed them during the three weeks (if we can accept th natural interpretation of *Acts* xvii) which he had spent in the midst. At the end of this chapter (*I Thess.* iv) St. Paul presen us with an eschatological passage which to most modern ears singularly unattractive. There is of course nothing unattractiv about eschatology as such; no theological system which lacks a eschatology can be satisfying or complete: but the particular typ of eschatology which we find in *I Thess.* iv, *I Cor.* xv, 50-5 *II Pet.* iii, 8-13, etc., is repulsive to most of us. I am not mai taining for the moment that, because most of us dislike it, it therefore wrong. *I Thess.* iv is typical of Apostolic Theology this respect: however much we may try to do so, we are unab to eliminate from the Theology of the Apostolic Church either i morality or its frequently crude eschatology. It is of course ope to us to reject these eschatological crudities if we believe that v

[3] *Mk.* iii, 13-16.

[4] *Gal.* iv, 21-31; *Phil.* iii, 2-3. cf. *Sanctuary and Sacrifice in the Chur of the New Testament,* by C. F. D. Moule (*Journal of Theological Studi* April, 1950).

[5] *Romans* xii and xiii; *Eph.* iv, 25-32, v, 1-vi, 20; *Col.* iii, 1-iv, 1; *I P* ii, 1-iii, 18, etc. cf. M. Dibelius, *A Fresh Approach to the N.T. and Ea Christian Literature* (Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1936); A. M. Hunter, *op. ci* Bishop Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Catechism* (C.U.P., 1940); E. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (Macmillan, 1947), Essay II.

justified in so doing; but we must admit that in rejecting n we are rejecting part of the teaching of the Church of the postolic age.

Professor Rudolf Bultmann of Marburg has recently pro- ed that the teaching of the New Testament ought to be sub- ed to 'demythologisation' (*Entmytholosierung*). The pre- tation of this thesis was the most striking event in German logical thought during the 1940's.

The problem,[6] according to Bultmann, is that the New Testa- nt is based upon a mythical conception of the Universe: the ee-storey theory of heaven, earth and the underworld is pre- posed; and the middle storey, the earth in which we dwell, hought of as the scene of the activity of supernatural forces, God and His angels and of Satan and his demons. Further, presentation of the Saving Acts of God (Heilsgeschchen) ch forms the content of the New Testament preaching, dove- s into the mythical conception of the Universe. We are told, nythological language, that when the times were fulfilled God t His Son, a pre-existent divine Being, Who appeared on th as a man. His death on the cross, which He suffered as a ner, procured expiation for the sins of men. His resurrection he beginning of the cosmic catastrophe, etc. All this, says ltmann, is mythological language derived from Apocalyptic l Gnostic sources, and is therefore incredible for modern men. s senseless to expect us to believe in the mythical conception he Universe, which is not specifically Christian, but represents thought of a byegone age not yet moulded by natural science. any case, it is impossible to adopt a conception of the Universe an act of will; we cannot thus step out of the age in which we e. It is true that we are able to modify our view upon particular nts, but to accept the conception of the Universe embodied in New Testament would be an impossible *sacrificium intellectus* those who live in a world of electric light, wireless, modern dicine and all the achievements of applied science. Neither terialists nor idealists can accept a physical resurrection.

After this ruthless statement of the problem Bultmann sets nself the task of finding a solution. He will adopt no policy picking and choosing; it is useless merely to reject the Virgin th or the physical Ascension: 'The mythical conception of the iverse can only be accepted or rejected as a whole.'[7] It is not

[6] As stated in *Kerygma und Mythos*, a collection of essays edited by Dr. W. Bartsch (Reich & Heidrich, Hamburg, 1948). This work will be re- ed to as *K.u.M.*

[7] *K.u.M.*, p. 22.

a question of cutting out part, but of transforming the whole. The older Liberals used the nutcrackers of criticism in order to free the kernel of religious truth from the shell of mythology: Bultmann hopes that his *Entmythologisierung* will prove to be a philosopher's stone capable of turning into gold the whole nut, shell and all. He is able to entertain this hope because he believes that myth should be interpreted not cosmologically but anthropologically, or rather existentially. In other words, myth does not tell us more about the world in which we live, about the origin or the end of the physical universe and the supernatural powers of good and evil which strive for dominion, but about the life which we live in the world, about the insecurity of human life and the fact that man is not master of himself. Bultmann's treatment of the New Testament leaves us with something very similar to the existentialist philosophy of Heidegger[8]: we can hardly fail to sympathize with Oscar Cullmann's[9] suspicion that Bultmann has read existentialism into the New Testament instead of deriving it from the New Testament by fair exegesis. What distinguishes Bultmann from non-Christian existentialists is his contention that a true understanding of the human situation is made possible only by the Christian Faith. 'What divides the New Testament from philosophy, Christian faith from natural self-understanding, is this: the New Testament speaks and the Christian faith knows of an act of God which first renders possible devotion, faith, love and the true life of man.'[10]

It is in the light of this conviction that he understands the Incarnation and the Atonement. He suggests that the mythological language which the New Testament uses about Christ, for example the Gospel accounts of His pre-existence and Virgin birth, merely bring out the significance of His life, which is what God says to me through Him.

The significance of Christ's death is expounded in a similar manner. 'To believe in the cross of Christ,' we are told, 'does not mean to look to a mythical event which has been fulfilled apart from ourselves and our world . . . it means, to accept the cross of Christ as our own, to let ourselves be crucified with Christ.'[11] The cross is present in the sacraments, in the preaching of the Word and in the lives of those who believe in Him.[12]

[8] Bultmann himself, *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen* (1941), p. 49.
[9] *Christ et le Temps* (1947), p. 21.
[10] *K.u.M.*, p. 43
[11] *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[12] *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen, 1948), pp. 298-9.

Bultmann goes on to ask : ' Can the account of the resurrection Christ be anything other than the expression of the significance he cross? Does it mean anything else than this, that the death Jesus on the cross should not be regarded as the death of a n, but as God's verdict of acquittal on the world, the verdict God which, because it is God's verdict, robs death of its wer? ' [13]

Can we regard Bultmann's treatment of the New Testament satisfactory? It has one great advantage. It does give eology a real content : Bultmann can point to the actual exience in the life of men and women who are prepared to testify t as a result of embracing the Christian religion they are freed n the power of sin and frustration. It is made clear that the ristian religion is not a belief in something merely external to selves, but a life to be lived with our whole being which deands the allegiance of all our power of will and feeling and ught. It does full justice to that element of the truth which is ressed in the well-known lines :

> ' If Christ a thousand times in Bethlehem were born
> But is not born in thee, for thee He lived in vain.'

But the fatal weakness of Bultmann's attempted solution is : he has taken two things which are fundamentally different, ristian Theology and existentialist philosophy of the nonristian variety, and has tried to show that they are identical. notice that to allow oneself to be crucified with Christ is part what we call believing in the cross of Christ; but according to ltmann it is the whole. It is true that the Resurrection does, ong other things, help us to see the cross in its true light; but loes more than that. The Holy Ghost is not to be identified h ' the possibility of a new life which is made available in h,' as Bultmann [14] alleges : He is the ground of that possity. The Christian life is made possible to believers by Some outsides themselves, namely God. Bultmann often speaks as God were Himself part of the Christian life, as if the word od ' were a convenient symbol for an element wholly contained the life of believers. This, of course, is far from being his ention; but it is something very similar to this that he has ieved : in his praiseworthy attempt to make it clear that salvan does not consist solely in events outside ourselves he has ne to the opposite extreme, and virtually reduced salvation to a cess entirely contained within the Christian life, independent

[13] *K.u.M.*, pp. 47-8.
[14] *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen*, p. 46.

of that 'Something not ourselves which makes for righteousness' which was Matthew Arnold's idea of God. His theology reminds us of the words of Omar Kayyam:

> 'Heaven but a dream of unfulfilled desire,
> Hell but the shadow of a soul on fire.'

If we are not satisfied with Bultmann's attempt to reinterpret the Theology of the New Testament, we are faced with a choice: either we must attempt the task of reinterpretation upon other lines; or we must eschew reinterpretation altogether and retain the categories and the thought-forms which the New Testament itself employs. This second alternative, the retention of New Testament thought-forms, has been chosen by a large number of contemporary theologians, notably by Oscar Cullmann, who adopts what is in essentials the solution propounded in *II Peter* for the problem of the delay of the Parousia. 'Jesus,' he says, 'had not indeed expected that this delay would last more than a few decades; but this does not affect the essence of the Gospel hope.'[15] He maintains that the temporal element in the scheme of salvation is of the very essence of Christianity; the judgment according to him is inseparably bound up with futurity, and we must not explain it away, as Bultmann does, by saying that it consists in being 'permanently confronted with decision.' He criticizes the sects—in this country, for example, the British Israelites and the Jehovah's Witnesses—on the ground that they select a part only of the teaching of the New Testament. But on this score Cullmann himself is at least equally to blame. Most of the New Testament writers believed that the period destined to elapse between the two Advents of Christ, the Incarnation and the Judgment, would be a matter of years, most certainly not a matter of centuries or even of millenia. In point of fact the hope entertained by the majority of New Testament writers, the hope that the return of Christ was imminent, has not been fulfilled. The beliefs of the larger part of the New Testament writers have proved false in one respect which they themselves would have held to be essential. We must either 'translate' the majority view as Bultmann has attempted to do, I think unsuccessfully, or we must adopt a minority view, as Cullmann has done. Cullmann's theory is, of course, in principle not capable of formal refutation since so long as the world endures it is possible for it to be terminated by the second Advent of our Lord. But such expectations, right or wrong, fail to carry conviction in these days, and

[15] *Le Retour du Christ* (Delachaux & Niestlé, 3rd ed., 1948), p. 25.

Cullmann lays himself open to the *ad hominem* argument that he has accepted a single strand of New Testament teaching in preference to the teaching of the New Testament writers as a whole, a proceeding which he himself has subjected to criticism in the case of those whom he designates sectarians.

This of course is a palmary instance of Cullmann's refusal to 'translate' the thought-language of the New Testament. The task of translation has been attempted before, disastrously by the Gnostics, more successfully by the Fathers and by the Schoolmen. Many Christians feel that in this respect the Fathers erred, and no one would be so bold as to claim that they were uniformly successful. But the fact remains that if this task had not been attempted, and carried out with a high degree of success, by the Fathers in the early centuries of our era, then Christianity, if indeed it had survived at all, would have survived only as an obscure Judaistic sect distinguished mainly by its millenarian fancies. Humanly speaking, no Christianity worthy of the name would have survived if this challenge had not been faced in the patristic period and again in the Middle Ages by the great Scholastics. Humanly speaking, no Christianity worthy of the name will survive unless this task, already attempted once more, is in this present age once more carried through to its completion. The task of translation is perilous indeed; of this danger the Gnostics are a staring example. But if translation has its risks, refusal to translate carries with it the certainty of failure. If we trade with the talents which God has entrusted to our care, we must indeed be aware of the dangers which we shall encounter; but if we bury them in the earth, we shall most certainly lose them. We must always remember that the New Testament is the original, and that any interpretation which we may offer is, at best, a translation only. We must beware of excessive contemporaneity: extremes of fashion, like the old 'new look,' will soon become wholly *démodé*.

The necessity for translation has been stressed for many years by English Liberal Modernists. In this we have not been alone. Theologians of all ecclesiastical parties have carried out more 'translation' of this kind than is sometimes realized. We have recently received a powerful reinforcement in the person of Emil Brunner. There are passages in the first volume of his *Dogmatik*, published in 1946,[16] which read like extracts from *The Modern*

[16] I quote from Dr. Olive Wyon's translation, *The Christian Doctrine of God* (Lutterworth Library, Vol. XXXV, 1949).

Churchman. He insists that God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ can never be superseded:

> 'There are no interim stages between the revelation which has taken place in the story of Jesus and that revelation of the End, when faith will pass into sight, face to face.' [17]

This revelation is not to be identified with any of those presentations of Christian doctrine which contain it.

> 'The fact that the doctrine of the Church is not the revelation itself comes out, as we have seen, in the New Testament witness to Christ Himself in the variety of the New Testament or apostolic doctrines. John speaks a different language from Paul; Paul uses different terms from Matthew.' [18]
>
> 'Therefore even as Christian believers we use different language from the believers of other days; we say the same thing, but we express it differently.' [19]

For example, we employ

> 'Ideas such as person, responsibility, decision, community, act, etc. Such ideas are necessary aids for the theologian, if he is to make plain to himself and his contemporaries that which in earlier days was intelligible in other terms, apart from these ideas. Conversely, ideas which our forefathers in the Faith used to express the truth we hold in common, must be freshly translated by us, and be replaced by others, in order to make clear what they meant. Thus the ideas of "substance," "person" (in the Trinitarian sense) and "nature" played an absolutely decisive part in ancient theology, but for us they are scarcely intelligible, or, if used without commentary, lead to gross misunderstanding.' [20]

On the other hand,

> 'What is so often offered to us as "genuinely Biblical theology" is the very opposite: it is a stale, lifeless theology, which is unable to make the Gospel intelligible in the language of the day; it is a theology which raises the suspicion that the faith behind it has not been truly appropriated — in any case, it is a theology which is unable to fulfil its task. These theologians would like most of all to use the "language of Canaan," that is, they would really prefer not to translate the Bible at all. They do not want to do so because they are unable to make the message of the Bible fully their own.
>
> 'Certainly this demand for a "contemporary" presentation of Christian truth contains a danger — the danger of betrayal of the central concern of the Bible. That is the danger of every translation: *"Toute traduction est une trahison"* is a witty remark, but it has been put still more strongly in the phrase *"traduttore—traditore."* But to give up translation means to abandon the effort to make the message our own.' [21]

Brunner is not usually classed as a Liberal. He has been driven to use this language by his concern for Evangelism, the great concern which to-day faces all branches of the Church. We as Liberals should welcome Brunner's words, not because they seem to justify us or to renew our prestige, but because they help

[17] *op. cit.*, p. 67. [18] *op. cit.*, p. 68. [19] *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[20] *op. cit.*, p. 70. [21] *op. cit.*, p. 71.

wards the solution of a problem which far transcends all con-
derations of allegiance to ecclesiastical parties, the problem of
inning for Christ that great mass of our contemporaries who are
erishing like sheep without a shepherd. It is of primary import-
nce that this problem should be solved: whether the credit for
s solution goes to Liberals or to Traditionalists is, in compari-
n, a matter of no account.

I shall not upon this occasion consider the problem presented
us by the 'translation' of the doctrines of the Incarnation and
e Atonement, but I shall attempt to 'translate' the doctrine of
e Second Coming. If we omit this doctrine altogether, then our
aching is neither true to the New Testament nor satisfying to
ır contemporaries, since by so doing we omit the victory of
od's purpose for mankind. If, on the other hand, we retain, with
ullmann, the thought-forms of the New Testament, the result is
e same, since we present the doctrine in a wholly indigestible
rm which the majority of men are unable to assimilate. It is
ue that many will reject it in whatever form it may be put before
em. But we have betrayed the Gospel if we preach it in such a
anner that it does not constitute a 'live option' or an effective
allenge. If they reject with clenched fists a challenge which
ey understand but will not accept, then we at least have done
ır part. If, however, they reject with a shrug of the shoulders
aching which presents no challenge because it has for them
meaning, we have betrayed the Gospel.[22]

If we examine the theology of the Bible as a whole, we notice
at it speaks of two great events which took place at the begin-
ng, the Creation and the Fall, and of two great events destined
take place at the end of history, the Second Coming and the
dgment. It is possible to conceive of an *instans rationis* before
hich the Creation did not exist and after which it did exist. But
e Biblical narratives of the Creation are concerned with far more
an this. They recount not only the Creation of matter, which
ay have occurred in a single instant, but the organization of
atter, the birth of stars and planets, the development of vege-
ble and animal life, and the origin of the human race. This
id not take place in a flash, or even in a series of flashes cor-
sponding to the days of Creation, but over a period which must
e reckoned in millions of years. Indeed, it still continues.
hough we may not accept Mr. Hoyle's contention that matter is

[22] cf. Eduard Schweizer's article, 'Zur Interpretation des Kreuzes bei R.
ultmann' in *Aux Sources de la Tradition Chrétienne* (Delachaux et Niestlé,
euchâtel, 1950), p. 230.

even now being created *ex nihilo*,[23] we cannot deny the fact that the development is still proceeding. Slowly, but not imperceptibly, the Universe is changing. The coastlines of our land-masses are gradually changing. Some of our mountain systems are still being thrust upwards, and all are being modified by erosion. The distribution of terrestrial flora is in a state of flux. In the animal world mutations occur and change continues. Biologically and in other respects the human race is anything but stable. In a word, the development of the Universe, which in the picture-language of *Genesis* is represented as having achieved its completion at the beginning of time, still continues, and there is no reason to suppose that it is proceeding at a more leisurely rate than in previous eras. All this is of great significance for Biblical exegesis because it shows that *Genesis* portrays processes which have gone on ever since the beginning of time, and which still continue, by means of picture-language which speaks of flash-events occurring at the beginning of time.

The same applies to the Fall of Man. It has been said that this is the only Christian doctrine for which we possess contemporary empirical evidence. No Christian could accept the word 'only' in this context, but it remains true that the evidence for the sinfulness of all men is both empirical and contemporary. Christian theologians from the time of St. Paul have connected this fact with the story of Adam's fall recounted in *Genesis* iii. Here again a process which has continued throughout the history of mankind is represented in Biblical theology by an event which is dated at the very beginning of human history.

This understanding of the Creation and the Fall is so familiar and has been accepted so widely that we are inclined to fall into the error of supposing that it is what the Bible says. In point of fact the Bible says nothing of the kind. The Bible says that God made the world in six days. The generally accepted theory is not an exposition of the teaching of the Bible but a translation, or, in Bultmann's terminology, an *Entmytholosierung* of part of the Biblical doctrine. This interpretation of the Biblical doctrines of the Creation and of the Fall is widely accepted and is supported by the witness of palaeontology and of history; we stand upon firm ground because we are dealing with what has already happened. When, however, we attempt to apply to the two great events which the Bible places in the future, the Second Coming and the Judgment, the same principles of interpretation which

[23] F. Hoyle, *The Nature of the Universe* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1950), pp. 104-107.

have already been applied to the two great events which the Bible places in the past, the Creation and the Fall, we no longer stand upon such firm ground because we are dealing with events which are still in the future.

One thing we can say with complete assurance: the New Testament doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ does mean that God's purpose for mankind will be achieved. But an element of speculation inevitably enters in just so soon as we ask how and when it will be accomplished. I suggest that, like the Creation, it will not be a flash-event, that it will not occur in a moment of time, but that, again like the Creation, it is going on all the time. I do not maintain that it is automatic; it is due to what God is and does, and it depends upon our response to what God does in and through Jesus Christ. It is not to be identified with political or economic peace or progress, although poverty and war appear to turn men away from God towards sheer despair or the false hope offered by Communism. This turning towards God is spiritual; and political or economic progress, though not without their own intrinsic value, are, for the Christian, chiefly significant in so far as they create an atmosphere which is favourable to spiritual growth. There is no steady, even progress; in the spiritual life both of individuals and of communities we are able to discern an ebb-and-flow. There are no spiritual micrometers which can enable us to measure with precision the growth of the soul; it is not given to us to unravel the skein of human motives. But in spite of all this, it is possible to discern, in the lives of our fellow-men, if not of ourselves, that spiritual growth which I would identify with the coming of God's Kingdom. In the words of F. T. Palgrave:

> 'Where'er the gentle heart
> Finds courage from above;
> Where'er the heart forsook
> Warms with the breath of love;
> Where faith bids fear depart,
> City of God, thou art.
>
> Thou art where'er the proud
> In humbleness melts down;
> Where self itself yields up;
> Where martyrs win their crown;
> Where faithful souls possess
> Themselves in perfect peace.'

It is certain that the doctrine of the Second Coming means that God's purpose for mankind will be fulfilled. And I personally believe that for this doctrine, no less than for the doctrine of human sinfulness, we possess evidence which is both empirical and

contemporary, that we are able to witness the partial accomplishment of God's purpose for mankind in the lives of men and women round about us.

But I do not believe that God's purpose will be wholly accomplished in this life. We can see human personalities being built up in our midst. But a man at the moment of death is like a house of which the foundation only has been constructed. To parody the words of St. Paul, if in this life only we can grow nearer to God, then is our preaching vain. It seems impossible to make sense of this life except on the hypothesis that it is the preparation for something greater, that this world is the infants' class in God's school for souls.

In order to guard against misunderstanding, it is necessary to lay stress upon two points: progress in this life is neither easy nor painless, so there is no reason to suppose that it will be either easy or painless after death; and it is a fallacy to imagine that the importance of the decisions which we make here on earth is diminished on the supposition that progress continues hereafter; indeed, the importance of this earthly life is greatly increased if we believe that what we do here and now will continue to affect us beyond the grave.

I do not wish to imply that progress should be conceived on individualistic lines: we are members one of another. For this, if for no other reason, the process will not be complete for any until it is complete for all. The problem of universalism will not be raised at this juncture, but it remains true that the vision of God will not be complete for any until it is complete for all those who are finally to enjoy it, whether or no that company is to comprise all the members of the human race. In this sense there will be a final triumph just as there was an initial beginning. It is to this final triumph that the New Testament looks forward. It speaks of a catastrophic coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. I suggest that here also, as in the case of the doctrine of the Creation, restatement is imperative, and that we should look for a spiritual growth which will continue and will reach its consummation in another world than this.

It will be urged that I have only substituted one mythology for another. I claim no more: in the twentieth century, as in the first, we see through a glass darkly. But I also claim that the picture of continued spiritual growth which I have presented is more congenial to our contemporaries than the first-century picture of a catastrophic return of Jesus Christ to this earth, and that the challenge of the New Testament doctrine of the Second Coming can be presented more forcibly to the men of our generation by means of this provisional restatement.

THE PLACE OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

A paper by the Rev. Willard L. Sperry, M.A., D.D.,
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THE two words 'Jesus Christ' are not synonyms, however inseparable they may be in Christian thought and usage. The st word is the name of a man who lived a brief life in Palestine uring the first third of the first century of our era. The second ord is a description or definition of the nature and office of that storical person in universal terms. The first of these words mains constant down the centuries. The second has been by no eans constant and uniform. At the first Jesus was called the essiah, God's Anointed. The word cannot have had for the entile world the overtones which it might have had for the Jews ho refused to accept it as the truth of one who was repudiated by s own people. The Greek word *Christos* falls short of the wealth meaning in the antecedent term, 'Messiah.' Thereafter we have sus the Son of God, the *Kurios*, the *Logos*; each an attempt to terpret the meaning and nature of the historical Jesus for the entile world. Other usages have spoken of him as the Great igh Priest, the King, the Saviour, the Redeemer. Each of these condary words was drawn from the environing thought and culre of its day and presupposed general familiarity with the idea connoted.

Of the many secondary words which have been so employed in is connection, that of the *Logos* is in many ways the most adeuate. The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel has given it values for ristian piety, implied though not quoted in the Nicene Creed, d never duplicated by any other single term. Nevertheless, the ct remains that in our own time the *Logos* doctrine no longer peals to a system of thought generally known and widely cepted. Initial academic understanding of that doctrine is now stricted to those who are familiar with Platonism, Stoicism and eoplatonism. To the contemporary man in the street, whether itish or American, we have said less than nothing when we say at Jesus is the *Logos*. Instead of interpreting and irradiating e historical figure to whom the term alludes, we have merely rkened counsel by words without knowledge. The plain truth is at for most moderns it is the person of the historical Jesus who eps the idea of the *Logos* alive, not the doctrine of the *Logos* ich recovers and reanimates the Jesus of history. Our twentieth ntury lacks any similar, well-known and generally understood

term which shall say for our time what the ancient classical terms said in the attempt to universalize the nature and meaning of Jesus of Nazareth. In general may we say of any and all of these second terms that they are understood to intimate the way in which Jesus, in a classic sentence from the Old Testament, 'stands to the people for God-ward,' in various degrees up to the point of actual identity with Deity. The last word on this matter has been said in the final lovely paragraph of Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*:

> 'He comes to us as One unknown without a name, as of old, by the lakeside, He came to those who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: "Follow thou me!" and sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfil for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience Who He is.'[1]

Meanwhile we shall do well to hark back to Harnack's comment on Neoplatonism. That system had gathered to itself most of the mature spiritual insights of Greek philosophy and had elevated philosophy to the level of an indubitable religion. There is no need to labour that thesis in this company. Yet Neoplatonism failed to capture the imagination and devotion of the still surviving classical culture of the first centuries of our era. Such Neoplatonism as survived reappears in the form of Christian mysticism, mediated in the first instance through the so-called Dionysius the Areopagite. It failed to survive in its original non-Christian forms. We may say that it came too late in the day. It was a matured and perhaps too sophisticated faith, once removed from the freshness of an early world. The future at that time already belonged to the good news of the Gospel. But Harnack attributes the cultural failure of Neoplatonism to another and wholly different reason. He says that it could not point to some single historical individual as its founder, since most, if not all, of the enduring world religions have been able to look to some such single men as their several founders. We need not labour his thesis. The instances of Lutheranism, Calvinism, Wesleyanism, and the like are evidence in support of this thesis. The same is true of Buddhism, Taoism and Islam, as well as of Confucianism in so far as it may be called a religion rather than a code of ethics. Up to a point the devotion of the Jew to Moses as the giver of the Law is a further instance of the same proposition.

A religion which is to capture the imagination and devotion of all sorts and conditions of men must apparently recognize the

[1] Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. Tr. W. Montgomery. p. 401. (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1911.)

lidity and necessity of what Whitehead calls 'the principle of ncretion.' Its universals must come down from the stratosphere abstract thought and tabernacle with men in their flesh, presumly in the terms of a single human life. Therein lies the insight d the appeal of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel. In want of e capacity for such concretion the otherwise valid universals of religion linger and languish in the upper air of sophisticated ety.

Some of you will remember the series of articles which appeared the *Hibbert Journal* many years ago on *Jesus or Christ*, later llected and reprinted in a single volume. This issue was at that ne much to the front. Is the Christian religion, or should it empt to be, primarily the religion of Jesus, or has it been and ist it always be a religion about Jesus? The insistence that ristianity ought always to be in the first instance the religion of sus was a matured conviction arising from the hundred year old storical study of the Gospels, which was and still remains the ory of nineteenth-century Protestantism. Men realized, with sh force, that the theological reinterpretations of the life and nistry of Jesus had, over the centuries, departed so far from the iginal, that the 'simplicity which is in Christ' had often been st and even caricatured. Thus one of your English church hisrians has a picture of Jesus in his seamless robe and sandals, anding at the west door of Santa Sophia in Constantinople at e end of the sixth century, listening to the dizzy doctrinal definins of his person and natures announced at the east end of the urch and watching the priests offer him again upon the altar, the al and perpetual sacrifice. Every one of us, whatever his Christogy, has felt that discrepancy. It was both the moral and the eological uneasiness created by this discrepancy which gave to e nineteenth century quest for the historical Jesus its indubitably ligious passion. But of that quest Schweitzer goes on to say:

> 'The study of the life of Jesus has had a curious history. It set out in quest of the historical Jesus, believing that when it had found Him it could bring Him straight into our times as a Teacher and Saviour. It loosed the bands by which He had been riveted for centuries to the stony rocks of ecclesiastical doctrine, and rejoiced to see life and movement coming into the figure once more and the historical Jesus advancing, as it seemed, to meet it. But He does not stay; He passes by our time and returns to His own. What surprised and dismayed the theology of the last forty years was that, despite all forced and arbitrary interpretations, it could not keep Him in our time, but had to let Him go. He returned to His own time, not owing to the application of any historical ingenuity, but by the same inevitable necessity by which the liberated pendulum returns to its original position.'[2]

[2] *op. cit.*, p. 397

This baffling outcome of the historical study of the Gospels was not without its discouraging effect upon the whole movement. The late Professor James Hardy Ropes of our own Divinity Faculty in Harvard once said that there is nothing which needs to be known about Jesus that cannot be had by anyone who will read the Gospel of Mark in the King James version with open eyes. The catch in that deceptively simple statement lies in the last three words, 'with open eyes.' The intellectual discipline required in the act of taking off the coloured glasses with which, inevitably and in some form or other, all of us approach the Gospels has been a costly one. Having spent three years under Canon Streeter in that discipline and having sat in the fringes of Canon Sanday's historic seminar on the Synoptic Gospels in Christ Church and having caught from both of those great souls something of their concern for sincerity, I have never been able to unlearn or even wished to unlearn the lessons learned at their feet. To this day I still regard a willingness to let Jesus of Nazareth be himself at whatever cost to one's prior conventions and convictions an initial test of one's Christianity. To attempt to wrest him out of his times and his setting in the Gospels and to remake him nearer to one's own patterns of life is an act of violence to the facts and of either insensitiveness to fact or cavalier indifference to it. Scott's word to his reporters on the *Manchester Guardian*, 'Opinions are free, but facts are sacred,' is or ought to be true of the study of the Gospels.

However, the indubitable effect of the critical and historical study of the Gospels as summed up in Schweitzer's great work has been to present us with a problem that had not been anticipated. One found oneself saying of the Jesus of History what Elizabeth Barrett said to Robert Browning, 'Unlike are we, O princely heart, unlike.' I have been told by some of his friends that Canon Sanday was sobered and to a degree saddened at the end of his life by the realization that the newer theological issues within Christianity had moved away from the ground which he had staked out and defended with such learning and piety over his long life-time. The whole historical quest seemed to be in process of becoming a record of 'far off things and battles long ago.'

There is no doubt that for the last twenty-five or thirty years Christian thought has moved off into another direction. It may well be that biblical criticism up to that time had temporarily exhausted the subject. Aside from the *Formgeschichte* theory as to the literary structure of the Gospels there has been little novel or arresting work done in the field. The devout attention of

ristendom has again been turned from the Jesus of History to Christ of Theology. This was one of the consequences of the st World War. Most of the pioneer work in the critical study the Gospels had been done by German scholars. They had haps unwittingly identified their findings with the genius of rman *Kultur*, and when that *Kultur* went down in ruins in 1918, arried with it in its fall, at least in their own minds, much of best scholarship of the previous hundred years. To put it ntly, history had failed them, and since it had failed them re was little to be gained by further preoccupation with it. rl Barth's commentary on the *Romans* became the point of parture for a move in quite another direction. Since that day centre of theological interest has been the so-called dialectical ology, the now familiar movement known as neo-orthodoxy. th and Brunner remain on the Continent its two most conspicu- spokesmen. I suppose that Reinhold Niebuhr is, with certain ent reservations, its best-known advocate in the English-speak- world. He is, I assume, as well known with you as with us.

In American divinity schools and among professional theolo- ns neo-orthodoxy is still the most arresting of the various tems which claim our theological attention. I cannot, however, ape the stubborn conviction that it fails to capture the imagina- n and consent of the rank and file of English and American ristians. Its unqualified emphasis upon the grace of God and disparagement of human capacity for moral self-help somehow not fit your traditional semi-Pelagianism or our native prag- tism, which is still with us a survival of the pioneer ways of the ntier. Arresting and exciting as this new orthodoxy is, and no denies its almost electric quality, it is primarily a preoccupa- n of professional theologians. It is not an interpretation of the th of the laity, save a minority which has preserved inviolate four hundred years the Calvinist insistence upon the absolute vereignty of God and the moral impotence of man.

Nevertheless this whole movement, as against the historical dy of Christian origins, has for the moment the strategical ad- ntage of novelty. Those who are for ever looking in religion some new thing now turn in that direction. And in so far as all us, Englishmen and Americans as well as Germans, feel that mehow history has played us false and let us down, and that at moment there is rather little to be hoped for from history, we understand the neo-orthodox attempt to restate and reinter- t our religion in more credible terms. We can sympathize with motives and the methods of this neo-orthodoxy, even though may not subscribe to its particular systematic findings. Plainly

a wistful and reminiscent cult of the Jesus of history will not suffice for a living religion in our time.

Perhaps Christianity ought to have remained the religion of Jesus. The plain fact is that it has never done so. On this matter Josiah Royce, in lectures delivered at Oxford some years ago, said what is indubitably so:

> 'Historically speaking, Christianity has never appeared simply as the religion taught by the Master. It has always been an interpretation of the Master and of his religion in the light of some doctrine concerning his mission, and also concerning God, man, and man's salvation — a doctrine which, even in its simplest expressions, has always gone beyond what the Master is traditionally reported to have taught while he lived . . . Such an interpretation has always existed ever since there was any Christian religion at all.'[3]

Hence the inevitability of the succession of second terms which have been employed in the attempt to interpret the prior term 'Jesus.'

It is not as though the successive attempts to find an adequate and accurate second term represent some unique mental process on the part of Christians. When Jesus entered Jerusalem on Palm Sunday the multitudes asked, 'Who is this?' That is a question which men always ask when any striking figure comes on the scene. In the instance of Jesus the significance of the answer lies in the conviction that only the most universal word, connoting either a divine mission or a divine nature, can suffice.

Down the centuries there has been a recurring tendency to make the second term do duty for both terms, to the neglect of the first term. Orthodoxy has been so concerned to defend the doctrine of the divinity of Christ that it has often neglected the correlative humanity of Jesus. We must grant only the handful of disciples of the first generation could have known Christ after the flesh. But the fact remains that those who, therefore, could know him only after the Spirit were the more free to fashion him after their own heart's desire. It says much for what was from the outset felt to be the catholicity or the universality of Jesus that William Langland could say of him:

> I have seen him in silk
> In grey and in fur
> I have seen him singing
> But in rich robes
> With cap and oiled hair
> And cleanly clothed
> In a Friar's frock
> In Saint Francis' time
>
> I have seen him in russet,
> and in gilt armor, . . .
> in ragged weeds,
> often he walketh
> and his crown shaven,
> in black and Tartar silk.
> once was he found
> — but it is long ago.

[3] Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 25. (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1913.)

e process, however, had led to Docetism — the persuasion that humanity of Jesus was at best an insubstantial veil worn by rist. The Docetic strain has never died out of Christian theo- y. It was boldly and rather widely reaffirmed in the last century those who held that our religion had its origins in what is called Christ myth and that the figure of the historical Jesus was an ention of pious fancy created to give more substance to the th.

In certain quarters the myth theory has been widely held. As member it is Karl Marx's method of disposing of Christianity. ce Jesus never lived, there is no reason for taking seriously the gion attributed to him. It should be remembered that advocates the Christ myth theory were by no means all of them persons o wished to be rid of the challenge of the Gospels to the con- tions of their time. Many of them, and those the best of them, ught of themselves as the defenders of the faith. In Dean e's words they were 'trying to put the ark of God somewhere ere the Philistines could not get at it.'

They pointed out with good reason that many of the world's at philosophies have had their origins in myths, and that myths bably represent the most penetrating insights of the human hd. In particular these mythologists of the last century were mpted by two motives. First the critical study of the Gospels med to be a kind of moth and rust eating away the text. The ount of authentic material seemed to be steadily shrinking. mmiedel arrived at the conclusion that there were only a half- en reported sayings of Jesus which could be trusted as his *issima verba*. The matter having come to that pass, it seemed t to get our religion on to a more firm basis.

Even more to the point the advocates of the Christ myth were, he main, persons whose mental affinities were with philosophy ner than history. The historian is concerned with concrete facts, philosopher with abstract universals. The philosophical type mind, when turned to the New Testament, is more interested in Gospel of John and the Epistles than in the first three Gospels. orge Tyrrell cites one of his friends who did not like the Synop- Gospels; she said she found them 'dry.' The philosopher is ays impatient with the facts of history, preferring to let his id soar high over the world of concrete happenings in the atosphere of his universals.

We have just had a striking instance of this tendency of the losopher's mind in a very devout and moving book by George ntayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*. Santayana was rn a Catholic, but during his teaching years in Harvard and the

subsequent years he spent in England does not seem to have bee a practising Catholic. Now, at the end of his long life, and writ ing from a convent in Rome, he has given us this unexpecte work. It is from the theological standpoint devoutly Christian His thesis is as follows:

> 'Beneath the legendary figure of Jesus on earth, there is undoubtedl a theological and mystical figure of Christ the Son of God, the eterna Word of the Father — the idea of God in man . . . The critic can neve reach any historical conclusion about the historical Jesus, because almos everything we know about him or can reasonably suppose rests not o independent lay evidence about the person of Jesus, but on inference drawn from the existence of Christ in the minds of Christians . . . As i poetry, so in religion, the question whether the events described hav actually occurred is trivial and irrelevant . . . The spiritual value of th idea of Christ does not depend on its having been already realized in fac but on the depths to which it sounds the ultimate vocation of every livin being . . . This mystery is a poetic expression of the dawn of spirit i every reflective mind.'[4]

These words are an unequivocal account of the way in whic the philosophical mind rests the case for Christianity upon th second of the two terms 'Jesus Christ.'

Now the dialectical theology and neo-orthodoxy seem to me t be moving in the same direction. Their advocates would accep in theory the existence of the historical Jesus, but their emphasi is upon the eternal Christ. They need for their argument th prologue to the Fourth Gospel, and the accounts of the crucifixio and resurrection. But these are not historically conditioned o construed. They are part of a scheme quite apart from history. have been told, for instance, that in one of the classics of neo orthodoxy, which runs to a thousand pages, the Jesus of histor is mentioned only once. Karl Barth's insistence that the Word i not to be identified in any way with anything which Jesus said i reaffirmed by Brunner, who tells us in his *Theology of Crisis*:

> 'The Word of God in the Scriptures is as little to be identified with th words of the Scriptures as the Christ according to the flesh is to b identified with the Christ according to the spirit . . . The historica appearance of Jesus is not, as such, revelation . . . the so-called Historica Jesus is not as such the Christ.'

Indeed, Brunner goes on to make the amazing statement that Jesu is 'the human *incognito* of the Christ.'

One cannot read theological literature of this type without feel ing that it is in peril of fashioning one more myth theory of Christ This newest theology has a cosmic sweep which in the very natur of the case was denied the historical theology of the late nineteent

[4] George Santayana, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*. pp. 3, 4, 10, 104 173-4. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946.)

d early twentieth centuries. The historian, as historian, is forbidden too facile generalizations. He must isolate the past fact d, in so far as is possible, allow it to interpret itself. If he turns ilosopher, as theologian, and proceeds to universalize the past ct, he is, in a certain sense, breaking academic caste.

There is no denying the dramatic appeal of the dialectical eology. The grand action of the drama moves through the agedy of the cross to its final triumph and resolution. Yet, somew the effect on the reader is to take him off the stage of historical tion, in which he might have a part, however humble, and seat m in the stalls. In particular he gets little personal moral guidce from witnessing the action, and he has no sense of companionip with the Jesus of the Gospels. Intimate problems of personal nscience and conduct are not given the recognition which they ceive when, for instance, one reads the Sermon on the Mount th open eyes. The new theology has, it is true, given fresh eaning to the eschatology of the Gospels, in so far as we are ving at the end of an age. To this extent it may help one underand the signs of these times, as they intimate the grand strategy history and thus of the divine plan. We are the creatures of the dgment of God and the objects of the grace of God, but as in l such cosmic schemes, ethics in any intimate sense is rather in eyance.

Therefore I cannot resist the conclusion that those of us who ere disciplined in earlier years in the historical study of the Gosls, and who have never regretted or repented of that study, are ill under bonds to go on asking the searching sort of personal oral questions which Tolstoi, for instance, proposed to himself d his generation. Those questions are shirked or evaded only at e cost of one of the permanent contributions which Christianity s made to history. For, as Professor Whitehead has said, in

> 'the impracticable ethics of Christianity
> a standard had now been created, expressed in concrete illustrations foolproof against perversions. This standard is a gauge by which to test the defects of human society. So long as the Galilean images are but the dreams of an unrealized world, so long must they spread the infection of an uneasy spirit.'[5]

ut this awareness of moral ideals and imperatives can be best d, perhaps only had, by those who vest an initial confidence in e Jesus of history.

Meanwhile, as to the Christological problem. You may remember the stupid remark of Carlyle, that the Christians of the fourth

[5] Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*. pp. 20-21. (The Macllan Company, New York, 1933.)

century were miserable jangling Syrian sects, their heads full of chaff, their hearts empty and dead. What was at stake then, and what is still at stake as between historical theology and dialectical theology is the relation of a concrete human life to a divine universal. There is and there ought always to be a tension between the two. If the tension is relaxed and attention devoted to only one of these two antithetical concerns something necessary to what we call the religious consciousness is lost.

It has always seemed to me a religious mistake, perhaps a theological heresy, to regard the Christological controversy, which was concerned with the doctrine of the two natures in one person, finally pronounced in the Chalcedonian Definition, as an inquiry into the nature or natures of a single unique personality. The Christological controversy, with its resultant paradox of the two natures in one person, is not an isolated academic matter. It is, rather, the classic instance of the basic problem for all religion, the relation of man to God. Hence the warrant for Pascal's words, 'Two natures in Jesus Christ . . . I consider Jesus Christ in all persons and in ourselves.' It is a tragedy that cautious modern orthodoxy has seldom had the courage to reaffirm the bold statement of Irenaeus and Athanasius, that Christ became man in order that man might become God, or become divine. The verb *theopoiein* is capable of either translation. Be that as it may, those fathers of the early Church understood what we have forgotten or have preferred to ignore, the true occasion and intention of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The problem of the concrete human life in history and of the universal significance of such a life in the terms of a divine universal is one which religion can never avoid, although the resolution of this antithesis must always take the form of a paradox in which a tension is still felt. A purely historical theology or a purely dialectic theology tends to relax this tension and thus impairs the very nature of the religious consciousness itself.

The place of Jesus Christ in the Christian Religion is for ever conditioned by the fact that the quality implied in those two words is, for us who profess and call ourselves Christians, the classic and definitive instance of the central paradox implied in all religion. Neither the Jesus of history alone, nor the Christ of the creeds apart from the historical figure can state the total issue. Paul's contention that what happened to Jesus is what is to happen to the disciple, and the later theological affirmation that what was true of Jesus Christ is what ought to be and what by his grace may be true of us, remains to-day, as it always has been, the source of the mysterious appeal of Jesus Christ to us.

Hence the necessity that a group such as the Modern Church-n should not relinquish to the theological party-of-the-other-t its own disciplines and heritage as spokesmen for the his-ical study of the Gospels. You here, and like-minded persons ny own land, must continue to make our necessary contribution the statement and resolution of the perennial Christological e in the terms of our own latest day.

Should Christians ever lose their awareness of Jesus of zareth and of an intimate relation to him as the Christ within, religion would be incredibly impoverished. The inalienable viction that the disciple should be and can be as his Master is ery precious possession. Other religions have looked back to ir historical founders with veneration. In no other religion has ty universalized the person of the founder to the extent that ristianity has universalized Jesus. Followers of other faiths do say, 'Buddha in me . . . Mohammed in me.' Nor has any Jew r said, 'Moses in me.' Thus Claude Montefiore in the preface his *Synoptic Gospels* says:

> '(The Jew) had had it ingrained into him that there need be nothing — no mediator, no divine man — between himself and God. The position of Jesus, the place he fills, even in Unitarian Christianity, is impossible for the Jew . . . The Christian fits in Jesus with his purest thought of God; Jesus brings God near to him . . . Jesus smooths the way to God. He *is* the Way. Without Jesus — if that fatality could be for a moment conceived — God would be more distant and more dim.'

Let me end with a few stanzas of a simple and authentically ristian hymn by Francis Palgrave:

Thou say'st, 'Take up thy cross,
O man, and follow me';
The night is black, the feet are slack
Yet we would follow thee.

O heavy cross of faith
In what we cannot see!
As once of yore thyself restore
And help to follow thee!

If not as once thou cam'st
In true humanity,
Come yet as guest within the breast
That burns to follow thee.

Within our heart of hearts
In nearest nearness be:
Set up thy throne within thine own:—
Go, Lord: we follow thee.

Note: Some of the material in this paper is to be found at greater length he author's recent book, *Jesus, Then and Now* (Harper and Brothers, New rk, 1949).

JESUS AND HIS GOSPEL, SINCE SCHWEITZE

By the Rev. T. F. Glasson, M.A., D.D.

I

IN the opening year of the present century there appeared i Germany a sketch of the life of Jesus[1] written by a youn Alsatian named Albert Schweitzer (b. 1875). Its main idea had com to him some time earlier when at the age of 19 he was involved i his year of compulsory military service, and it was while he wa reading *Matt.* x-xi from the Greek Testament he carried in h knapsack that he discovered the apocalyptic key to the life o Jesus. J. Weiss in a short book in 1892[2] had given substantiall the same interpretation, but whereas he had dealt with the teach ing of Jesus, Schweitzer tried to show that eschatology was th key to the events of His life also.

Little attention was paid to the sketch of 1901 and it did no appear in English until 1925. But in 1906 Schweitzer produce his great work *From Reimarus to Wrede*, brilliantly translate into English four years later by W. Montgomery under the titl *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. This was a work which coul not be ignored and it soon aroused great debate, though more i this country than in Germany. It is true that R. H. Charles, wit his unrivalled knowledge of apocalyptic literature, was not greatl impressed, and wrote in the preface to the second edition (191 of his *Eschatology* :

> Since Schweitzer's eschatological studies show no knowledge original documents and hardly any of first hand works on the document and since further they make no fresh contribution to the subject, notice is taken of him in this edition.

Nevertheless the book created a furore in Oxford and Cambridg and was commended by Burkitt and Sanday, though the latte withdrew his support soon after.

The tremendous impact of this work was due partly to i dynamic presentation of Jesus, and also to the exciting way in whic the research of the previous 150 years was set out. Nor ought w to forget the greatness of the author's own personality. Thos moving words at the close about Christ coming to us as One u known, with His call to discipleship — so difficult to reconci with the main drift of the book — took on a new meaning whe men saw Schweitzer abandoning his musical and academic caree

[1] *Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis. Eine Skizze des Lebens Je* (1901). Eng. Trans., *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God* (1925).

[2] *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes.*

embarking for equatorial Africa as a medical missionary, and himself seeking to be a 'channel of the power of Jesus.'

Since Schweitzer every interpretation of the life and teaching of Jesus has had to reckon with the apocalyptic school. Half way through the century is not a bad time to look back in order to trace the developments which have taken place in this field of study. No attempt will be made to enumerate or characterize the many lives of Jesus and accounts of His teaching which have appeared in the past fifty years; we shall look rather at the particular question which Schweitzer brought to the forefront, to see how it has been treated by certain representative writers, and how his interpretation has fared. The long process of research which he claimed to have brought to its close still continues; and the question which he regarded as settled refuses to lie down. But first it is important to remember his main theme. It is concerned with Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God. Jesus did not announce 'a kingdom that was to be founded and realized in the natural world by himself and the believers, but one that was to be expected as coming with the almost immediate dawn of a supernatural age.' This distinction is far more important than the handling of particular events. It is unnecessary at this time of day to point out that Synoptic study has shown that some of the eschatological material of the Gospels is secondary, and that after the researches of Hawkins and Streeter we cannot accept the discourse of *Matt.* x as 'historical as a whole and down to the smallest detail.' Without lingering with these and many similar matters, we should rather dwell upon this main point of *the character of the Kingdom of God.* There was, it is affirmed, nothing ethico-religious about it. Reimarus had seen that Jesus set out to be not a spiritual Saviour but a political deliverer. Weiss's interpretation was simply Reimarus again 'with the signs changed,' that is, with the apocalyptic Messiah instead of the political. 'A picture of the future is not spiritualized by being projected upon the clouds.' The eudaemonistic aspirations have merely been transferred to a place of safety, to the transcendental region. This is the real thread of Schweitzer's work. He did not invent eschatology. His contribution stands or falls with the view that an expectation of the imminent end of the world provides the key to the teaching and life of Jesus.

II

The apocalyptic interpretation has had many supporters and one or two examples may be mentioned. The literary critic, J. Middleton Murry, in his beautifully written *Life of Jesus* (1926)

presenting Him as man of genius, tells us that at His baptism He realized He was son of God, but it was a relationship open to all men. Later He found that His experience was unique and concluded that He was the Messiah; He was destined to be the Son of Man whose advent He had previously foretold. The cry of dereliction bears witness to the collapse of His hopes. It is impossible, says Murry, to understand the thought of our Lord unless we recognize that the Jews had abandoned belief in a Messiah who belonged to the order of humanity and expected the dramatic and spectacular advent of a transcendent figure. Like Schweitzer and many others, he takes it for granted that Jesus took over current Messianic expectations.

But when we ask for evidence to substantiate this familiar statement about Jewish beliefs, nothing really convincing can be produced. This point is worth dwelling upon for a moment. The apocalypses in general do not teach the Messiah's Parousia. The *Similitudes of Enoch* are exceptional but it is by no means certain that they were in existence during our Lord's life. A number of scholars date them at a later period, and the reasons given by R. H. Charles for his dating are quite inconclusive, as I have shown elsewhere.[3] Moreover, the Messiah's appearing in the *Similitudes* is different in important respects from the New Testament conception of the Second Advent, and the imagery of the latter is derived in every particular from Old Testament prophecies of the advent of God and the Day of the Lord. It appears that the Messiah's Parousia was not a current Jewish doctrine ready for Jesus to take over, and one of the eschatologists' initial assumptions falls to the ground.

One or two German scholars last century gave an exaggerated account of the importance of the apocalyptic writings and produced an impression that there was a general belief that an entirely transcendent Kingdom was to be inaugurated by a heavenly Messiah. G. Dalman[4] protested against this, pointing out that some of the alleged evidence had been 'manufactured' and that a picture of the Messianic hope among the Jews in the time of Christ ought never to have been given in these terms. His words were not heeded and the Life-of-Jesus-Research has suffered in consequence. Schweitzer described the important work of Dalman and other Aramaic scholars as an 'episode in the general resistance to eschatology' (*Quest*, p. 289).

[3] *The Second Advent: the Origin of the New Testament Doctrine* (1945) pp. 57 *ff*.

[4] *Die Worte Jesu* (1898). Eng. Trans., *The Words of Jesus* (1902), pp. 132, 248.

C. Guignebert in his *Jesus* (1932; Eng. Trans. 1935) admits, rightly, I think, that Jesus did not teach the doctrine of His own Parousia, but he holds that He expected the Kingdom of God to arrive very shortly by catastrophic action. When we consider the slender evidence by which this contention is supported, we cannot help feeling somewhat puzzled by the emphatic way in which it is put forward. The passages which Guignebert relies on are as follows: *Mark* ix, 1 ('There be some here of them that stand by . . .' — a difficult saying whose meaning is by no means certain); *Mark* xiii, 30; *Matt.* x, 23; *Luke* xix, 11, which merely states that they, *i.e.* either the disciples or the crowd, 'supposed that the Kingdom of God was immediately to appear'; and *Mark* xiv, 25 ('I will not any more drink of the fruit of the vine . . .') These are quite unable to support the weight of the confident assumption which Guignebert rests upon them.

Goguel and Loisy are others who belong to the apocalyptic school. F. C. Burkitt's *Jesus Christ: an Historical Outline* (1932) takes a similar line, and even the conception of 'interim ethics' is accepted (p. 20). Future generations do not count, says Jesus in effect; the Kingdom of God is at hand, give to him that asks of you. . . .

> It is difficult not to infer from the story in the early part of *Mark* that Jesus started with the belief 'that the Kingdom of God should immediately appear,' while the rest of the Gospel may be read as putting before us some of the steps whereby Jesus came to realize that the time was not yet quite ripe, and to be persuaded that He must go up to Jerusalem and die there as the first condition for the coming of the New Age.

III

The view of the eschatologists means, of course, that Jesus was mistaken. In face of this serious difficulty, some have urged that as our Lord's knowledge was limited to the thought-forms of His own time we need not be greatly disturbed; others have explained the matter as a case of prophetic foreshortening. It may be pointed out, however, that we are not concerned with a mere mistake about a date, but about the very character of the Kingdom of God. The apocalyptic view means

> that Jesus wholly misconceived God's method of action in history; that His emphasis was not on the moral and the spiritual, but on the supernatural in the sense of the miraculous; that He did not comprehend the meaning of His Cross, which stands as the boundary mark between two epochs of history and two conflicting interpretations of life . . . that He never dreamt of the dispensation of the Spirit. . . .[5]

[5] M. Hughes, *The Kingdom of Heaven* (1922), p. 96.

In spite of the various explanations which scholars have pu forward to show that a mistake of this kind does not really matter it remains true that some people have abandoned the Christian faith on this issue, finding no bridge between the apocalyptic visionary and the Christ of the Church's worship. H. D. A. Majo is surely right in saying that 'for many plain people Schweitzer's conclusions had a devastating effect on their Christian faith.'[6]

At the other extreme we have the 'crisis theologians' who wel come the interpretation of Schweitzer and his school, finding in i a vivid way of expressing the 'wholly other' character of the Kingdom. Thus R. Bultmann[7] admits the mythological nature o the Parousia doctrine, but he finds the essential meaning of Jesus message of the Kingdom in the conception of man which in the last analysis underlies it, the conception of man as forced t decision through a future act of God.

> To this mythology belongs the expectation of the end of the world a occurring in time, the expectation which in the contemporary situatio of Jesus is the natural expression of his conviction that even in the pre sent man stands in the crisis of decision, that the present is for him th last hour. (p. 56.)

Bultmann's book is affected by the excessive scepticism wit which he treats the Gospel material, and this is connected wit Form Criticism, which lies outside our immediate subject. Whil it has weakened our confidence in the sequence of events in th Gospels, it has no right to the final word on their historicity or o the genuineness of the sayings. Bultmann's opinion that Jesus di not believe Himself to be Messiah is sufficiently answered by W Manson's *Jesus the Messiah* (1943).

Bultmann emphasizes the message of Jesus to such an exten that he appears to attach no importance to His person, and ca even write the following:

> By the tradition Jesus is named as bearer of the message; accordin to overwhelming probability he really was. Should it prove otherwise that does not change in any way what is said in the record. I see then n objection to naming Jesus throughout as the speaker. (p. 14.)

Jesus is the bearer of God's word. But if the central place is to b given to God's claim and demand for obedience, one wonders wh Christianity has been selected in this connection; Islam woul seem to lend itself more readily to this treatment. In any case, message of this kind has more resemblance to the Law than th Gospel. Other 'crisis theologians' do not agree with this rathe

[6] *Civilization and Religious Values* (1948), p. 132.
[7] *Jesus* (1926). Eng. Trans., *Jesus and the Word* (1935).

negative position, and E. Brunner, while describing the work as n important event, rightly says that the Marburg scholar 'sets the *eaching* of Jesus as *the* important thing over against His person, which is unimportant: he goes so far in this direction that he sserts his complete indifference to the question whether Jesus ver existed at all.'[8]

It has often been pointed out that the Kingdom is somehow nseparably connected with Jesus Himself. To follow Him is ynonymous with entering the Kingdom. Anything which obcures this essential relation has missed one of the unique elements f the Christian religion. 'Who do men say that I am?' is still he vital question. 'What new thing did Jesus bring?' asks renaeus; and answers with the words, 'He brought Himself.'

If the Kingdom is thus closely associated with the person of hrist, so that in a sense it came when He came, some light is hrown on the question of a present Kingdom, a subject to which e now turn.

IV

Much attention has been given to those passages in which our ord speaks of the Kingdom of God as something which is even ow in the midst of men. 'If I by the finger of God cast out evils, then is the Kingdom of God come upon you' (*Lk.* xi, 20). uch sayings, and there are many of them, would appear to be uite inconsistent with the view that Jesus expected the Kingdom o arrive catastrophically in the near future. They suggest rather at He reinterpreted the meaning of the Kingdom in a highly riginal way.

The eschatologists, however, take these passages to mean that e Kingdom is so near that already its powers are felt in the resent. Schweitzer in explaining Weiss's view of a Kingdom at is wholly future writes:

> It is present only as a cloud may be said to be present which throws its shadow upon the earth; its nearness, that is to say, is recognized by the paralysis of the Kingdom of Satan. . . . This is the only sense in which Jesus thinks of the Kingdom as present. (*Quest*, p. 238.)

When we examine the references to a present Kingdom it is very ifficult to accept this interpretation. Look for example at *Lk.* x, 3-24 ('Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see . . .'). hese words surely speak of something that has already arrived. he disciples are not merely the last in a long series of those who aited and expected. Again, there are references to Satan having

[8] *The Mediator* (1927; Eng. Trans. 1934), p. 157.

fallen from heaven, and to the strong man being bound. T goods of the strong man are being spoiled because he has alrea been mastered. Those who say this means merely that he is abo to be overcome should attempt to despoil a burglar's lair two da before his approaching arrest; the experiment would, I thin have great expository value!

Jesus found the signs of the Kingdom's presence in His ow ministry of healing and saving and preaching to the poor. T way in which this has been recognized in the period we are co sidering may be illustrated with one or two examples.

E. von Dobschütz in his *Eschatology of the Gospels* (1910), series of lectures delivered at Oxford in 1909, showed that in t teaching of Jesus we have 'transmuted eschatology':

> What was spoken of in Jewish eschatology as to come in the last da is taken here as already at hand in the lifetime of Jesus; it is transmut at the same time in the other sense that what was expected as an extern change is taken inwardly. (p. 150.)

Similarly W. Manson in *Christ's View of the Kingdom of G* (1918):

> Jesus regarded the new powers thus liberated in Himself for the ove coming of moral and physical evil as a definite indication of a ne ingress of God in human life, marking a fresh era, and making all thin new. (p. 84.)
>
> The Gospel of Jesus, by presenting the Kingdom as something alrea cast like a seed into the ground, breaks through the moulds of apocalyp thought, and diffuses itself in the world as a religion of realized redem tion. (p. 97.)

T. W. Manson in his important work *The Teaching of Jes* (1931) has rather a different way of explaining the presence of t Kingdom. Taking the expression in a collective sense, he mai tains that Jesus' mission was to create 'the Son of Man,' the Kin dom of the saints of the Most High. First He appeals to t people and then, when this appeal produces no adequate respons He consolidates His own band of followers. Finally, 'when becomes apparent that not even the disciples are ready to rise the demands of the ideal, he stands alone, embodying in his ow person the perfect human response to the regal claims of God.'

> The last part of the way He travels alone; and at the cross He alo is the Son of Man, the incarnation of the Kingdom of God on ear The Son of Man is rejected and slain. That ought to be the end of t story; but it is not. The suffering and death of Jesus are the birth-pan of the Son of Man. The cross proves to be the key that opens the Kin dom of God to men. (p. 235.)

This connection of the Kingdom with the Cross has been notic by a number of writers. It helps to explain some of the forwar

ooking references to the Kingdom, and such a saying as *Lk.* xii, 9-50, where

> Jesus implies that He is subject as yet to conditions that imprison and fetter Him. He cannot move at freedom till He has undergone His baptism; and He looks forward to it with passionate eagerness as to the great event which will mark the beginning of His true activity.[9]

Ve can thus understand that although the Kingdom is present in he ministry of Jesus, it is present only in its initial stages; its full oming, its coming with power, lies on the other side of the Cross. He believed His death to be a necessary step to the establishment of the Kingdom.'[10]

According to R. Otto's *Kingdom of God and Son of Man* 1934; Eng. Trans. 1938) the Kingdom in the thought of Jesus still awaits its full revelation, but in its preliminary dawning it s already present as a power effective in advance' (Eng. Trans., . 109). So strongly has Otto emphasized the Kingdom as a present reality that he is sometimes classed as holding a system of realized eschatology'; but he makes it plain that in his view 'the Kingdom of God was for Christ always the future Kingdom of he new age and was conceived on strict eschatological terms.' But already its powers had penetrated into the world. Otto's contention that 'Jesus lived in the ideas of Enoch's apocalyptic radition' has not won wide acceptance.

The phrase 'realized eschatology' is specially identified with C. H. Dodd, who has developed the conception in a series of works. Particular mention may be made of his *Parables of the Kingdom* (1935).[11] The parables are seen in their original setting in the life of Jesus and related to a Kingdom which has already arrived; 'the "eschatological" Kingdom of God is proclaimed as present fact, which men must recognize, whether by their actions hey accept it or reject it' (p. 44).

It should in fairness be mentioned that one or two of those referred to in this section while rejecting 'consistent eschatology' nevertheless believe that Jesus did expect to return before the end of that generation. Thus Dobschütz admitted that Jesus retained ome eschatological conceptions which cannot be included among hose which He 'transmuted.' It was in this way alone that He ould imagine final success. The hope was mistaken but the

[9] E. F. Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah* (1911), p. 229.

[10] V. Taylor, *Jesus and His Sacrifice* (1929), pp. 141-2.

[11] See also his brief but invaluable summary 'The Life and Teaching of esus Christ' in T. W. Manson's *Companion to the Bible* (1939), pp. 367 ff.

spiritual conviction it expressed holds good, and we still have th main body of His teaching which is not eschatological in an sense. This is a very common point of view.

V

In the light of the foregoing there is some justification fo describing the past fifty years as showing 'The Breakdown o Consistent Eschatology.' The same result is apparent if we con sider the relations of our Lord with the Jewish nation. Schweitzer following Reimarus, said that Jesus was a Jew and had no inten tion of founding a new religion. He also affirmed that Jesus di not foresee the destruction of Jerusalem (*Quest*, p. 231). Bot these points were vital to his eschatological scheme. J. Klausner the Jewish scholar, in his *Jesus of Nazareth* (1922; Eng. Trans 1925) agreed that it did not enter the mind of Jesus to form a new religion and proclaim it outside the Jewish nation. Jesus ma have unconsciously given a certain impetus toward a new religio by exaggerating His own relationship to God and by His extrem emphasis on ethics, but it was due to 'reasons and causes outsid of Jesus' that a new religion branched off from the community o Israel and spread among the Gentiles. These other causes ar explained in Klausner's *From Jesus to Paul* (1939; Eng. Trans 1944).

It is true that the New Testament does not speak o Christianity as 'a new religion.' The Church was continuous wit Israel as 'the people of God.' But this does not warrant us i saying that Jesus had no thought of altering the ways of Judaism There is definite evidence that the new era of the Kingdom o God inaugurated by His ministry held far-reaching changes. Th references to the new patch on the old garment, to new wine an the old wine-skins, show that in the thought of Jesus somethin new had arrived which could not be accommodated within th existing framework. 'The law and the prophets were until John from that time the gospel of the Kingdom of God is preached.'

It may be that our Lord first hoped that the nation as a whol would respond to His message. This has been argued by C. J Cadoux in his well-documented study, *The Historic Mission o Jesus* (1941). Jesus, he maintains, advocated a policy of recon ciliation with Rome. When it became clear that the nation wa not responding, He changed His plans and envisaged the futur of the Kingdom in a very different way. He foresaw, among othe things, a collapse of the nation's life resulting from a revol against Rome, a revolt He had sought to avert. There was

causal connexion between the rejection of His ethic of love and the calamity of A.D. 70.

If Jesus foresaw the fall of the old Israel, and there is good evidence that He did,[12] did He regard His own disciples as the nucleus of a new Israel, a Remnant? Cadoux does not follow this line of thought, but a number of others have done so. The withdrawal of our Lord from the multitude, who could not grasp 'the mystery of the Kingdom,' and His concentration upon the training of His disciples, are more than compatible with the view that He had in mind the creation of a new fellowship. J. W. Bowman of Pennsylvania in his thoughtful work *The Intention of Jesus* (1945) holds that the very choice of twelve disciples was an acted parable which showed that 'of this typical Remnant he would raise up a new congregation of Israel to displace the old one' (p. 185). He concludes that 'Jesus appears to have aimed at the setting up of a definitive group in which the Kingdom ethic should find realization.' This reference to the moral teaching is interesting, because others have been led by a study of this to the idea of a new community. Few would to-day support the idea of 'interim ethics,' and it is clear that the teaching on love of God and one's neighbour, prayer, sincerity, meekness, industry, reconciliation, has no connection with a limited amount of time.

> The moral standard set up by Jesus (writes T. W. Manson) is to be conceived as given to the New Israel—the community of His followers— . . . to be the charter of their existence as a people of God. Entrance into the Kingdom or discipleship — they come to much the same thing — involves acceptance of the way of life which Jesus teaches and exemplifies.
>
> The Kingdom on earth manifests itself as the society of all those who follow the Messiah and take upon themselves the yoke which He bears.[13]

One of the most surprising developments of recent years is the way in which from various approaches we are led back to the conception of the Church. The eschatologists told us most emphatically that nothing can have been further from our Lord's mind. Jesus, says M. Goguel,[14] was too much dominated by the idea of the immediate end of the existing order to trouble about such things as the future of His disciples. But the words at the Last Supper alone suggest a different conclusion.

> According to Jewish thought, a new covenant with God implied and constituted a new religious community — a new Israel. Even were there no other evidence, this fact by itself would be almost sufficient to prove that the Christian Church was no mere result of the force of

[12] See C. J. Cadoux, *op. cit.*, pp. 266 ff.
[13] *Teaching of Jesus*, pp. 295, 211.
[14] *Jesus the Nazarene; Myth or History?* (1925; Eng. Trans. 1926), p. 242.

circumstances after Christ's death, but that, when He so impressively invited His disciples to enter into a new covenant with God sealed by His blood, He was consciously and with full purpose founding a new community.[15]

K. L. Schmidt, the critic who 'shattered' the Synoptic outline, writes that 'the question whether Jesus made His disciples into an "ecclesia" must be answered in the affirmative.'[16] R. N. Flew in *Jesus and His Church* (1938) demonstrates by a five-fold argument that Jesus 'had in view a community of a new kind' (p. 48).

Years ago Loisy declared that 'Jesus foretold the Kingdom, and it was the Church that came.'[17] This is really an astonishing remark, if it implies that the Church was an undesigned accident. When we have on one hand Jesus speaking of some great developments which will follow upon His death, and on the other side we have the Church conscious of a new divine power streaming from a living Lord, it is hard to believe that He expected something entirely different. Jesus says to the disciples, 'Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the Kingdom.' Later we find the Christian community with these same men at its heart rejoicing in a present Kingdom of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. Jesus speaks of a Kingdom which is present in embryonic form, a seed destined to grow into a tree, a Kingdom which is shortly to come with power. Later we find the Church in possession of a Kingdom which has a sense of divine power as one of its main characteristics; 'the Kingdom of God is not in word but in power' (*I Cor.* iv, 20).

VI

Recent trends thus suggest a decisive answer to our original question about the character of the Kingdom of God. There is no doubt at all that the early Church thought of itself as living within the new age. The early Christians without question reinterpreted the conception of the Kingdom; the only point at issue is whether this reinterpretation was foreshadowed by our Lord. Is it credible that He held to the view of a Kingdom to be established by divine catastrophe and that it was His followers who evolved ideas of such force and originality? Sir Edwyn Hoskyns discusses this question in his *Cambridge Sermons* (1938). He shows that Paul, John and Luke find in the coming of the Spirit and in the Christian fellowship the fulfilment of the promises of God. Then

[15] A. G. Hogg, *Christ's Message of the Kingdom* (1911), p. 214.
[16] Quoted in Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 425 (Eng. Trans.).
[17] A. F. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* (1902; Eng. Trans., 1908), p. 166.

he goes on to ask what our Lord Himself meant. 'Is this Pauline, Lukan, Johannine interpretation of our Lord's teaching really justifiable?'

> Is His language about the End and about the Kingdom of God capable of such an interpretation? There can, I venture to suggest to you, be no real doubt as to our answer. Our Lord's eschatological language, as indeed all His teaching and actions, was mainly symbolical. To speak humanly, He felt Himself standing on the brink of a new spiritual order, an order which was to come into being as a direct result of His life and death, and which was to be the fulfilment of the longings of the greatest of the Jewish prophets. To express this Gospel He used the traditional language of Jewish expectation of the End, since it provided Him with a vehicle to express the significance of His life and death. (pp. 31-32.)

This interpretation does not of course (as Hoskyns saw) absorb all the eschatological teaching of the Gospels by any means. Great confusion has been caused by a certain ambiguity in the meaning of the word 'eschatology.' Strictly it means the doctrine of the last things, and the four traditional last things are death, judgment, heaven and hell. But the word is sometimes used in connection with the Messianic time; it would have been much better if the word 'Messianic' had been used for this special sense of 'eschatological.'

The past fifty years have thus in one way witnessed a return to earlier views. We have had to descend from the dizzy apocalyptic heights; but while our journey was not really necessary, we have had the benefit of the view and we descend to the sober plain with a clearer understanding of its contours. We see in a more vivid way that the coming of Christ marks a new era; we have a more dynamic conception of His life and work. We are not returning to the view popular fifty years ago of the Kingdom of God as a glorified moral rearmament campaign, but we understand it in terms of the action of God Himself. And as a result we have a new appreciation of the unity of the New Testament. Gospels and Epistles alike announce that God was in Christ taking action for the salvation of men.

The fragments of Reimarus were issued with the title, 'The Aim of Jesus and His Disciples.' This is the theme we need to consider just as seriously as the meaning of isolated texts. What was the intention of Jesus, the controlling purpose of His activity? In answering this question we are led to the fact that Jesus reinterpreted not only the Kingdom but also the Messiahship, combining this office with the prophecies of the Suffering Servant. In the Temptation do we not see Him working out the methods of His Messiahship? (Incidentally it is significant that the Temptation story, in which Dostoevsky and others have found such

profound meanings, is dismissed by Schweitzer as unhistorical.) He refuses to bribe men with social alleviation, rejects the ways of domination and supernatural display. He will establish His sovereignty by choosing the path of obedience and service. So it is through the whole story.

His aim is nothing less than the kingdoms of the world, but He will win them by the methods of sacrificial love. As He faces the Cross He sees beyond it the fulfilment of Daniel's vision of one like unto a son of man who comes to the Ancient of Days,

> and there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.

JESUS CHRIST AND THE RELIGION OF MANKIND: THE WIDER CHRISTOLOGY

By Rev. A. C. Bouquet, D.D.

THE title of this paper begs a question, or at least the possibility of its being debated. Do we need a Christology at all? I think I am right to infer, however, that I am meant to take my start from the point of what we may call 'standard Christian belief,' which means (1) the belief that over against or within the total corpus of human religion is set apart by itself the historical phenomenon of Jesus, (2) the belief that that historical phenomenon cannot help being valued in terms of its cosmic significance, valued, let us say for convenience, as the Council of Chalcedon valued Him, or as we find Him valued in the *Christus Veritas* of Archbishop William Temple.

Put in that way, it is fairly obvious that to do justice to the modern critical and philosophical problems involved would need a whole book rather than a short paper. I must therefore limit my objective considerably.

Now the preliminary question, as well as the second item outlined above, has been recently dealt with by Professor D. M. Baillie in a book[1] both brilliant and readable. So I think I can reasonably set it upon one side for the moment, provided that we return later on to Baillie's own exposition of Christology.

I will start then from the standard orthodox assumption in (1). This is, of course, that the history of human religion is not merely

[1] *God was in Christ.*

one of a plurality of attempts, all of them more or less relative and partial, to get *en rapport* with the Supernatural, but that with the entry of the historical Jesus into the world of men's experience there entered something new and absolute in quality, so that the true account of religion is of the *plurality plus* this special and unique element. There are in fact two parts in the account. The problem is: How are these two parts to be related?

The most recent and familiar of any magnitude has been the answer of Professor Hendrik Kraemer of Leyden, who subsumes all the first part under the heading of 'naturalist transempirical realization,' and designates the second 'biblical realism.' One can have no doubt that this division corresponds to a sense of observed fact, as otherwise no defence of it would have been possible, nor could Christian missionary propaganda have achieved so signal a series of successes. There is a distinction which can be experimentally demonstrated between the products of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, which lends some support to this conclusion. Yet a closer study of the data leads one to the suspicion that it cannot be acceptable as an entirely satisfactory general theory, since no one can deny that, leaving out of count the various types of organized Christianity, the Biblical records themselves include material which falls within the category of 'naturalistic transempirical realization,' while material which reaches the standard set by what is here called 'Biblical realism' occurs here and there outside the confines of Hebraeo-Christian religion.

I want to suggest therefore that it may do some good if we approach the subject not by spinning theories so much as by engaging in a consideration of the actual course of events.

After the appearance in the world of Jesus of Nazareth, what, as a matter of fact, was the way in which educated Gentile thinkers began by relating Him to the cosmic order? The answer is that they made use of a general theory which lay ready to their hands, *i.e.* the theory connected with the *logos*. The history of its origin has been already unfolded by a number of scholars, not least by our own Dr. Inge, at some length, and also in a shorter monograph by another of our members, Dr. R. G. Bury, published in 1940. There is also the relevant chapter in Father Lebreton's first volume of his *History of the Dogma of the Trinity*, and finally we have the late Dr. Wilfrid Knox's Schweich Lectures, and also his recent article in the *Harvard Theological Review*, from both of which much information may be gleaned. Mr. E. I. Watkin's bibliography to the English translation of Le Breton will give any who wish to study further some suggestions on which they can work.

Briefly the story runs as follows.

Somewhere in the region of 500 B.C., both in India and in Ionian Greece, not to mention China, we have movements of human thought which sought to give a unitary explanation of the world. There was a time when it used to be held that Greek and Hellenistic intellectual activities were in a separate compartment from those of middle or eastern Asia. To-day we are in considerable doubt as to how far this was really the case. We do not know, it is true, very much about the actual migration of ideas along trade routes, though we think we are beginning to know something about the migration of art-forms. It is certainly interesting that in both ancient India and China ideas as to the structure, nature, and purpose of reality are to be found which resemble those known to have come to exist among the Greeks. We can regard these resemblances as the result of contacts following a diffusion which went either from east to west or from west to east, or perhaps from some area lying between these two points of the compass (Professor Haloun would no doubt hazard the conjecture that it may have been Sumeria), and from which streams of influence travelled in both directions, eastward as well as westward. For the moment I will say nothing further about Indian and Sinitic developments, but confine myself to what is better known, *i.e.* the *logos* doctrine in Greek and Hellenistic thought.

The doctrine is said to appear first in the works of Heraclitus of Ephesus. After various suggestions as to the permanent substance which underlies the changing and diverse appearances of the world as we see it — water, air, and mist — Heraclitus puts forward the proposition that all things are really and ultimately *fire*, which is the source of birth and the cause of dissolution, the spring of intelligence containing in itself the cause or principle of its never-ceasing change. Anyone can see that this is simply an early form of a theory of physics, and if we substitute for fire Sir Arthur Eddington's 'mind-stuff,' or Sir Edmund Whittaker's 'energy,' or the Marxist 'primordial matter in dialectic process,' we can still agree with a good deal that is said by the early Ionian philosophers. The point, however, which chiefly concerns us here is that Heraclitus says that the changes produced by the One Self-Existent Being are not fortuitous or spasmodic, but orderly. All things, he says, happen through *logos*, which is universal, a cosmic all-pervading principle of reason. I shall show presently that this has its analogy in the apparently independent writings of a much later Chinese philosophical theologian, Chu Hsi. The *logos*, then, as Dr. Adam says, is virtually the Divine Reason immanent in nature and in man, though it is not yet clear whether

t can be described as quasi-personal. It has been observed that n the genuine works of Plato, and also in Aristotle, the term *ogos* does not play any important part, its place being taken by he term *nous*. When we come to the Stoics, the case is somewhat ifferent. This school of thinkers takes its terminology direct from Heraclitus, and revives the term *logos*. For the Stoics too, as Bury says, fire is the ultimate substance, fire is *theos*, and fire is *ogos*. (One may speculate here whether there is any influence oming in from Iran.) But this primal fire is spoken of as *pneuma*, re-mist or fire-vapour, perhaps a kind of compressible gas or uper-heated steam. Each species of object expresses its nature ccording to its own principle of tension or *tonos*, and this is its wn *logos*, more strictly its *spermatikos logos*, *logos* according o which that individual sperm develops. But all these lesser *logoi* re gathered up into the One Divine Intelligence, Who contains n Himself all the lesser spermatic *logoi*. So far this is as material- tic a pantheism as that of any Marxist. But the tendency shows tself as time goes on to spiritualize *pneuma* and to personify the *ogos*, and then to identify the primordial *pneuma* with Zeus, or t any rate with a supreme quasi-personal deity; while the good ife becomes that which is lived according to *logos*, or according o nature.

In due season, all the above is applied to the elucidation of Hebrew religion by the Jew of the Diaspora, Philo, and to the lucidation of Christianity by certain Greek-speaking Christians, mong them the author of what we to-day cautiously call 'the ourth Gospel.' But in between there are certain important evelopments.

First, there is the enrichment of the Stoic idea of the Absolute y its association with a moral monotheism. The original Active rinciple is of a kind such as would receive the tolerant assent of ny Marxist. But to later Stoicism, as Lebreton says, Zeus is the overeign law determining all things, physical being, logical truth, nd moral goodness, He is the all-wise and all-powerful reason hich draws the world and each one of us towards the excellent nd which He will infallibly attain.

In the second place, there is the adaptation of what Lebreton alls 'this proud and rigid conception' to popular mythology. his is to be seen in Plutarch, in the Outline of Theology by ornutus, and also in the pseudepigraphic Treatise of the Homeric Allegories to which the name of Heraclitus himself was pplied (the actual author was a Stoic). Here the *logos* is found ncarnate in Cronos, in the Titans, in Eros, in Atlas, in Pan, in gathodemon, and not least in Hermes and in Herakles. We

think at once of the multiple *avatars* of India. Perhaps the two most striking of these incarnations are those of Herakles and of Hermes. A fairly full account of the Herakles incarnation may be read in the article by Dr. Knox to which I have above referred. Hermes had for long been popularly regarded as the god of speech and reason. It was not therefore difficult to see in him a special personification of the *logos*, and thus the multitude could 'salute the divine *logos* in the statue of Hermes, so familiar an object in the street and in the shop' (Le Breton, op. cit., p. 49). But Hermes as the incarnation of the *logos* is not the supreme god, but is inferior to Zeus, and is speech rather than reason. He is in fact 'The Divine Word.' We may discern in the Arian Christ an attempt to give the glorified Jesus the same sort of status as Hermes.

We are now ready to see the significance of the use made of the *logos* doctrine by the writer of the Fourth Gospel. There is no need to be scared at the suggestion that there is any dependence of the prologue upon the writings of Philo, or to reject such a connexion with vehemence, since it is unnecessary, though, as Mr. Bury has shown, it is by no means to be ruled out.[2] What seems probable is that Philo, the author of the Fourth Gospel, Justin, and the writer of the epistle to Diognetus, to take only four cardinal instances, are not necessarily using one another's writings, but all of them alike employing the terms of a current form of secular thought, to which perhaps each made his own independent approach. Christian theologians of to-day constantly refer to evolution, or entropy, or indeterminacy, taking the terms from the works of their scientific contemporaries. But we know that it would be foolish for some future textual critic to insist that these theologians were continually *copying* one another.

Philo's treatment of the *logos*, in view of the attitude adopted in their respective generations by such English scholars as Westcott and Hoskyns, deserves a note to itself. To Philo, God HIMSELF is Infinite, Unknowable, Definable only by negation (this is, of course, Upanishadic). He is the Existent One or the Absolute, τὸ ὄν. He can only be known through mediating agents or δυναμεῖς, and these are summed up in the *logos*.

Philo describes the *logos* as distinct from God, as the Reason or Mind of God, as His First-Begotten Son, πρωτόγονος, whose mother is Sophia or Divine Wisdom, as the Mediator between God and the world, as θέος but not ὁ θέος, as the Agent of Creation and the Instrument of Providence, and as the Head of the Body

[2] The evidence from the mystical use of numbers seems rather convincing

.e gives other personal titles also to the *logos*, i.e. παράκλητος, ιστής, ἀρχιερεύς, εἰκὼν θεοῦ, πρεσβευτής, ἐλεγχός, ἑρμηνευτής, ἄνθρωπος .οῦ. To Philo the manna—the Bread from Heaven—is a type of .e *logos*, and the Divine *logos* is full of the water of wisdom, an ver-flowing fount. He speaks of 'the holy *logos* according to :ven,' *i.e.* as revealed in the mystic number seven, and in this nnexion it may be noted that the Fourth Gospel has seven signs ημεῖα), seven 'I am' pronouncements, seven special scriptural notations, and a cure wrought at the seventh hour. This can ardly be accidental.

Westcott took the view that whereas *logos* can mean either 'The Divine Reason' or 'The Divine Word,' Philo is chiefly con-rned with the former, and the author of the Fourth Gospel with .e latter. 'They found the same term current, but used it accord-g to their respective apprehensions of the truth.' It is less ossible to-day than when Westcott wrote to draw so sharp a dis-nction. It seems nearer the mark to say, as Holtzmann did, that though the author of the Fourth Gospel makes a *new application* the term *logos*, the instrument he uses is the same instrument that employed by the other Hellenistic writers, including Philo.

The point of essential importance here, then, is that the writer the Fourth Gospel deliberately identifies the personality of the storical Jesus with much that the Divine *logos* meant to his de-out non-Christian contemporaries. I say 'much' deliberately, be-use it is well recognized that certain differences are clearly aintained. To the writer of the Fourth Gospel the *logos* is not mere intermediary or *deuteros theos*. To him as much as to St. aul, the incarnation of Jesus is that of the *pleroma* of the God-ad bodily; it is not, as in the case of some Indian *avatars*, one-lf or one-third of the total Godhead. Again, however much the thor spiritualizes or interprets the story, it is not a docetic myth. he Johannine writings are anti-docetic, and the writer believes at he is dealing with genuine historical events. Thirdly, as the shop of Oxford has lately pointed out, the Christian incarnation the *logos* is not simply *theophanic* but *theurgic*. If Hermes anced to appear, it was not quite certain whether his visit was a neficent one, or whether it was merely a rather dangerous mani-station of the *mysterium tremendum*, like the appearance of ionysus at Thebes, so grimly portrayed by Euripides in the *cchae*, or a theophany of Siva. But the coming of Jesus was the ique and purposive irruption of Divine Love, for us men and r our salvation, and is typified by His entry into Jerusalem on e young ass, and His exit bearing His cross. The cleansing of e temple is not the capricious moodiness of a short-tempered

deva (a mere tantrum in fact), but the moral indignation of a Ho God. It is noteworthy that the behaviour attributed to Jesus whi most resembles that of Siva or Krishna is to be found in t apocryphal gospels.[3] Nor is His appearance a mere piece of *li* or divine sport. My meat, says the Johannine Jesus, is to do t will of Him that sent Me, and to finish His work. He is delibera and purposive. Even one of the early apologists goes wrong her owing to his Gentile *provenance*. Justin Martyr in his apolo makes the Incarnation of the *logos* in Jesus that of a teacher announcer, while the canonical gospels plainly set forth that was more than this — an Act of God, culminating not in the Se mon on the Mount but on the Cross. Moreover, it is doubtf whether many of the quasi-incarnational appearances of divinit in non-Christian religions can be regarded as other than doceti accommodations to human finite weakness, but not comple assumptions of human earthly conditions in a genuinely historic manner.[4]

Nevertheless, the *logos*-doctrine became the official link b tween the life of Jesus and the cosmic order, and in the hands Clement of Alexandria, Justin, and Athenagoras, it was used relate the personalities of the various sages of antiquity to t Person of Jesus. The acceptance of the Johannine gospel and t first epistle, and their incorporation into the canon, and also the retention there ever since, must be taken as constituting the ado tion of the doctrine expressed in those documents as the offici expression of the belief of the Christian Church.

We are thus faced with a dilemma: *either* the acceptance the Fourth Gospel as part of the canon was due to a misunde standing, *or* the theory of Kraemer is in some way defective.

Assuming, however, that we accept the Fourth Gospel rightly placed within the canon, we come naturally to the vit question of the employment of the doctrine embodied in throughout the course of the evangelistic work in which t Christian Church is perpetually engaged. I am well aware th Professor Kirsopp Lake, in his essay, *The Religion of Yesterd and To-morrow*, relegated the *logos*-doctrine to the former cat gory; but I think that he must have meant thereby to reject t form of it which makes the *logos* a kind of demi-god or emanatio and so a Gnostic rather than an orthodox conception.

I wish to suggest that the retention and use of the Johanni form of the *logos*-doctrine, so far from being obsolete, is still

[3] See Professor E. M. Butler: *The Magus*.

[4] Dr. Knox considers that no Greek of the Hellenistic age could ha agreed to say: ὁλόγός σάρξ ἐγένετο, with all its implications.

highest importance in commending Christian belief to the ger part of the Gentile world of to-day.

My reasons for saying so are as follows:

(1) The world in which the *logos*-doctrine took shape was not, reality, very far removed from the world of non-Christian dia and China with which in the past 150 years we have become much more familiar. I am doubtful whether the India of the panishadic age could be said to have had a Logos-doctrine, but is certain that the age which followed it had a doctrine of dis-ntinuous incarnations which were, if we may believe the famous ssage of the Gita, *theurgic*:

> 'Whenever, O Bharata, there is a decline in virtue and an outburst of evil, then am I born to set matters right again.'

there were multiple incarnations, that is only because, as r. Betty Heimann has reminded us, India tends as part of the iom of her symbolism, to pluralize Divine persons, attributes, d activities, as a way of intensifying them. The Christian ctrine of the Incarnation, if capable of establishment, would t seem incongruous to a Vaishnavite Hindu. When we come Buddhism, we find that the idea of a cosmic principle, or *harmakaya*, which incarnates itself in a series of concrete and dividual Buddhas or Bodhisattvas is the central feature of ahayana theology. China owes much to Buddhism, but the con-ption of a supreme cosmic principle, sometimes called *Tao*, ough by a later scholastic theologian of the eleventh century A.D., u Hsi, it is called *li*, was there long before Buddhism entered e country, and *li* greatly resembles the *logos* of the Stoics. It self-existent cosmic law, a guiding and directing principle which termines the form of everything that exists and causes it to be, d its component attributes are love, righteousness and wisdom, ich are, it must be confessed, personal attributes. I cannot help eling that it was the consciousness of the Jesuit missionaries of e seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the Chinese already d such ideas, which led them to declare that in China they found me natural theology already existing.

The word *Tao* has a long and honourable history, and anyone o has read Mr. Arthur Waley's fine English edition of the *Tao-King* will, I feel sure, appreciate the tremendous significance the fact that in translating the Fourth Gospel into Chinese the rd *logos* is rendered *Tao*. I do not know who was the trans-or responsible for this, but it seems to me to have been a stroke genius. *Tao* is current coin to Confucians and Buddhists alike,

as well as to philosophic Taoists, and it must be of the greate importance to those who are seeking to evangelize modern Chin not least when she is looking towards Moscow, that the prologu to the Johannine Gospel should contain this valuable verb weapon, for *Tao* strictly means Way or Process.

It is less encouraging to contrast with this the way in which th prologue has been rendered into other eastern languages. I hav not been able to discover what the rendering of *logos* is in Pal but since the only Pali translation of the Fourth Gospel was mad in 1835, I should imagine that the way in which it was done probably similar to that to be found in the Sanskrit and Arab versions of the New Testament. There are only two Sanskr versions, the one made in 1808 by the famous Baptist missionar William Carey, and the second a revision made by Bengel in 185 Both give a purely literal rendering of *logos* by the word *vad* which means 'speech' or 'argument,' and never, at any tim could have conveyed the meaning which *logos* would have done t Hellenistic readers of the Fourth Gospel. The translators ev dently made no attempt at giving the technical sense, leaving it t the exegesis of commentators to do this. No doubt it is not eas to find a very good equivalent for *logos* to Sanskrit, but apart fro this, it is obvious that at the time the translation was made, the was no knowledge among Christian scholars of the position play by the doctrine of the *logos* in the Mediterranean world of th first two centuries. The situation is much the same when we com to Arabic. Here the word used to render *logos* is *kalam*, whi again means the 'spoken word' or 'pronouncement' of Allah *kalamullah*. A Moslem reader, unless instructed in the meanin of the original word rendered *kalam*, would never understan either the allusion of the evangelist, or the significance of th Johannine prologue for the purpose of defining the cosmic statu of the historical Jesus. It seems strange that in later Islam the was a word *amr*, which was applied, I think, especially by th Sufis, to indicate the relation of the Prophet Mohammed to Allah *Amr* means, I believe, spirit, but as used by Sufis it seems suggest an approximation to the *logos*-doctrine in interpreting th inspired personality of Mohammed.

To sum up at this point: it would seem that the place of th Fourth Gospel in the canon gives full justification to those wh would seek to commend the Christian faith in a wider contex without disparaging the sages and holy men and women of oth religions.

Nevertheless, it seems to me quite clear that to make th commendation effectively, we need a fresh scrutiny of th

ersions of the Fourth Gospel into other languages. It is surely ot in the interests of Christian missions that the young hurches should only have in their hands versions that were made ver a century ago, before the work of the textual critics of the ineteenth and twentieth centuries. If British and American cholars are now engaged, as I understand that they are, upon a evision of the Greek New Testament text, surely the results of hat revision should be made accessible as speedily as possible to ie ministries and schools of those young Churches, if only in order hat their members shall not be misinformed Christians who may ave afterwards to unlearn some of the things that have previously een taught them. And again, it is quite clear that the original anslators of the Fourth Gospel were not in possession of such ill information as, for example, the late Dr. Wilfrid Knox has ately been able to communicate through his Schweich Lectures id his article in the *Harvard Theological Review* (not even Dr. Westcott had it), so that to them (though perhaps not to Westcott[5]) ie *logos* of the famous prologue meant not the personification of Cosmic Principle but little more than what Protestant funda- entalists mean when they say, 'The Bible is the Word of God.'

(2) But secondly. The proper use of the *logos*-doctrine should nable Christian theologians to distinguish the Christian idea of ie Incarnation from that found in other religions. As I have ready said, the doctrine of the Johannine writings is most em- hatically not docetic. The gospel prologue and the first epistle re at one on this point. The phase in its history when Christianity as most like Hinduism was the dangerous period, so often dealized by romantic historians, when it freely used the apocry- hal gospels to fill out the story of the life of Jesus, and when a rge number of parish churches had a sort of Christian *sadhu* ttached to them. It was, however, only a phase from which the enaissance and the Reformation, with all their shortcomings and berrations, effectually delivered us. In commending Christianity s the common world religion of the future, it is essential to stress hat the life of Jesus is a matter of genuine history and not edifying lyth or legend, and that therefore we tell it because it is true, and ven prune it so as to remove any possible legendary accretions. t is true as a supreme episode in what Professor Burkitt once escribed as 'the career of God,' and it is true as an account of ertain events which occurred in first-century Palestine under the omans. Now the stories of Indian *avatars* such as Rama and

[5] See his important note on the Philonean *logos* in his Commentary on the ourth Gospel, pp. xvi-xviii.

Krishna are choked with legend, and the pious believer is not only undisturbed by it, but is prepared actually to justify the situation because, on principle, history for him does not possess the significance which it does for the philosophic Christian. (If you doubt this, see what Pandit Nehru says about it in the *Discovery of India*.[6]) The successive appearances of the *Dharmakaya* in the Buddhism of the Mahayana are singularly unhistorical, and nobody seems to worry about it. Who the devout Japanese thinks Amida and Nyorai to have been, or when he thinks they lived, is a complete enigma, and if he were to trust the judgment of Mr Aldous Huxley, it would not very much matter if they were no more than the Christ of the apocryphal *Acts of John* — 'Perceive thou in me the piercing of the *logos*, the wounding of the *logos* the dying of the *logos*. Thou hearest that I suffered, *yet I did not suffer*. So speak I, separating off the manhood. 'This as you see is not the orthodox *logos*-doctrine, but it *is* a *logos*-doctrine and it would be quite acceptable to many Orientals, who as Nehru says are woolly about whether things happened or whether they did not. If we once abandon the anchorage of our belief upon historical events, in the vain hope of becoming more spiritual, we shall not only find ourselves drifting into a not very respectable theosophy, but we shall be taking over from India just those very ideas which some of her best intellects are uneasy about, or would like to get rid of. We shall also be playing straight into the hands of the Marxists, who *do* value the elucidation of the course of events, although their reading of them is not the same as ours, but as has been already maintained, is something like a dialectic antithesis to it.

I would pause here for a moment to say that it is most disquieting to read (as we did in yesterday's papers) that on November 1st next, as a climax to the Holy Year, the Bishop of Rome is intending to decree a new dogma — the bodily assumption of Mary, the Mother of Jesus. One can conceive no objection to people holding such a belief as a pious opinion, if they can satisfy themselves that they are justified in so doing; but for ecclesiastical authority to make it a matter *de fide* at any time, least of all at the present one, can hardly be regarded otherwise than as a great disservice to the historically based Christian religion, and as a mortal blow at the cause of Christian reunion. The belief in the bodily assumption of Mary belongs to legend, not to history. There is nothing to support it in the canonical scriptures, and its appearance as a pious opinion does not occur in the Eastern

[6] *e.g.* page 75.

church before 650 A.D. and in the Western Church before the eighth century of the Christian era.[7] It sounds suspiciously like an adaptation of the myth of the bodily assumption of Herakles, and it can have no possible value as a dogma. To decree it now is to give to a troubled world facing the menace of Marxism the impression that the largest single body of Christians is interested not in fact but in myth, and a rather trivial myth at that. However sincere the promoters of this decree may be, one is bound to say that from the point of view of honest scholarship it is 'a detestable enormity.' We who are here may not be a large body, but it seems clear that according to our principles we are in duty bound to raise our united voice against any such public declaration, seeing that it is not a private denominational matter but that it would inflict grave injury upon the Christian cause in general. To many who subscribe to Anglo-Catholic views, as much as to ourselves, the prospect of this decree seems hardly believable. Indeed, if one did not hold the Christian doctrine of God one would be tempted to quote the old tag: *Quem deus vult perdere prius dementat.* I sincerely trust that the voice of every reputable English-speaking scholar will be raised in protest, asking the Holy Father with all due respect to repudiate such a project. It is painful to have to say what will I fear give pain to fellow-Christians whose earnestness and devotion one cannot fail to admire and respect, but the times are too serious for one to mince matters. I desire only to 'speak the truth in love.'

And now finally let me come back to Professor Donald Baillie. The crux of his argument is to be found in the fourth section of his fifth chapter, the paradox of the Incarnation. He bases it upon the familiar paradox, 'I yet not I,' and quotes the well-known words of the hymn:

> And every virtue we possess
> And every conquest won
> And every thought of holiness
> Are His alone.

[7] The *Catholic Encyclopaedia* gives the information that the main evidence is a statement purporting to have been made at the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) that a tomb alleged to have been that of Mary was opened during the lifetime of the apostle Thomas and found empty. This is not contemporary evidence, and the selection of Thomas as the principal figure suggests an attempt to represent him as acting in harmony with his character as given in the Fourth Gospel. Other evidence is an apocryphal book, together with some sermons, one by St. Jerome, which are adjudged spurious. That fine and judicious scholar, Pope Benedict XIV, is said to have declared the statement about the bodily assumption of Mary to be 'a probable opinion,' though he adds, doubtless as a concession to the pious, that it is impious and even blasphemous to doubt it.

As he says, the truth is that in the last analysis a Christian does no live by practising any ethic or moulding himself on any ideal, bu by a faith in God which ascribes all good to Him, and it is pa of the paradox that this does not make us morally irresponsible.

Applying this to the elucidation of what is known as the doc trine of the two natures in Christ, he reminds us that the gospels and by no means least of all the Fourth Gospel, show us that i the historical Jesus this paradox, 'I yet not I,' is brought to i peak. His self-consciousness was swallowed up in his deep an humble and continual consciousness of God. In the Fourt Gospel, with its transcendently high Christology, the paradox ever present. 'A man that hath told you the truth.' 'Yet no I but the Father.' 'The Son can do nothing of himself but wha he seeth the Father doing.' 'I am not come of myself.' 'I spea not from myself.' 'I seek not mine own glory.' Here, says Baillie we have the highest claims made in such a way that they soun rather like disclaimers. The higher they become, the more do the refer themselves to God, giving God all the glory. Thus the unio of the humanity and divinity is seen in the perfection of the su render of the former[8] which makes possible a unique descent of th gracious Personality of the Father into the spatio-temporal orde That, unless I have misunderstood it, is Baillie's thesis. If w apply it to an expression of the relationship between the sain and sages of the Christian and non-Christian worlds, we can sa that, in proportion to the sincerity and earnest searching of th latter after the Truth, the Grace of God, or, if you would prefer i the Divine *logos* or Self-Expression of God, is manifest in an through their lives. But — and here we must agree with Kraem — God is really God and man is really man, and the *full* manife tation, if only we are realists enough to see and admit it, requir something more than a mere *tat tvam asi*, 'thou art That.' The is an age-long tension between the creaturely and the Creator, that the end of the gospel is not seen in the peaceful didact atmosphere of the last discourses. It *costs* more than that. Th incarnate *logos* has to go to his agony and his crucifixion befo His reign can begin.

[8] Baillie would I think agree, from the moment of conception.

THE TRINITY: MEANING OR MYSTERY

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CHRISTIANITY claims that the doctrine of the Trinity is its own particular contribution to man's knowledge of the nature of God: God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is not possible to say who invented this doctrine, for many minds played their part in its formulation; rather did it grow out of an original religious experience, an experience of God in Jesus the Messiah. The many stages in its growth are marked by the sincerity, spiritual insight, intellectual ability, and above all, by the faith of men who desired to fathom the mystery of Jesus' relation to God. In attempting this, many fell into error, and the doctrine as finally set forth in the creeds and formularies of the Church represents, for the most part, the result of a long series of defensive battles against heresy, culminating in the definition of Chalcedon. This necessity of preserving the unity of the Church's doctrine against heresy actually played a more important part in the formulation of the doctrine, than did the innate desire to penetrate the hidden mystery of the nature of God. The remarkable words of Hilary of Poitiers provide the background against which development should be viewed:

> 'The errors of heretics and blasphemers force us to deal with unlawful matters, to scale perilous heights, to speak unutterable words, to trespass on forbidden ground. Faith ought in silence to fulfil the commandments, worshipping the Father, reverencing with Him the Son, abounding in the Holy Spirit, but we must strain the poor resources of our language to express thoughts too great for words. The error of others compels us to err in daring to embody in human terms truths which ought to be hidden in the silent veneration of the heart.' [1]

It is not my intention to attempt a treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity philosophically; I am not competent to do that, but let me say at the outset, it contains not a single philosophical concept but what is vitiated by premises which no philosopher as such could accept. Nor do I propose to treat it theologically, for it is only by emptying words of any meaning, or by giving them a meaning which is meaningless, that any significance can be found by this approach, and even then it is only the significance of make-belief.[2] I propose therefore to treat the subject historically,

[1] *De Trinitate* ii, 2 (about 350 A.D.).

[2] A good example of this kind of treatment is to be found in Barth's *Doctrine of the Word of God*, ch. ii.

for only in that way is it possible to understand what the Fathe were trying to express, and why they expressed it in any one wa By watching the doctrine develop, by observing the permutatio and combinations of ideas, influences and difficulties as it too form, we can best gauge its strength and its weaknesses, and ther by measure its significance.

I have said that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity grew o of a religious experience, a religious experience centred in Jes the Messiah. It had its roots, however, deeply embedded in th soil which nurtured him. This religious experience in Jesus wa the culmination of a wider age-long Semitic religious experienc It would be a waste of time to look for a doctrine of the Trini in the Old Testament, but there is much there which Christianit rightly or wrongly, used both in the early and in the later stag of the doctrine's growth.

Polytheism is the deification of unrelated sources of religiou experience: monotheism is the deification of related ones. Th monotheism which Christianity inherited from Judaism claime to have been revealed, that is, that there had been a continuou subject-object relationship between God and Israel. From th classic period of Hebrew monotheism, the transcendental mon theism of the sixth and following centuries, this relationship wa indirect; revelation was mediated through God's word, an through his spirit, impersonal agents of his will and powe These vehicles of revelation, these immediate sources of religiou experience, were never deified. Once Judaism left polytheis behind, it left it severely alone. It had no theories of God 'twoness' or of his 'threeness,' no binity, no trinity: 'the Lor our God is one Lord.'[3] Prophets were God-inspired men; lik bishops, they might be translated,[4] but they were never deifie David was God-anointed, God-begot, God's son,[5] but neither h nor his Messiah was ever deified. Jewish monotheism held fir to the end.

This was the legacy of Judaism to Christianity, a God wh revealed himself to man, usually to special men, through his i personal word, or spirit. This is the theory of revelation in th early sources of the New Testament. Jesus is the recipient of revelation through the impersonal spirit.[6] Of Old Testament cat gories of recipients of revelation, he is identified with the me sianic. As such he proved to be a failure: he was crucified, he d not bring in the promised kingdom. Such, however, had he be

[3] *Deut.* vi, 4. [4] *II Kings* ii, 11. [5] *Psalm* ii, 7f. [6] *Mk.* i, 10.

some as a centre of religious experience, that he was still the essiah; but he was Messiah in a different sense. He was no longer recipient of revelation, he was its vehicle; he was the revelation God, 'for in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead dily.'[7] He would come again as Messiah to consummate this perience of God which they had through him. Jesus became the ntre of a cult. To him were ascribed the ancient messianic titles, t with a new significance; anointed of God, begotten of God, od's Son, of whom David had spoken; the heavenly Son of Man, Son the Messiah, of whom the Apocalyptists had dreamed. ut Jesus was not deified.

His relationship to the spirit, which had made him what he as,[8] now became uncertain. Had he taken its place? No, for e spirit was still a vehicle of revelation working with the spirit the Messiah, as well as independently of him.[9] There were now o vehicles of revelation, two immediate sources of religious exrience, Jesus and the spirit, the one personal, the other still imrsonal. Both were working for the same consummation which sus as Messiah was about to perfect. Jesus did not come, nor d his kingdom; they were let down again. Logic, religious fertur, and the march of events suggested that he could not come til all the world owned allegiance to him; but that would take very long time. Meanwhile, many were disillusioned, many gan to fall back. Was this new religious experience but another lse hope, the dream of a Golden Age which would never come? hristianity was in serious danger of disintegration from within. ich was its position in the last decades of the first century.

During its first stage of development Christianity had been minated by this expectation of the Second Coming. Speculan about Jesus had been prejudiced by preconceived messianic eas of a functional kind. There had been little time for speculan on his personal relationship to God. What mattered was the vation which he had brought, and which he was about to comete. That in itself raised many problems, practical and theogical; to them Paul and others primarily devoted themselves. ho was Jesus? Beyond the fact that he was the Messiah, did at matter? Two steps forward had, however, been taken; first, new conception of Messiah had emerged, namely, as a source religious experience and a vehicle, rather than a recipient, of velation; and secondly, a personal vehicle of revelation had en added to the traditionally impersonal ones. From these two w ideas sprang the problem which lay at the heart of Trinitarian

[7] *Col.* ii, 9. [8] *Rom.* i, 4. [9] *Rom.* viii, 9f.

definition. What was the relationship of this new personal agen on the one hand to God, on the other hand to the impersona spirit? On the former question, faith and tradition had no doubt Jesus the Messiah is God's Son: but reason asked, how is h God's Son?

Christianity was saved from the disintegration which threatene it by the answer given to these questions by men of a differer culture from that of their predecessors. Though tentative sugge tions had already been made in the same direction,[10] it was th author of the Fourth Gospel who first seriously took up the cha lenge. His answer was, Jesus the Messiah is God's Son becaus he is God. He is God because the *logos*, the Word of God, whic in the beginning 'was with God' and 'was God,' 'became fles and tabernacled among us.'[11] In this he really ignores the que tion of Sonship; instead, he propounds an assumption, albeit, a assumption born of his own religious experience. He save Christianity. There was to be no Second Coming in the physica sense; there was no need, for the *logos* which had reigned eternall in the hearts of believers, would continue to do so. He revolu tionized messianic thought. He did this by superimposing on wholly Hebrew concept a purely Greek one, thereby raising from the categories of the national and temporal to those of th universal and eternal. By the bold and wholly unprecedente stroke of deifying the *logos*, he deified the Messiah also.

The author of the Fourth Gospel had carried the formulatio of the doctrine of the Trinity a stage further, from Jesus th Messiah is the Son of God, to Jesus the Messiah is God, but i doing so he involved himself in endless difficulties. As we hav seen, his problem was to explain the relationship of a person and an impersonal source of religious experience to each othe and to God the ultimate source of all religious experience. It wa a sound religious instinct which told him that all religious exper ence was one. To express this idea, the *logos*, the underlyin principle of reality which gave both form and content to the un verse and to everything in it, and which was inseparable from Go was ideally suited. By this means, these two sources of religiou experience could be reduced to one, and that one identified wi God. The *logos* concept had, however, one great drawback, th *logos* was impersonal. As such, it could be identified with th impersonal spirit; but not with Jesus, for religious experience ar

[10] By the author of *Hebrews*, and possibly by Paul in his later epistles, b neither gets as far as deifying Jesus.

[11] *John* i, 1 f.

radition insisted that Jesus was a person. The *logos* must there-ore be made personal; this he does by his theory of incarnation. hat, however, raised a further difficulty; the *logos* was a universal rinciple, and, though it might temporarily be confined to one an, that process had to be reversed, and without loss of the per-onality gained by its incarnation. Here he calls to his aid the esurrection; the *logos*-endowed Jesus goes to the Father, the no onger impersonal *logos* thus resuming his previous relationship ith God. He also resumes his previous relationship with the orld as the Spirit, now, also for the first time, personified by dentification with the glorified Jesus.[12]

The author of the Fourth Gospel succeeded in accomplishing hat he set out to do. He united the two sources of religious xperience, the personal and the impersonal, in the one personal ource of all religious experience. He left behind him, however, trail of theological chaos which occupied the attention of the athers of the next three hundred years. He prescribed their ne of thought, and prejudiced their conclusions. If any man an be credited with having framed the doctrine of the Trinity, it ould be the author of the Fourth Gospel. The weaknesses of his eory are obvious. He did not attempt to justify his deification ither of the *logos* or of Jesus, or to define the relationship etween the *logos* and God, and therefore between Jesus and od, and between the Spirit and God. The deity which Jesus eceived from the *logos* was essentially an impersonal deity, and he personality which the *logos* received from Jesus was a human ersonality. His incarnation, if not meaningless, was purposeless part from his scheme of things. His identification of the Spirit ith the glorified Jesus deprived it of both existence and *raison 'être*.[13]

In departing from previous Jewish and Christian monotheistic recedent of not deifying sources of religious experience other hat the ultimate one, the author of the Fourth Gospel had chal-enged monotheism. Could two sources of religious experience be eified, and there not be more than one God? It was a serious hallenge, for monotheism was the rock on which Christianity was ounded theologically, its differentia from all other religious ystems excepting that of Judaism. Polytheism would have been

[12] *John* vii, 39. cp. xiv, 3 f., 28 f., xvi 13 f.

[13] A similar theory of the relationship of Jesus to God through the *logos*-Spirit is worked out with greater naïvety and with more picturesque detail n the roughly contemporaneous *Shepherd of Hermas*, and in some of the Apocryphal Gospels.

an easy way out of the difficulty; add Jesus to the pantheon, and all would be well: so thought the Emperors. Such a suggestion was resisted with blood. Christianity had challenged itself from within; the challenge must be met from within.

The Fathers of the second and third centuries turned with devotion to this task. Some of them abandoned altogether the idea that Jesus was God. The Gnostics declared that he was one of a series of aeons, like stars from celestial space, split off from God: his appearance on earth was an illusion, he was of the angelic type. The Adoptionists and others avowed that Jesus was an inspired man, indwelt, as in a temple, by the Spirit, thereby he was raised to divine status. The Sabellians accepted the idea that Jesus was God, but affirmed that the whole Godhead dwelt in him.

The first real champions of Christian monotheism were the Greek Apologists[14]; they saw that an answer must be given by defining in what sense Jesus was God, not by abandoning the idea, or by identifying him with the whole Godhead. They took the problem up where the author of the Fourth Gospel had left it, and they used his tools. They saw that the main weakness of his assertion that Jesus was God lay in the fact that he had not defined the way in which the indwelling *logos* was God. They therefore addressed themselves to this task of defining the relation of *logos* to God, only to find themselves left with a Jesus indwelt by an impersonal 'god.' The second champions were the Latin Apologists.[15] They practically abandoned the *logos* approach to the problem, though they inherited the confusion caused by it, and looked for the deity of Jesus in his Sonship. They left behind a secondary god, a vocabulary, and a seed bed of heresy.

Though neither Greek nor Latin Apologists got very far in their defence of Christian monotheism, they exposed its difficulties. One of the greatest of these, and one which, as Hilary saw, remained with their successors to the end, was that of language. They were engaged in problems of metaphysics, but the only vocabulary of metaphysics which they possessed was Greek. From the point of view of what they were trying to give expression to, they could hardly have been more unfortunate. They were trying to express a religious experience. While Greek had no rivals as a language of metaphysics, it was not the language of religion, belonging as it did to agnostic systems of thought.

[14] Justin, Tatian, Theophilus and others.
[15] Tertullian, and Minucius Felix.

Confusion was worse confounded by the fact that the Church was bilingual. This meant that Latin equivalents had to be found for Greek terms, and *vice versa*. What does Tertullian's Trinitarian formula mean, *tres, non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie,*' either as a definition or in terms of theological enlightenment?

The Fathers were equally unfortunate in the key words which they had inherited from their own Christian tradition, for they carried with them some concepts which were either wholly, or in part, alien to the ideas which they wanted to express. *Logos* and Son, for instance, had long histories behind them. *Logos*, as we have seen, conveyed the Greek idea of an essentially impersonal relationship between the phenomenal world and the reality which lay behind it. Despite poetic licence which had clothed it with the language of personality, despite the author of the Fourth Gospel's identification of Jesus with it, the leopard never changed his spots. It was a dangerously shifty word, too, for in describing the ultimate relationship between God and *logos*, too much emphasis on distinction brought out these inherent impersonal qualities, leaving Jesus an inspired man; while too much emphasis on identity, then *logos* merged into what it was an expression of, and any distinction between Jesus and God disappeared. These difficulties, inalienably idigenous to the term, could only be avoided if *logos* was given a new meaning delicately balanced between these two extreme tendencies. The other term, Son, had equal, if not greater, drawbacks. Whereas *logos* was essentially impersonal, Son was essentially personal. It had been used in the Old Testament of the relation of individuals as well as of the nation to God; it had been used in the New Testament of individual Christians,[16] as well as of Jesus. Inherent in it was the idea of derivation, dependence, subordination, as well as, to say the least, a quasi-physical relationship: used as a Trinitarian term it was an incorrigible anthropomorphism. If the distinction between Son and Father was stressed, bitheism, the first step towards polytheism, was inevitable; if the identity, its use became meaningless. Again, a delicate balance between these two extremes had to be preserved. It was only when Son ceased to mean Son, and *logos* ceased to mean *logos*, and each meant what the other meant, though no one ever knew precisely what that was, that these words could safely be used.

Difficulty was also caused by the term Spirit. As we have seen, it had been badly compromised by the author of the Fourth

[16] *Gal.* iv, 7; *Rom* viii, 16f.; etc.

Gospel. Speculation on the place of the Spirit in the Godhead is rare in the writings of these Fathers. They were largely preoccupied with the problem of the relation of the Son to the Father, hence their approach was binitarian rather than trinitarian. That is of course understandable, for once the rigidity of the monotheism which Christianity had inherited from Judaism had been broken down, relationships could be extended *ad infinitum* as religious experience demanded. It is difficult to comprehend why Roman Catholics are satisfied with a Trinity when, if not their beliefs, then certainly their devotions, so obviously demand a Quaternity. The main difficulty, however, connected with the term Spirit was due to the fact that in both Jewish and Christian literature, its content is equivalent to that of *logos*, and, as the *logos* had been used in attempts to elucidate the relationship of Son to the Father, the Spirit's fire had been stolen. It was superfluous both as a term and as an idea, but tradition and religious experience demanded its retention.

The difficulties of terminology were nothing as compared with those of the problem to which they related, and these were enhanced by the way in which the Fathers approached it. Their problem was twofold: how was Christian monotheism to be defended, and in what sense was Jesus God? With varying degrees of success they managed to defend monotheism, but they found themselves always in a dilemma. If they stressed the oneness of God, they compromised the deity of Jesus; if they stressed the deity of Jesus they compromised monotheism. They were led into this dilemma because they approached the problem as that of revelation rather than as the problem of the nature of God. The inevitable result was that whatever relationship they agreed to exist between Jesus and God was brought about by cosmic causes, that is, either by the necessity of creation, or by that of redemption. Had there been no creation, had there been no fall there would have been no Trinity. The Son and the Spirit were the offspring, not of a necessity indigenous to the nature of God but of a cosmic need.

So far, that is up to the beginning of the first quarter of the third century, little or nothing had been done to resolve the problem. The first to see the inadequacy of the arguments put forward by the Greek and Latin Apologists was Origen. He realized that their approach had been wrong, that the problem was a metaphysical problem rather than one of revelation. He started a new line of approach, for he recognized that if Jesus was God then he must be God, as it were, in his own right, because of an essential relationship to God, not on account of the needs of his

creation. If there was a Trinity, it must belong to the very nature of God. He saw that a new definition of monotheism was necessary. He removed the problem from the domain of religious experience to that of the academy. From his time on it was treated increasingly as an academic problem. Origen therefore approached the problem of Son-Father relationship as a philosopher. Modelling his thought on the idea of the relation of the particular to the universal, he produced his famous theory of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father. There never was a time when the Son was not; no priority could be given to the Father over the Son excepting the purely nominal one as implied by the term Father. Origen's philosophical model left no room for the Spirit; like his predecessors, he is uncertain how to relate him to Father or Son. He finds no word with which to describe any relationship, and though he assumed the eternity of the Spirit, he nevertheless refers to him as a creature.

Apart from taking the problem out of the sphere of cosmic relationships, and establishing the co-eternity of the Son and the Father, Origen contributes nothing to its elucidation. If his theory of an autogenous God means anything, it means that the distinction between the Son and the Father is so fine that it exists only in name. Though Origen approached the problem as one of divine autogeny, he gives no reason for such spontaneous generation on the part of the Father. There was none to give excepting that of the requirements of religious experience. His solution, like that of the Apologists is, in the last resort, based on a necessity imposed by cosmic need. His Trinity is not really an essential one, but an economic one. With his predecessors, he fell a victim to the wiles of *logos* theology.

The next stage in the building up of the doctrine of the Trinity was brought about by the speculations of Arius. Partly influenced by Origen, and by way of reaction to the Sabellian tendencies which he suspected in the Church at Alexandria, he started from the theory that God was unknowable. He could not have had any part in creation; he could not have revealed himself. It followed, therefore, that Jesus could neither have been God, nor have revealed him. He was an inferior being; his title God was honorific; he was the demigod who created the world, the demiurge.

Here was a new challenge, and at a time when the Church was beginning to feel its way in the world. It was backed by both popular and influential support. Drastic measures had to be taken. They were; 318 bishops were summoned to Nicaea to deal

with it. So far matters of heresy had been dealt with locally, but here was something which challenged the central article of the Christian faith. Jesus had never before been so divorced from God. It was a challenge to the whole Church, the whole Church must meet it. The question of the relationship of Jesus to God must no longer be dependent on the speculations of individual scholars and teachers, or enshrined only in a body of tradition; it must be stated with authority, it must be formulated officially. The first oecumenical council produced the first official attempt to formulate a doctrine of the Trinity, but not until three centuries had elapsed since the religious experience which gave it birth.

The result of these deliberations at Nicaea, and later at many other councils, are familiar to us. 'We believe in one God . . . and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, Very God of very God, begotten, not made, of one substance with the Father . . . and in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceedeth from the Father.'

Behind this neat formula, which was not fixed until 381, there had raged a battle of words. It began when Athanasius, the most perspicacious of the contestants, threw into the arena the word ὁμοούσιος, *of the same substance*. He wanted to rule out every trace of the Arian idea that the Son was a creature, or in any way different in nature from the Father. The word, he thought, would guarantee the Son's oneness with the Father. To some of his colleagues, however, that was its drawback, not its recommendation. In fighting Arius was he not offering a sop to Sabellius? Did the word not imply that there was no distinction between Father and Son? This disquiet over the word exposed the great weakness in their discussions, and in their thought. They had never defined either the nature of God, or that of the distinctions within the Godhead, and yet they were trying to relate the two comparatively. One cannot compare two unknown qualities.

The battle of words which followed need not detain us; suffice it to say that it produced words only. An old word, 'substantia,' but with a new meaning, was chosen to express the nature of God; another, 'persona,' also with a new meaning, to express the distinctions within that nature. In each case form was there but content remained vague and undefined. The Fathers had addressed themselves to the question, how can the Father be God, the Son be God, and the Spirit be God, and yet there be only one God? They slipped out of the dilemma, first, by saying that God is one substance, which is not the same thing as saying that

there is only one God; secondly, that God is three persons, which is not the same as saying the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God. Nor did they attempt to substantiate these claims: they were assumptions based on tradition and religious experience. They may have been justifiable assumptions, but they were assumptions nevertheless. Neither the oneness, or the threeness, of their Father-Son-Spirit relationship belonged to the nature of God; they depended on the universe in which he was active. Their Trinity, too, like Origen's is a trinity of revelation. Their Father-Son relationship was also intrinsically subordinationist. Despite the ὁμοούσιον, its key word 'begotten,' whatever its precise meaning, and that was never defined, cannot escape the implication of derivation, an implication reinforced by the anthropomorphic terms Father and Son.

Unsatisfactory as was their definition of the relation of the Son to the Father, their classification of the Spirit was even more unsatisfactory. For reasons best known to Athanasius and his successors, the ὁμοούσιον could not be used. What other possibilities were there? Begotten? They had declared the Son to be the only-begotten of the Father: there could not be two 'only-begottens.' The word 'proceeding,' a further legacy from Johannine theology,[17] was chosen. Thereby they gave back to the Spirit the position in Trinitarian thought from which it had been ousted by the *logos*; but its status was still vague and nebulous. It was vague and nebulous because, though the term *logos* had been replaced by the term Son, nevertheless the Son had retained all the qualities characteristic of the *logos*. There was still no *raison d'être* for the Spirit. Though the Nicene definition is trinitarian in form it is binitarian in content.

Some of the weaknesses of Nicene thought were fully appreciated by the Cappadocians,[18] who, mainly in order to counteract tritheistic and subordinationist tendencies latent in it, propounded their theories of περιχώρησις, or *interpenetration*. Father, Son, and Spirit were not just three 'persons' linked together as one God by the vague ties of 'unbegotten,' 'begotten' and 'proceeding,' or by two of them sharing 'the same substance.' They were not three Gods working in harmony. They were essentially one God, not working now as Father, now as Son, now as Spirit, but one God working always and eternally as Father, Son, and Spirit. Between them there was an interpenetration of action, thought, will, so that any one act of one was equally the act of the whole.

[17] *John* xv, 26.
[18] Two Gregorys and Basil.

All ideas of derivation, separateness, or subordinateness must be ruled out. The doctrine of the Trinity was the doctrine of 'God in God,' not that of 'God of God.'

One merit of their theory was that it further strengthened the status of the Spirit, giving him a functional place in the Trinity equal to that of the Father and the Son, but they did nothing to show why his place there was really necessary. The Cappadocians in their anxiety to insist upon the oneness of the distinctions or persons within the Trinity deprived them of any significance whatever excepting as labels for particular types of action by God. Indeed, they virtually abolished the distinctions, and therefore the Trinity. Despite their claims that the threeness of God belonged to his very nature, in so far as they allowed it to exist, it was still a threeness of revelation. In attempting to escape from tritheism and subordinationism, they too gave hostages to Sabellianism.

With the Cappadocians further speculation on the Trinity ceased. The findings of the Fathers were enshrined, with becoming anathemas, in The Definition at Chalcedon, and later in the so-called Athanasian Creed. Those who continued to concern themselves with the problem confined their attentions to the elucidation of what had already been done. By the application of appropriate and inappropriate analogies, they attempted to rescue from its academic sepulchre this inalienable inheritance, to breathe into its dry bones some breath of life, some religious and devotional value.

Meaning or mystery? This cursory historical survey should have left no doubt in our minds that the exposition of the doctrine of Trinity as set out in the formularies of the Church was not a part of the Apostolic tradition, nor, as some would have it, does it date back to the Old Testament, and beyond. It was the product of trial and error in the science of definition; it was built up over a period of some four hundred years. It was a monument raised up out of the ruins of heresies and schisms. Though it is in itself an empty shell, it is a monument to something. It is a monument to a unique religious experience which, as Hilary wrote, ought never to have been expressed in words. It adds nothing to man's knowledge of God excepting in so far as it points back to the religious experience which it attempts to define. It teaches nothing about his nature, only about his self-revelation. Though it claims to define a triune God, what it does define is a triune experience of God, in creation, redemption and sanctification. It is not polytheism, because its sources of religious experience are related to one ultimate source; it is not monotheism,

because more than one source of religious experience is deified; but it is nearer the former than the latter. Whether the Fathers were right in treating religious experience chronologically and historically in this way is a matter of faith. Can religious experience be so departmentalized? Were there three revelations of God, and not a million? Only those who can still so separate their religious experience can find any meaning in the doctrine and claim the right to believe and to teach it.

Jesus the Messiah, not God, is the sole foundation-stone of the Trinitarian edifice; without the experience of God which men had in him, it would never have been built. No previous categories of messiahship, or of religious experience, were sufficient to contain him; the idea of God had to be changed in order to accommodate him. Did this religious experience as centred in him justify his deification, and if so, did it justify a denial of the unity of religious experience as centred in God? Again, only faith, and religious experience, can answer these questions. The nature of God is a mystery, it must always be so: the Fathers attempted to explain this Mystery, but in doing so they made it thrice mystified.

DOGMATIC REFORM

By C. J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D., Rector of Kingston, Canterbury

Introduction. To-day is a liberating and creative age, demanding truthful and courageous men and women. The possibilities for good or ill are thus incalculable.

WHAT is 'Dogma,' and what 'Dogmatics'? asks both the sceptical materialist and the theological authoritarian. Neither, I fear, will stay for an answer. The first, because he cannot think there is anything to stay for. The second, because all is settled and arranged: for *about* 'dogmas,' 'ours not to reason why'; while *within* 'dogmas,' we must live and die.

To the first, 'Dogma' and 'Dogmatics' are about nothing—the day- and night-dreams of an intoxicated vanity. To the second they are about everything — the universal code of an infallible rationalism. To the first, 'Dogma' and 'Dogmatics' call not for reformation but for destruction. To the second, they call not for reconstruction but for imposition, the agents being

Prompt to impose, and fond to dogmatize.

To the first, there is nothing to be shaped. To the second, there is nothing to be re-shaped. To the first, 'Dogmatics' is 'finished'—done for — in the sense that it ought never to have been started. To the second, 'Dogmatics' is 'finished' — in the sense that it is complete. To the first, it is a vain thing, and about vanity. To the second, it is a 'supernatural' thing, and about the 'infallible.'

That I am not constructing antitheses as a neat and cheap exercise will be obvious to all acquainted, however slightly, with the history of Dogmatics. Always there have been those who declared that man can know nothing. Always there have been those who affirmed that he can know everything: having even been allowed 'a peep into the autobiography of God.' Each class has created the other. As a symbol of the first, the Gospels give us 'jesting Pilate,' with his 'What is Truth?': and also shrewd Caiaphas, who expressed his negation in a more oblique, but also more final, way, with his 'It is expedient that one man should die for the people.' As a symbol of the second, I know none better than the altar-table at the Council of Trent where side by side stood 'The Infallible Book' and its Final Interpretation by Aquinas, the mediaeval modernist, who himself, let us remember, knew at the end of his mighty dogmatician's effort that all he had written was as straw. Perhaps — dreadful thought! — some

Modern Churchman's dogmatics may one day become as authoritative as Aquinas or Calvin.

So the motto of this my introduction is: *There is a third way.* Dogmatics is neither about nothing nor about everything. It is either done-for, nor completed. Indeed, it will only be done-for if it is regarded as a finished article and taught or imposed as such. In that case, misinterpretation and misrepresentation must continue to create each other: even as it has often been noted about 'the dogma of the Trinity,' that the misinterpretations of Christians and the misrepresentations of non-Christians have always mirrored each other, and also afforded each other weapons for the blinkered dialectical battle.

That third way is the theme of this paper. It is a much less easy, and a much more adventurous, way than either of the others. 'Dynamite,' as a friend said to me. However, it is now inescapable: imposed, indeed, by our whole present situation, or, as I prefer to say, by Providence. It is not the mediaeval Scholastic's way, with his two infallibilities, with his clear division of knowledge and truth into 'natural' and 'revealed' and with his sacrosanct dichotomy of events into the law-abiding and the miracle. Nor is it the Reformed Scholastic's way, with his one infallibility instead of two, and with the other two divisions — of knowledge and event — as before. Nor is it the enquiry-frightened way that devoted Newman felt he must travel, seeing only two possible roads, Atheism and Rome: a hasty and tortured simplification which has left a thwarting and divisive heritage in English Christianity and throughout its world-wide Communions. This third way — of Dogmatic Reform — calls, first, for a truthful estimate of the present situation, of its causes and of the moral and spiritual principles on which Reformation must be based; and, second, for a practical programme of specific reshaping.

1. The Present Situation, its Causes, and Principles of Reform

First — and here I must begin, for it is my basic though unprovable conviction — the distintegration of dogmatic systems in our times is but the negative side of the positive, if at present uncertain and clouded, struggle for reintegration. When the nature of this struggle is more clearly and generally seen reformation will proceed apace. At present it tarries, for the issues are confused. Sanctified obstacles abound. 'No thoroughfare' notices still intimidate. And, as it was in the dogmatic controversies of the fourth century, few know whether they strike at friend or foe.

Dogma and Civilization.

The disintegration of dogma and dogmatic system is closely involved in what is called 'A Day of Disintegrating Civilization.' Civilization is the name for the way of life of people emerging from barbarism and savagery, and seeking to be loyal to the final values of Truth and Justice. It is the expression of what they think, and feel, and will. It is not a self-created entity, nor did it descend ready-made from the sky. There is no 'civilization' without civilized men and women. We all tend to hypostasize abstractions — like 'civilization,' 'science,' 'religion,' and so on — and these become verbal weapons for attack or self-defence, ideological shelters, and sometimes cradle-songs. How often do we hear and read such sentences as 'civilization is collapsing,' 'science thinks this, and does that,' 'religion says this, or ensures that.' By such utterances — which we all make at times for verbal economy, or thought-avoidance — the soporific suggestion is that we are spectators, not participants; machines, not men; puppets not creators; fated things, not moral and spiritual beings. We thus escape our personal responsibility for any existing situation, and, instead of confronting it, retreat from it. We find a haven in some codified system of belief and inherited institution. We are disturbed, and we resent the disturber, forgetting that to live is to change, and to live nobly is to change much. We do not like to be roused from our dogmatic slumber. Our party and partisan concepts — even our theological concepts — have betrayed our true natures. We are in chains to the habitual. Inert ideas have become our moral jailors. Custom has fashioned our spiritual tomb.

What we variously term 'religion,' 'science,' 'theology,' 'philosophy' represent the *inner* side of a 'civilization.' They symbolize the thoughts, emotions and purposes without which it could not have been. When the creating thoughts, emotions and purposes change, the 'civilization' necessarily changes. Goethe said, 'When the religion of a civilization dies, the death of the civilization speedily follows.' That is, mind fashions form, consciousness shapes custom, spirit informs reality: and if men cease to live inwardly they begin to die outwardly. The writer of *The Proverbs* said it this way: 'Where there is no vision the people perishes.' Jesus said it this way: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Nothing is ever better than its maker. When the sap ceases to rise in a tree, no fruit is possible.

The problem presented, therefore, by what is called a 'disintegrating civilization' is the problem of man's inner life — his thoughts, emotions, and purposes. Fragmentation is a symptom

ot a cause. Our problem is ourselves: the selves of all of us; ur disordered and conflicting minds and hearts and wills.

That is why disintegrating civilization springs, in part, from isintegrating dogma. For 'dogma' is just statement of what man eems to be true. And 'dogmatics' represents the endeavour to ut all 'dogmas' into a system. When inherited dogmas are no nger generally believed to be true, decay of the civilized struc- ire of life is inevitable. That is why both the scientific humanists r materialists and the authoritarian theologians or dogmatists are oth entirely justified when they say that the basic struggle to-day about belief. But where — as I cannot but think — they are *oth* mistaken is in their conception of the place, nature and nction of dogma in the movement of human history, and in the nstruction of its meaning or of its vanity. In other words, the isintegration of dogma is, to all people of final faith, the chal- nge to the reintegration of dogma.

auses, Effects and Principles.

The causes — the historical causes — of this decay of dogma nd dogmatic system can be summed up. In recent generations here has come, as the result of an increase of truthfulness, a eeper understanding of religious literature, a fuller knowledge f history, and a greater knowledge of nature. These three are ne, inseparably one. I confine myself here to the truth of the ible, though what I wish to say applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to all eligious literature.

The Bible — itself a whole literature — was written, like all ther books, by men. The whole was thought and felt before ritten: that is, it was the expression of human consciousness nfronting all the problems of existence. Written by many men ver a thousand years, it gives *many* answers to the Whence, Why, nd Whither of all things visible and invisible. There was, how- ver, an underlying unity, certain basic insights and convictions, ehind this diversity: a unity that was felt and seen to transcend ne dividing-line between the Old and the New Testaments, in- ights and convictions common to both. Men of Palestine had rought out of a common treasury things new, and old — the old n a new way.

I cannot here and now even attempt to portray these things, ld and new. But, just as in looking at any human face you look rst at the eyes, so I ask you to look at the two speaking *eyes* of ne Bible.

The prophets of this whole literature kept saying, or trying to ay, two things. First, that all history in time and place has a

Transcendent Source, Meaning, and Goal, even though man ca never spell it out in accurate words or comprehend it in define and systematized dogmas. That is why they said 'God,' an thought 'God,' and worshipped 'God'—'God' of the unutte able name: and why they wanted always to break down men idols, both of final definition and of final denial. On the first, a image-maker and image-worshipper, the prophet of the exil poured out the vials of his irony, asking with scorn of the spiri 'To whom then will ye liken God?'; or saying, as Zophar to Jo 'Canst thou by searching find out God?': and so, inspiring ever spiritual thinker who has said, with the mediaeval Frenchman t all dogmatic chatterers, that 'Le Dieu défini, c'est le Dieu fin Of the second, as God-denier or God-derider, the Psalmist sai 'The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God'; and inspirin even the eighteenth-century prophet of mocking denial who sai 'If there were no God, it would be necessary to invent Him.'

The second thing the Biblical prophets kept saying, or tryin to say, was that this Transcendent Meaning can only be tru seen and its Goal can only be really furthered by a complete *mor* response to our immediate environing situation. That is, the had *truth in the inward parts*. Neither for self-comfort nor t applause did they fight old battles or beat dead horses. The looked at their times to see what was there, not to see what the were told or what they wished to find; and then they acted accor ingly. Thus the first of Israel's writing prophets was compelled speak because of 'man's inhumanity to man,' and man's untrut fulness to man. This was the compulsion of Truth.

These two insights and convictions may be termed *spiritu* and *moral*. In the language of definition we link them togeth and say that 'ethical monotheism' expresses the prophetic tru of the Bible: indicating both the nature of the one God wo shipped and the ethical fountain of this faith. The definition h often, alas, had the effect of converting an intense moral passi into a rationalistic screen, and an integrating spiritual insight in an emotional or even sentimental aura. The clarifying dogm tended to disintegrate its fontal moral and spiritual conviction and settled creed and inherited system circumvented the inn most truth, or drained it away into stagnant canals. This has be the history of all organized religions and of all their varied a conflicting dogmatic embodiments. It is symbolized for all ti in the life, message and mission of Jesus. 'O Jerusalem, Jerusal that killeth the prophets and stoneth them sent unto thee'!

Christianity is the daughter of Jerusalem: but, at its fou in Jesus and His message, *not* of the Jerusalem of time and pla

- that is, *not* of the Jerusalem that sought throughout its history kill truth and to circumvent justice; *not* the Jerusalem of aiaphas, *not* the Jerusalem of Pharisees and Scribes, *not* the rusalem of Zealots. Jesus was the heir, and the crown, of a long oral and spiritual history. His message did not destroy theirs: 'fulfilled' them, or was their fruition. Basically it said the me two things as they had said: but He said it with a creative iginality peculiar to His unexampled spiritual perception and oral fidelity. An ellipse with two foci — Eternity and Time, eligion and Ethics, God and Man. His symbol for Eternity was ather'; His symbol for Man was 'Brother.' The two were conined in the twin commandments which summed up the Law and e Prophets: as also in the Marcan saying, 'Whosoever shall do e will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother' *lk.* iii, 35; *Matt.* xii, 50). Loyalty to the moral and spiritual ource of man's being, as of his nature, transcends every other yalty, whether of brain (as in dogma), or of blood (as in family nd nation).

In the New Testament this crowning prophetic history is ritten in four 'Gospels,' and most dramatically in *St. John*—'the irror of Christ's spiritual flame.' This last Gospel was, accordg to the Faustus legend, the only one which Mephistopheles forade Faustus to read. It was too dangerous, and too true. It owed piercingly that throughout history Darkness had never astered Light; that the moral and the spiritual had never been xtinguished by the crafty, and never would be, for Eternity was n its side. 'The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy' *Rev.* xix, 10).

Yet the dogmatic history of the sixteen centuries up to and cluding the uncompleted Reformation shows how perilously this oral and spiritual substance of being and existence was poised time and place. For it had to be both 'explained' and peretuated, to be put both into dogmas and into institutions. The reek metaphysical thinkers saw to the first. The Latin legal dministrators saw to the second. The first called on men to *ink*. The second called on men to *obey*. But in thinking, they ubmerged the moral and the spiritual in the intellectual. And in dering, they forgot truth in discipline. The zeal of the dogmacian's house had eaten them up.

It is a long and perplexing story, of which we are all the heirs, r good and ill.

Chiefly, and briefly, it meant the subordination of the moral nd spiritual to the rationalistic and the governmental. In Scripure, moral disobedience and spiritual blindness are the darkness

and the evil to be fought and overcome. To the dogmatist, inade quate speculative ideas were the main foe to be fought and overcome. The weapons were final and infallible dogmas, guarded and hoarded by final and infallible institution. Though a dogma of infallibility was not fashioned and proclaimed until 1870, its seeds were sown, or it was logically necessitated, from the moment the Church in General Council said: 'This dogmatic definition is final, complete, unalterable.' Logical consistency involved it: the psychology of government required it. Dogma ceased to be principle and became command.

But was it not right, inevitable indeed, that Scriptural truth be defined? And was it not imperative that all should be systematized and made tight? Certainly it was right to clarify, to define, to relate, to reconcile the many and various thoughts from a thousand years of moral and spiritual history. But when the tragic word 'finality' was applied to the result, how deep the ensuing disorder in marching and questing minds! How subtle the perversions encouraged! How proud the claims put forth! Logic ceased to smile at itself or to be kind. Of which I give but two illustrations.

The first from Eusebius. A certain Apelles, at the end of the second century, confessed to a certain Rhodon his inability to *prove* some of the transcendent beliefs he held. Rhodon wrote of this confession: 'Then I laughed at him, and strongly reproved him; in that, while claiming to be a teacher, he did not know how to prove what he taught.' Rhodon seemed oblivious that while he laughed in petty pride, he was hiding his denial of Scriptural truth behind formal robes of proof.

The second illustration is from the Middle Ages. A certain Parisian master, Simon of Tournai, won the applause of his hearers by his lucid and elegant dialectic in favour of the doctrine of the Trinity. He declared that if he wished he could demolish with equal facility the doctrine he had just been maintaining. Cerebral agility mistaken for Reason! Trick for Truth! Pride for Faith!

And what influence did this emphasis on final dogmas exert upon the faithful? On those such as the old woman who carried eagerly her faggot to Hus's pile in 1415, to whom the martyr exclaimed, 'O Sancta Simplicitas!'? Let me answer my question in the words of one of the most truthful Christian teachers in nineteenth-century Oxford. 'The holding of approved opinions was elevated to a position at first co-ordinate with, and at last superior to, trust in God and the effort to live a holy life . . . it has been a *damnosa hereditas*. It has given to later Christianity that part of it which is doomed to perish, and which yet, while it

ves, holds the key of the prison-house of many souls.' (Edwin Hatch in his Hibbert Lectures.) Since then—sixty-two years ago —the perishing process has proceeded rapidly, all the time, everywhere, and among all.

The liberating process, however, is now proceeding apace, if uncertainly, and with many a backward look of hesitation and question. Through the disinterested labours of historical students, the Bible is now almost emancipated in truthful minds from the false rationalism which controlled for so many centuries its exegesis. I would remind you that both the theological system of Aquinas and that of the Protestant Scholastics were 'nailed down with texts' taken indiscriminatingly from any book of canonical Scripture. The Old and New Testaments were held to contain a complete, symmetrical and consistent body of beliefs about God, Nature and Man. Instead of a flowing stream of developing and enlarging truth, the Bible presented a frozen lake of static and inert ideas. From this imaginary body of self-consistent beliefs, deductive processes of logical reasoning could extract a final creed and an authoritative system of dogmatics. Aquinas and Calvin were here agreed, as were their smaller successors. The task was impossible, for the premisses were false. You cannot build an immovable house on a river, or in a growing tree. 'The Bible,' as Goethe said, 'will always be more beautiful the more it is understood: the more, that is, we see and observe that every word which we take in a general sense and apply specially to ourselves, had, under certain circumstances of time and place, a peculiar, special, and directly individual reference.' During the last hundred years literary and scientific students have made this plain.

All thoughtful people now know that the dogmatic clarity achieved by the dogmaticians was a false clarity — like the mirage on the desert. Abelard said of the lectures on Holy Writ by Anselm of Laon to which he listened: 'When he lit a fire, he filled the house with smoke, he did not illuminate it with light.' Biblical dogmatics was both too clear, and too dark; too rationalistically final, and too morally and spiritually hazy. It emphasized the peripheral, and clouded the central.

Of the imposition of a straight-laced dogmatism on the Scriptures the history of Theology is full of examples. In the sphere of morals, it inspired persecution to the death for minority opinion, and so denied the essential truth of all moral and spiritual history. It put most of the forward-looking books that have endured upon an Index: sharing the scepticism of the Caliph Omar when he thus justified the burning of the priceless library of Alexandria:

'What agreed with the Koran is unnecessary and what does not agree is pernicious.' In the sphere of dogma and dogmatics it made the three-fold Self-revelation of God in the Universe, Man, and Church Eternal into a proud and final rationalistic, but irrational, conundrum. It construed the priceless truth of Incarnation into a see-saw alternation of Divine and Human within the one moral and spiritual person of Jesus, or, alternatively, made His human words and deeds a play-acting game. It constructed a 'Plan of Salvation' so neat and tight from the many and varied metaphors of Scripture that it was both *a priori* certain, apart from all human experience, and a sure *Open Sesame* to Future Happiness for its acceptors and an *Abandon Hope* jail for its rejectors. It treated the sublime Myth of Creation as history and the picturesque Myth of the Fall as the irreducible dogma about man and evil.

In the sphere of philosophy it both impoverished and stultified Revelation by confining it to a fragment of human history, and by treating even that fragment as scientifically sacrosanct. It forbade the theologians to teach philosophy and the philosophers to teach theology. Out of a fictitious standard of objective truth it deduced new dogmas and theories which shocked the truthful and alienated the spiritual.

Two days ago, on August 15th (the Paper was read to the Modern Churchman's Conference on August 17th), an announcement appeared in the press of the world that the Pope is to hold a consistory on October 30th at which he will announce his intention of proclaiming a new dogma of the Roman Catholic Church, that of the Assumption of Mary, the mother of Jesus, into heaven. Further, that the proclamation is to be made in St. Peter's on November 1st, All Saints' Day. Thus within a century three new dogmas will have been proclaimed — the Immaculate Conception in 1854, the Infallibility of the Pope in 1870, and the long expected and long prepared for Assumption of Mary in 1950. It is, of course, a fact familiar to all historians of the Church that 'The Feast of the Assumption of the B.V.M.' has had a place in Church calendars for August 15th since the seventh century.

I can here and now make but two brief comments, one in my own words, the other in the words of a postcard received this morning from a teacher of science who seeks to relate that teaching to religious faith and conviction.

'The Assumption of Mary' is a 'Christian' legend. It is of the same kind as the classical legend of the assumption of Herakles, which tells that on his death he was carried from Mt. Etna in Thessaly by Zeus into heaven in a chariot drawn by

our horses : that neither his bones nor his ashes could be found. The underlying idea of the legend was doubtless that earth was not a worthy resting-place for the earthly remains of one so god-like. On November 1st legend is to be made 'Dogma,' and Command. As was said about the Immaculate Conception, so it will be said about the Assumption : 'The more the Church pondered over the Incarnation, the clearer became *the necessity* of the new dogma.' That is (being translated) : if you begin with certain false presuppositions about Truth, you will deduce all sorts of spurious historical statements therefrom. Logical coherence becomes the negation of Reason. When you begin wrongly, there is no absurdity to which you will not arrive.

My postcard said : 'Man has once more created a "miracle" in his imagination.'

Yet liberation proceeds. It proceeds from three main principles, suggested but not fully elucidated here : (1) that all dogma is partial and provisional; (2) that Revelation is both Universal and Unifying; and (3) is conditioned, chiefly, by man's moral and spiritual fidelity.

2. Practical Suggestions

I conclude with some *concrete and constructive suggestions for a practical programme of dogmatic reform.* So far I have felt it right to deal with basic principles, believing that practical reforms can only spring from understanding of and insight into the mental, moral and spiritual issues involved. Wise and courageous decisions, however, are required : for nothing is easier than, giving lip-service to principles, to do nothing. Needless to say, I do not put forth these suggestions as immutable dogmas or as a final and complete programme. It has seemed to me that this Modern Churchmen's Union has been raised in the Church for just this kind of vital and constructive service. I know no other body, in any other ecclesia, placed and ready for practical leadership and for constructive suggestion to responsible authority.

First, about Creed. Everyone to-day knows that a large body of thoughtful moral and spiritual people do not find the two approved Creeds — 'Apostles' and 'Nicene,' the 'Athanasian' being wisely no longer obligatory — an adequate expression of their Christian convictions. They are revered historical documents. Once they were symbols of unity. But they have grown old, and are now symbols of division within the Church. Not only is it that out-moded language teaches badly and confuses much, but also the assertion of dubious fact antagonizes an increasing

number of devout worshippers. These have become aware that few Christian scholars have any confidence that what is called the Virgin Birth was historical fact, and that there are a number of possible and permissible theories of what is called the Resurrection, the Ascension, the Judgment. Symbolical language is inseparable from all statement of belief about the things of eternity: but no teaching and missionary Church can perpetuate language that distorts and stultifies the living truth or repudiates the results of disinterested research.

Two suggestions have frequently but vainly been made in years gone by. I am less confident of the first than of the second.

First, that the original Creed of Nicaea be substituted for the Creed mistakenly so called. From that original Nicene Creed, it has been said, clauses are absent that most trouble truthful minds. My own judgment, however, is that credal revision must look before, not back, and must await a rebirth of real faith.

Second, and now practicable. Credal statements in the language of the ripest and most spiritual passages of Scripture should be permitted by authority to be used at suitable times and where generally desired. My own judgment is that Johannine language and thought are most appropriate for this purpose.

Further, I would suggest that it would be in accord with the whole Biblical revelation if, before the recitation or singing of any credal statement, some such Scriptural words as these should be said: *Jesus said, Not everyone that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in Heaven.* Or (perhaps also) at the close, the Johannine beatitude might be said: *Jesus said, If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them.* For believing and doing are not two things, but one thing, as they were to Socrates and to all Biblical and non-Biblical prophets and seers.

Next, as far as Dogmatics proper is concerned. A step forward was taken when the Commission of Doctrine was set up by Archbishop Davidson in 1922, whose Report was welcomed and critically considered at the Girton Conference of 1939, just prior to the outbreak of war. Has not the time come when another kind of unofficial Commission with a larger and deeper task should be set up representing, not only all Christian Communions in this land, but also eminent Jews and other competent thinkers who share the moral and spiritual convictions on which our civilization has been built? The main issue is not alterations here and there in credal formula or in other parts of ordered worship, but in the whole content and presentation of the religious message to a perplexed but questing generation. This situation can only be met

by free, enlightened and inspiring teaching; and chiefly, I believe, in all theological colleges, where the future ministry of the Christian Church will be trained. The call is to transcend the sectarian dogmatic issues which all the Communions have inherited and which are now irrelevant to the real situation. The World Council of Churches, with its British section, will not be able to do its necessary work for Unity — will be bogged in irrelevancies — unless it can speak through a prophetic teaching ministry about what is, not was, and about what *ought* to be. For Unity can only be advanced on the basis of Truth. Such a Commission would help to clear the ground and to secure positions gained.

The advancement of truth, however, depends not on Commissions but on individuals. 'The Spirit breatheth where He wills.' Yet this coming of the Spirit — I dare to say — is neither capricious nor unconditioned. And there is available to everyone, and now, a 'Reformation Without Tarrying for Anie.'

Conclusion. The mistake of the materialist is that he doubts what is certain. The mistake of the dogmatist is that he would perpetuate what is uncertain. The first tries to believe and to teach that the universe has no meaning. The second tries to believe and to teach that the universe has *his* meaning. The first feels obliged to deny the truth planted in his own mental, moral and spiritual nature. The second feels pledged to repeat all that a majority once decreed. The finality of both these dogmas is a betrayal of Truth.

What folly to try to hand down either Despair or Superstition!

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP IN THE NEW REFORMATION

By Canon R. D. Richardson, Principal of Ripon Hall

THE focus of the Reformation in the sixteenth century was the Church's worship. Great national, social and intellectual changes were at work; but without any question all these were felt to come to a head in the character of the public worship offered to Almighty God. Thus, in England, the distinctive and only fully authoritative expression of the Reformation was the Book of Common Prayer: it was incorporated in the law of the land, absence from its Services was at one time punished, and its regular use powerfully influenced the development of English life and character for three and a half centuries. Then, this century, further great changes of outlook caused it to fall into comparative disuse; and only a small proportion of the population now attends regularly the religious services of any Church. Nevertheless, the rightfulness of Public Worship will not lightly be dismissed, save by the careless and by those who deliberately seek to turn life into channels discontinuous with its age-long purpose and vitality. The right task is to secure the worship of God under the truest and purest forms at present possible, and, as a preliminary to this, to think out clearly the principles by which these forms should be constructed. These were the tasks to which the compilers of the Book of Common Prayer addressed themselves in their own day; and in seeking to promote them a stage further, we are loyal to our ancestry in the Church of England.

There are, in Christian worship as in all other institutions, two distinct elements: forms which have been handed down, and a spirit that informs and shapes them.

Our inherited material is not in its origins specifically Christian. It goes back, so anthropologists tell us, to a myth and ritual pattern which seems to have arisen in more or less uniform style throughout the world. This ancient pattern, which we find also among contemporary primitive races and which is now widely regarded as of great importance for the understanding of Christian worship, centred on the eclipse and the renewal of life, and it embodied the conception of a world-scheme, though the latter, of course, covered only the limited and local 'world' of which its devotees had knowledge. What was held to be eclipsed and revitalized was — following the description by

Professor Theodor H. Gaster,[1] the latest writer on this subject — 'the entire complex of any given locality, the total corporate unity of all the elements, animate and inanimate, past, present and future, which make up its distinctive character.' The periodic renewal of Nature was not thought of as the gift of Providence, or as a consequence of natural law, but as the result of a programme of ritual activities of two kinds: of fasts, austerities and other rites of emptying, or *kenosis*; and of mock combats against the forces of drought and evil, the performance of rain charms, and other fertility rites of filling, or *plerosis*. These rites, performed originally by the whole community, came to be centred on a representative person, the king, who himself then underwent temporary eclipse, death and resurrection, fought victoriously against noxious powers, was triumphantly enthroned, and became the bridegroom in a sacred marriage. And what the king did ritually at a particular time and for a present community was thought to body forth an ideal and sempiternal reality: what the king did on the temporal level, the god was thought to do on the durative level. Accordingly, the seasonal rituals were accompanied by myths, whose function was to project the procedure of the rituals to the plane of the ideal situations which the rituals were then taken to 'substantise' and reproduce. The myth, modern anthropologists point out, is not to be thought of as an imaginative story which gave rise to the ritual, nor exactly as a rationalization of the ritual *ex post facto*; but as something which grew up *with* the ritual, a thought in the form of a story, a guide to the ritual's activities, which were aimed at ensuring life. The ritual myth became from time to time confused and broken up, sometimes by the mingling of different religions, sometimes because it was questioned and rejected; and then its myths developed independently as religious epics, poems and dramas; but by some natural functioning of the human mind it has always tended to reassert and reshape itself, and its symbols have in any case become part of our mental furniture. It was broken up, for instance, under the vigorous thinking of great Hebrew prophets, although its influence survived in the metaphors and symbols that they used and in their conception of an irresistible Power *directly* controlling Nature and History. About the same period the ritual-myth seems to have been supplanted by religious questioners and philosophers in Babylon, Greece, India and China. But it revived, in the Near East, in the sixth-fifth centuries B.C.; and since the conception of history and more ethical conceptions

[1] *Thespis: Ritual, Myth and Drama in the Ancient East.*

of right and wrong had by this time been developed, the conflict between the warring forces of good and evil in the universe was now projected both backwards and forwards, in a cosmology and an eschatology. This explains in particular the dramas of the later Jewish apocalyptic literature, to which the times of crisis in which they were written gave an impetus.

I do not myself perceive that these conceptions govern the essential thought of Jesus; at any rate the distinctive and original elements in the New Testament breathe quite a different atmosphere from that of the apocalyptists; but, inevitably, the current apocalyptic ideas were used, even by New Testament writers, to interpret His significance, and the writer of the Book of *The Revelation* presents Christianity entirely after the pattern of the ritual myth, full of dramatic action and highly-coloured symbol. In the Graeco-Roman world the scattered fragments of the pattern were once again brought together, 'like the dismembered body of Osiris' (I quote Professor E. O. James[2]) 'round the Figure of a spiritual Divine King' incarnated once for all by a miraculous birth, which broke the root cause of the ills to which flesh is heir; 'dying to live on a cross which has become symbolized as the tree of life'; harrowing hell in sacred combat; enthroned on high after an ascension; bestowing everlasting life, through his mysteries, upon the Church which he has taken to be his Bride; and finally 'fixing destinies' (an important item in the Mesopotamiam myth and ritual ceremonies) at a coming Great Assize. What Jesus Himself said and did, the revelation of God which He gave in His Person and Character, tended to be left out of account as quickly-crystallizing theological doctrine concentrated on His significance in a dramatically-conceived and all-embracing world-view. Professor E. O. James, in his important book *Christian Myth and Ritual*, not only traces the ancient drama of the divine kingship and its ritual pattern in the Catholic presentation, upon a higher plane, of Christianity itself, but he also traces the same pattern in the Christian ceremonies for crowning kings, for ordaining bishops, priests and deacons, for initiating individuals into Church membership, for celebratng Mass and marriage, for administering the last rites to the dying, for ordering processions, for enacting mystery plays, and for observing those seasonal games, contests and burlesques that figured prominently in ecclesiastical calendrical observances and still survive in the traditional life of small towns and villages.

This vast reconstruction and extension of the ancient pattern

[2] *Christian Myth and Ritual*, p. 41.

as once again broken up in the countries that experienced the eformation. The Reformers, and those who succeeded them in great moral and intellectual revival, looking more directly to ie Person and Character of Jesus Himself, found in the inherited orms of worship — to quote the Prefaces to the Book of Common rayer — 'things which are untrue, uncertain and superstitious'; stories and legends'; and a 'multitude of ceremonies' that 'did iore confound and darken, than declare and set forth, Christ's enefits,' and which turned 'Christ's Gospel' into 'a Ceremonial aw' instead of 'a Religion to serve God, not in bondage of gure or shadow, but in the freedom of the Spirit.' They were ontent, they said, 'only with those Ceremonies which do serve a ecent Order and Godly Discipline, and such as be apt to stir up ie dull mind of man to the remembrance of his duty to God by ome notable and special signification, whereby he might be edi-ed.' And in the Services of the Prayer Book taken as a whole, hile these are instinct with the spirit of profound reverence and doration which is the essence of worship, we find a new sense iat Divine worship also enriches, and makes more precious, uman life in its natural setting — a new understanding of the ict that from the manward side Public Worship should promote piritual values in the worshippers. This new element, driven ome to the congregation by the ethical and educational tenor of ie Exhortations, stands of course side by side with a less edify-ig view — one bound up with the earliest type of ritual-myth — amely, that Public Worship is necessary for a nation or com-iunity if it is to secure the blessing and *protection* of the leavenly Powers. But always in our Prayer Book we get the new nd the old; and it is the new and creative element, so easy to verlook, that, being introduced deliberately, tells us most of the itentions of the compilers. The Book of Common Prayer made ie right beginning of the recasting of Christian Worship, and s new spirit but calls for fuller and more consistent expression.)ur Charter of Progress is the Prayer Book itself.

Thus, in the Offices of Morning and Evening Prayer, Christ's wn distinctive view of God appears immediately; and nothing more noticeable in comparing pre-Reformation prayers with iose of the Prayer Book than that while the former begin almost ivariably with 'Almighty God . . .' the latter usually add 'our leavenly Father.' Then a universal note concerning God's for-iveness is struck; it is said to be 'according to Thy promises eclared unto mankind in Christ Jesus our Lord' and is pre-ently declared by the Minister to be given freely to all who epent and believe the Gospel; and the object of this pardoning

love is 'that we may live a godly, righteous and sober life,' mad 'pure and holy by the Holy Spirit.' In the medieval supplica tions, still continued in Roman Catholic Services, forgiveness i asked for through the intercessions of the Virgin Mary and th Saints; and the Christian virtues are briefly subsumed under th description of 'God's holy Law.' Next, in our own Morning an Evening Services, the Lord's Prayer said aloud by all, instea of by the priest only or under the breath, ensures that the firs words taken on the worshippers' own lips shall truly be praye made in the Name, that is to say the Nature, of Jesus Christ. Th Confession of Faith, too, a little later, is ordered to be recite openly; and although some of us have come to deplore the lat medieval custom of including the Creed in daily services, yet th open, instead of private, recitation of it represents the corporat nature of such recitation and the Reformers' stress on a publi profession of personal faith: 'If thou shalt confess with th mouth . . . and believe in thy heart . . . thou shalt be saved.' Th Psalms, in the Prayer Book version, are virtually a new creation and we must note in passing that this fact provides some prece dent for new devotional editions such as the *Broadcast Psalter*— which might well be widely used. Then, in the later group o Versicles and Responses, the petition for the Sovereign was pu first by our Reformers, instead of the one for priests—the meanin of which change is not that the secular power may be honoure above the ecclesiastical, but that the great cleavage between th clergy and the rest of men, whereby the former used to be calle *spirituales* and the latter *carnales*, is no longer recognized: peti tions for the King, for God's Ministers (presumably those of th Crown as well as of the Church—*vide* the Litany), and fo God's people now follow in this sequence, all classes of me thereby being brought within one order of mankind. The Collect have often greater beauty and richness than their Latin proto types, stressing again God's 'tender love towards mankind' an the need to 'follow the blessed steps' of Christ's 'most holy life And in the concluding prayers, the Catholic Church is define anew in the phrase 'all who profess and call themselves Chris tians'—just as it is, too, in the Bidding Prayer. There is indee a characteristic absence in the Prayer Book of the dogmatic att tude, and religion is brought close to life in this world, with consequent hallowing of the world itself. The stress is not ex clusively on the Other World; and thus trammels are remove which in practice constitute a hindrance to wide concern for socia betterment, to free research of every kind and to the acceptanc of new learning as a divine revelation.

The Litany, our earliest authorised reformed Service in English, is naturally the most medieval in thought and construction. Its most direct reference to the work of Christ seems to be based on the expiatory efficacy of His sufferings. In the words of Dr. Major, 'it is the utterance of a human soul, as it contemplates the mystery of salvation and the stages of its accomplishment, imploring the Soul of all things for deliverance from sin and death.' But there are other suffrages which bring life as a whole within the sphere of sanctification; and those characteristics of our worship which I have mentioned are already clearly traceable. Withal, the Litany captures for an English Service a standard of reverence and dignity, of literary style and rhythm, without which worship cannot be worthy; nor was this lost when Cranmer proceeded to his more original and creative ventures.

The predominance of the figure of Jesus Christ, and a searching simplicity of approach to the full circumstances of the praying Christian, determined the Reformers' changes in the Occasional Offices no less than in those of Morning and Evening Prayer. Even the Baptismal Office, which is most generally now thought to need revision, yet substitutes Christ's blessing of the children in the Marcan version for that of the Matthaean version, thereby stressing the tender humanity of the Christ who took children in His arms; it adds the promise to keep God's holy will and commandments; introduces the blessing of the water into every Baptismal Service, thereby doing away with the superstitious keeping of the holy water locked up in the font; it adds the prayer for the reception of the child 'into the congregation of Christ's flock' and brings back very fruitfully — perchance from the ancient myth and ritual pattern, but surely especially from the experience of human life — the mention of the spiritual combat to be fought, in this case by the growing child, under the banner of Christ.

But the principles which should govern all loyal revision of our Services are most strikingly revealed in the central Service of our Prayer Book, 'the Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion.' What a revolution is indicated by the title alone! The Mass was the Service in which the myth and ritual pattern had taken supreme control. The figure of Jesus in it had been entirely adapted to a theological and liturgical scheme — a scheme of Sacrifice and Atonement — in which Jesus played the part of Victim and Mediator. The act of Communion in the Mass had become a participation in a supernatural life dispensed sacramentally from the altar — according to the 'sacrifice and burnt-offering' view of the relation of man with God. In the

Prayer Book, however, the figure of the Historic Christ is agai brought forward in the insistence that Jesus' Last Supper wit His disciples is commemorated in the Service. And the Servic has become essentially one of communion with Christ Himself — an altar being replaced by The Lord's Table. It is a communio in fellowship; and at the same time it is an act of discipleship, th placing of the Administration directly after the Words of Institu tion (in the 1552 Rite there is not even an intervening 'Amen' ensuring the impression that what we partake of is bestowed b Christ's own hands upon His faithful disciples gathered roun Him. The doctrine of the Real Presence — by which was the meant the doctrine of transubstantiation, no more and no less — was rejected. And the Intercessions — previously placed imme diately after the Consecration as likely to be most efficacious a the moment when the dread miracle of conversion of the element had just been effected — were replaced by the Prayer for th Whole State of Christ's Church, made in a spirit of direc approach to God. The sacrificial aspect of Christ's death is re tained, but as 'the oblation of himself once offered'; and th sacrifice which we present is essentially the offering of our whol selves to God; presented humbly, not as in itself worthy, but i union with the perfect self-offering of Christ. We come to Hi in His present, living Person, and are made whole by Him and b Him alone: it is not the reception of transubstantiated element that endows us with a new life-substance. Thus a fully Christia view of Redemption is set forward in the Service — one primaril personal and religious. The hieratic and cosmic conception o Christ's sacrifice, in which the priest commemorates, indeed pe forms, an act of universal and eternal import, still has a place but that aspect recedes into the background as the *philosophically* ultimate meaning of the whole re-evocation of the Last Supp and of all that went with it.

The Book of Common Prayer, with its transforming an dynamic changes, has in our own day come to be despised an rejected, largely because its principles are no longer understoo or are misconceived. It has recently been described as the Boo of *Un*common Prayer, and the description is exact. For, on th one hand, many studies and experiments, chiefly directed to th nature and constitution of the Universe, have tended to shake th religious interpretation of existence altogether, and have cause men to abstain from Public Worship; and on the other hand, th Churches, faced with the need for a radical restatement Christianity and for a revision of its forms of worship — a nee which arises out of loyalty no less to Christ than to the deman

the new learning — have shrunk from that far-reaching task
l have preferred to make for the old beliefs and practices ex-
sive and authoritative claims which alienate even deeply reli-
us men and women. This essentially supernaturalistic attitude
our Church is in part a reaction against a modern tendency to
stitute humanitarianism and ethics for religion; while the
ctacle of nations and civilizations tottering on the brink of ruin
revived the atmosphere of crisis in which the myth and ritual
ttern of worship always flourishes. Thus the mind of Christ,
s teaching and historic Person generally, which were so truth-
ly and constructively brought forward in the Prayer Book, are
w being increasingly set aside in an effort to re-establish a
tem of Public Worship which centres on Christ as the Divine
ng and on the renewal of life in His Church through the ritual
enactment of His death and resurrection in the Mass or
charist. It is not even uncommon for ordinands of 'advanced
urchmanship' to say that they are 'not interested in Jesus as a
rson'; and it has become a commonplace for theological
chers, even in our Universities, to declare that nothing of im-
rtance can be known of Jesus apart from the Church's presenta-
n of Him in its creeds and rituals. Those who have committed
mselves to this view of Christianity claim to find confirmation
it in a fundamental trustworthiness of the myth and ritual
ttern, which thus serves as a *preparatio Evangelii*. Others, how-
er, have concluded that if the Church's system of thought and
rship follows the same pattern, say, as that of the ancient
bylonians and the present-day Winnebago tribe in North
nerica, then all religions are essentially alike, and all but the
lations of the human mind. To this it is answered that Chris-
nity differs from all other religions of the myth and ritual
ttern in that Christ actually did offer Himself a willing victim
God and was actually raised by God on the third day from the
ad, so that the Christian pattern of worship re-enacts God's
itable mighty acts in Christ. Yet the apologists who argue
is also find themselves compelled to maintain that the events
ich are to be so viewed require that faith first be brought to the
rception of them. Thus Christianity is no longer to be seen in
light of events which created a faith that overcame the world,
t in the light of events which demand anterior faith for their
ceptance. I will not discuss this travesty of history further than
point out that the essence of Christianity — as taught by its
eatest exponents in all ages — is that 'once in the course of the
rld's history there was seen on earth a perfect life, the first and
ominent feature of which' (the words are those of Dean Church)

'was the combination in it, most intimate and never interrupt of the world of time and human life with that which is beyo sight and time.' Admittedly the reconstruction of that life in a thing like a detailed biography has been made almost impossi since we realized how great an element of theological interpre tion has entered into the Gospels. At the same time the essen outlines of the life are there, and the character and mind of Ch are fully discernible in their originality and uniqueness—so mu so as to make an immediate appeal to men of every time a place. This being the case, all recent efforts to thrust forwar scheme of Christian worship which sets aside the revelation ma in the Perfect Life, and to stress instead, and exclusively, Chris significance in terms of a pre-scientific world-view and a s Christian theology, can have no possible claims upon us. Christians were reduced to believing that they could not kn 'the life that was manifested' once in Galilee, they would be all men most pitiable.'

At the same time, since the ancient myth and ritual patte reasserts itself so persistently in history, even in Christianity, must at least witness to some enduring human need and value. therefore we now look below its symbols to their underlying s nificance we may discover in what that need and value consi and thus come to understand how the historic Christ fulfils th even more truly, and what is the position that He claims in Pub Worship.

In the first place, the ancient ritual myth expresses man's se of his dependence on powers beyond himself: the communi and then the king, stood in special relationship to their G Then, it expresses penitence, deepening, as consciousness veloped, from a sense of failure to fulfil the ritual into a profou sense of sin and alienation, and bringing with it a desperate lo ing for atonement: hence the acts of mourning and psalms lamentation. Moreover, a mysterious human experience t innocent suffering avails for the guilty and carries in its own ri a redemptive value, is evidenced by the element of vicarious sa fice in the pattern. And closely connected with this is its provisi for man's desire to dedicate — and, in proportion as his adorati has been stirred, to give freely and fully — what he values mo the king dies — if, in the end, a ritual death only. Again, it be witness to the quest for life — and the supplications, and activities of the ritual, go beyond the securing of physical pr perity: in the rising of the God, the total life, both of the in vidual and of the community, revives. It acknowledges, too, h great a price the gift of life demands: all good things are cost

effort and pain are the conditions of possessing them. Indeed, ultimate meaning of the ritual myth is the truth that we must to live; and this great truth fitted in from the first with the of man's experience of the rhythm in Nature: of day breaking out from night; of living creatures waking refreshed by sleep; spring banishing winter; of the moon waxing after it has waned disappeared; of the rising and setting of the constellations in ation to the sun and planets; of the ebb and flow of the tides. us the myth and ritual pattern was felt to be at one with the mic pattern, and it expressed men's sense of solidarity and mmunity with Nature, with other men, and with the Heavenly wers.

These deepest needs of men, from which we thus see that the ient pattern of worship flowed, testify to the fact that human ure, however evil it can be, is fundamentally spiritual — with spirituality that includes moral and rational elements. And all se spiritual needs are met supremely by Jesus Christ and His spel, whose centrality in the worship of Christians is thus true only to history but to the whole spiritual nature of man. ecifically, our sense of dependence is fully satisfied, and tured, by the Heavenly Father revealed in Christ as a God hout arbitrary elements in His perfect Being. Communion, , takes on a deeper meaning for those who understand, ough Christ, what is signified by the assurance that we are d's children. At the same time our sense of sin is given a er ethical value because the view of man disclosed by Christ mself is free from all suggestion that our nature was corrupted ts source; and what our worst sins are we learn from the pride l bigotry, combined with cruelty, that brought Jesus to the ss. Likewise His atonement for our sins is seen to consist in nething different from, and greater than, the self-immolation a ritual sacrificial victim; He is, in His passion and death, both nkind's expiation for its own darkest evil, and also, through the ss, the intimate revelation of God's nature whereby mankind wholly won, in and by Him, for God; the Cross throws a new ht for ever on all pain and suffering. Then, the desire to offer, lich is a passionate motive in worship, is fulfilled through rist: His was the perfect self-offering, and it moves us to unite rselves to Him when we ask God to accept the offering of our es. Petition, too, moves on a different level when, taught by rist, we learn to make our requests conditional on their being de in accordance with God's will. Moreover, Christ Himself possed the more abundant life which has been man's quest from beginning — a life which conquered death, and through the

touch of His Spirit on our own, especially in worship, we are e
riched by it: it is a type of life not well described in metaphysic
or ethical — still less in magical — terms, but which the author
the Fourth Gospel best conceives, poetically, in terms of
organic life informing the vine and all its branches. Once mor
the urge implanted in us to make continual, costly effort
directed by Christ beyond the practice of austerities themselv
—whether they be part of a ritual-religious scheme, or of a schen
of salvation based on ideals of world-renunciation; so that nc
it takes the form of utterly un-self-regarding service, as God
fellow-workers, in a scheme of world-redemption. Finally, th
scheme must itself be linked to an interpretation of life and
the universe that satisfies our deep rational—though also spiritu
—need of a key to the whole mystery of existence. And Christ
perfect life, linked to the created world by His humanity ar
thus setting its seal on the evolutionary processes, assures
that the great conflux of immensities in which we live is governe
by one only supreme Mind and Being of infinite perfectio
The mystery of evil remains, but we must believe that it is
God's own permission, an inseparable condition of good in
world which is essentially a scene of moral order and of spiritu
life. And therefore we can no longer conceive of a strugg
between good and evil after the primitive pattern of an endless
recurring cycle; nor after the traditional Christian pattern of
war between God and the 'spiritual hosts of wickedness,' 'rule
of the darkness of this world,' whose final overthrow is for
shadowed by the series of God's mighty acts of direct interventi
in history, especially those wrought in the birth, miracles ar
physical resurrection of Christ. Dramatic as the latter picture
and well suited to be the background of a scheme of thought ar
liturgy, it cannot any longer be retained except by taking
cosmological and apocalyptic scheme *symbolically* and by tran
ferring many of what were once considered historical events
the sphere called 'meta-history.' But this is really to put Christi
thought and worship in grave danger of severance from facts
any kind. The essentials of the cosmic aspect of Christian wo
ship are perceived by setting Christ against the background
the Universe as disclosed by Science, not by constricting t
Christ Himself to the office of a sacrificial victim in a worl
conflict mythologically conceived. Awe thus remains the basis
great worship, but it does not require a surrender of fact; for t
God Who created, and is still creating, this stupendous univer
cannot but inspire an even greater awe than that inspired by t
universe itself. Nor is this awe dimmed by Christ's revelation

God as Father, for it is clear both from the severity of Nature and from Christ's own teaching that He is a Father Whose face is stern against all evil.

In the worship of the new Reformation, then, all the deepest needs of our spiritual nature will be expressed and fully met. And the Services will converge upon, and lead the worshipper directly to, God as He is most intimately Self-revealed in that perfect Life which once was lived in Galilee. When our forms of service have achieved this, they will also be a perfect means of communion whereby the power of Christ's endless life in God will be quickened within us and among us.

There are two aspects to a Christian liturgy or Public Service: it should express upon the highest level the universal element in worship — the awe, the adoration, the contrition, the gratitude and praise that we owe to God, together with earnest entreaty of Him for ourselves and others; and it should also have the power to stamp upon the minds of worshippers the image of God-in-Christ, together with the Christian scale of values and ultimate interpretation of life. By these two aspects, preserved and strengthened in the Services of the future, our worship will be brought to full fruition.

THE CHURCH: ITS OFFICE AND FUNCTION

By the Rev. E. C. Dewick, D.D.

A. Introductory. The Present Situation

SOME years ago, two friends of mine were discussing the subject of 'the Church.' Both of them were sincere Christians though perhaps neither was what is commonly called 'a good Churchman.' At length one of them remarked: 'Well, I suppose we must admit that the Church is a regrettable necessity!' To which the other replied: '"Regrettable"?—I agree; but "a necessity"?—I am not so sure!' Perhaps both these estimates are over-critical; but I think a good many laymen to-day would be inclined to endorse one or other of them.

A diametrically opposite view is prevalent to-day in ecclesiastical circles (both clerical and lay), where one of the most significant trends of thought is the *increasing* emphasis on the importance—indeed the absolute necessity—of the Church. This has, of course, always been a central feature of the 'Catholic' tradition. It was also a fundamental principle of the sixteenth century Reformers; among them, Luther, who said:

> 'Anyone who is to find Christ must first find the Church. . . . Outside the Christian Church is no truth, no Christ, no blessedness.'[1]

Calvin, too, claimed that the Church is God's Viceroy on earth entitled to act and speak with the full authority of Christ himself; and that 'the whole of creation revolves round the Church and is designed to serve the Church.'[2] In fact, the Reformers held a doctrine of the Church no less 'High' than that of the Pope himself. Only, since both they and he were sure that 'the Church' included themselves, but excluded their opponents, their doctrine, though substantially one and the same, led to diametrically opposite practical conclusions and policies.

Later Protestantism, however, tended, on the whole, to relegate the doctrine of the Church to a secondary place in the scheme of the Gospel: and this has been regarded by Catholics as one of its gravest defects. But to-day the pendulum has again swung and one of the chief notes of the New Protestantism on the Continent, and also of the 'younger Churches' overseas, is the revival of the doctrine of the Church. At the Amsterdam meeting of the

[1] T. M. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, Vol. I, p. 487 f.
[2] do. do. Vol. II, p. 7 f.; cf. T. F. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, p. 176.

World Council of Churches in 1948, Bishop Gustav Aulén, of the Swedish Lutheran Church, affirmed that

> 'Christ and the Church belong together in an inseparable unity. . . . Christ is incarnate in the Church'[3];

and Dr. Paul Devanandan, of the United Church of South India, said:

> 'What makes the primary difference in outlook between the leaders of the previous generation in the "younger Churches" and those who are leaders to-day is, that the latter perceive that the relation between the Gospel and the Church is not accidental, but integral and constitutive.'[4]

In between the two extremes, all kinds of intermediate positions are to be found. What should be our attitude, as liberal Churchmen, to these divergent views of the Church?

On the one hand, I imagine that many of us have a good deal of sympathy—more, perhaps, than our brethren of other schools of thought—with those who find 'the Church as it is' so hopeless that they turn away from it in despair. On the other hand, most of us feel a true affection and loyalty towards the Church, which has been to us a 'spiritual mother.' Nor do we feel justified in dismissing, as unworthy of serious attention, this renewed emphasis on the Church which is evident to-day among young, alert and progressive Christian thinkers, and which challenges us to consider carefully whether it may contain elements of truth, capable of being used to promote that kind of reformation in the Church which we ourselves desire to accomplish.

B. The Doctrine of the Church in the Scriptures

As Anglicans, I take it that we accept the principle laid down in our VIth Article, that no doctrine is to be regarded as absolutely essential unless it has warrant in the Scriptures, and above all in the message of our Lord himself, which lies at the heart of the Bible. We also accept the principle laid down in Articles XIX and XXI, that no Church, and no General Council, is finally infallible.

Let us therefore turn in the first place to see what is the doctrine of the Church to be found in the Scriptures.

1. *In the Old Testament.*

Although the word 'Church' never occurs in the English Old Testament,[5] the conception of a 'People of God' as a visible, organized community, is fundamental; and its formation,

[3] Amsterdam Series of Reports, Vol. I, p. 19.
[4] do. do. Vol. I, p. 149.
[5] But the Hebrew word '*qahal*,' denoting the assembly of the Israelites, is generally translated in the Septuagint by the Greek word *ecclesia*.

organization and worship are set forth as having been directly appointed by God himself. But so far as I am aware, no Christian Church to-day claims to base its hierarchy on ritual exactly on the Divine pattern given to Moses. In other words, we may legitimately trace back to the Old Testament the general idea of a Church, but not the details of its organization or worship.

2. *In the Message of Jesus Christ.*

As is well known, there are but two passages in the Gospels (both of them in *St. Matthew* only) in which our Lord is reported as using the word 'church' (*ecclesia*). These are:

(1) *Matt.* xvi, 18: 'On this rock I will build my Church';
and (2) *Matt.* xxvii, 17: 'Tell it to the Church; . . . If he will not hear the Church, . . .'

Can any specific doctrine of the Church be based on these two passages? Many competent Christian scholars have expressed doubts whether we can be sure that in either of these passages we have a *verbatim* report of the words spoken by Jesus.[6] Moreover, the text 'On this rock . . .' is in any case of very doubtful interpretation; for even among Protestants, who agree in rejecting the application of it to the Papacy, there is no general agreement as to what it really does mean.[7] The second text, 'Tell it to the Church,' offers little difficulty; but it need involve no more than the simple principle that in any society, disputes between individuals, if unsolved, must in the last resort be brought for settlement before an impartial authority, representing the 'common mind'; and that whoever refuses to submit to this authority is no longer entitled to enjoy the privileges of membership in the society. On these two texts it is impossible for sound scholarship to build any *particular* doctrine of Church-organization. And besides these, there is no other reference to 'the Church' in all the recorded teaching of our Lord.

There are, however, many indications in the Gospels that Jesus did regard his followers as forming a group or fellowship, bound together by mutual ties of love and service; and that the welfare of this 'little flock' was very near to his heart.[8] Further, he constantly teaches that 'the Kingdom of God' involves *social* relationships,[9] and is not only a matter of 'the soul and its God.' All this indicates the probability that he did have in mind the general idea of a 'Church'; but it gives us no warrant for claiming

[6] *e.g.* Streeter, in *The Four Gospels*, p. 258; or Principal Grieve, in Peake's *Bible Commentary, ad loc.*

[7] Grieve, *op. cit., ad loc.*, gives three distinct non-Roman interpretations.

[8] *Mark* x, 43 f.; *Luke* x, 26 f., xii, 32; *Matt.* xxvi, 31.

[9] *e.g. Mark* ix, 41; cf. *John* xii, 14 f.

more than this. With regard to worship, while, for myself, I would not question the tradition that the two 'Sacraments of the Gospel' were instituted by our Lord, I would agree with Canon Quick that it is difficult to be certain what precise significance he attached to them.[10]

3. *In the Apostolic Writings of the New Testament.*

In these, the Church occupies a large and important place. Both in *Acts* and in the Epistles, the Christian *Ecclesia* is regarded as the New Israel, carrying on the work, and inheriting the ancient privileges, of the People of God.[11] It is clear, too, that the early Church was organized under officers — overseers (*episcopoi*), elders (*presbyteroi*), teachers (*didaskaloi*), and assistants (*diaconoi*).[12] But it is not necessary to explain these offices by any theory of special 'Divine appointment.' Every organized society has to appoint officers of some kind; and these titles are used in the New Testament in a 'fluid' way, which suggests that they denote, not fixed Orders, but persons performing certain functions in the Church.[13]

The one exception to this is the group of Apostles, who clearly stand by themselves, and may fairly be called an 'Order.'[14] But here again, it was entirely natural that men who had been chosen by the Lord, and had been in intimate personal contact with him, should be regarded as persons of unique authority. It is another matter to claim that he gave them exclusive supernatural powers; and still another to suppose that they transmitted these powers only to their episcopal successors.[15]

In the New Testament there are two striking epithets applied to the Church. To St. Paul, it is 'the Body of Christ.'[16] This

[10] See Quick, *The Christian Sacraments*, p. 118.

[11] *Acts* vii, AB, xiii, 17-40; *Rom.* ix, 25 f.; *Gal.* vi, 16.

[12] See *Acts* xx, 28, *Phil.* i, 1, *I Tim.* iii, 1 f. (*episcopoi*); *Acts* xiv, 23, *I Tim.* v, 1, 19 (*presbyteroi*); *I Cor.* xii, 28 f. (*didaskaloi*); *I Tim.* iii, 10-13 (*diaconoi*).

[13] See T. W. Manson, *The Church's Ministry*, pp. 55-60. The 'laying-on-of-hands,' which generally accompanied appointment to these offices, was evidently not necessarily 'Ordination' in our modern sense of the term; for it was used in all kinds of blessings, and for commissioning those sent forth to a temporary piece of work. (See *Acts* vii, 18, xiii, 2, etc.)

[14] *Acts* i, 21-26; *I Cor.* ix, 1; *II Cor.* xi, 5.

[15] It is often asserted that the commission in *John* xx, 23 ('Whosesoever sins ye remit, . . .') was given exclusively to the Apostles and their successors. (*e.g.* Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christian Dogma*, p. 193.) But it is noteworthy that the Report of the Fulham Conference of 1901 states that *all* the members (and these included the late Lord Halifax, Fr. R. M. Benson, S.S.J.E., and Principal V. S. Coles of Pusey House) were *agreed* that this commission was 'not addressed only to the Apostles and clergy, but to the whole Church.' (p. 109.)

[16] *I Cor.* xii, 12-30; *Eph.* iv, 12; *Col.* i, 18-24.

suggests a visible organization, filled with the Spirit of Christ, so that through it he can speak and act, as we speak and act through our human bodies. And in *Revelation*, the Church is described as 'the bride of Christ'[17]; and this implies that the bond of love between Christ and his Church is the closest that human language knows.

We have now briefly surveyed the New Testament doctrine of the Church, and from it we draw the following conclusions:

1. That the idea of 'a Church,' or society of believers in Christ, is in harmony with his mind and plan.
2. That the purpose of this society is to be the organ through which Christ speaks and acts on earth, and the means of binding his followers (or 'members') together in mutual love and service to all men.
3. That the Church is free to adopt any form of organization or worship that will best fulfil this purpose.

If these conclusions are accepted, they have far-reaching practical consequences. For whatever may be the further developments of the Doctrine of the Church and its ministry along Papal, Episcopal or Puritan lines, none of these 'can be proved to be sure warrants of Holy Scripture'; and consequently none of them are binding upon the Church for all time, nor need they fetter the freedom of any 'New Reformation' of the Church that may be undertaken to-day.

C. Towards a Christian Reformation in the Church To-day

Turning now from the past to the present, let us consider whether there are any steps which may be taken by us, as liberal Churchmen, to bring 'the Church as it is' into closer harmony with 'the Church as it should be,' in the mind of Christ. First, may I refer to some lines which I believe we should *not* follow?

1. *Not the idea of a 'Church-less Christianity.'*

A favourite slogan of late in some quarters has been: 'What we want is Christianity, not "Churchianity"!' Now as a protest against an exaggerated 'ecclesiolatry,' this may be useful. But is it really tenable? If the pilot of an aeroplane, finding his plane sluggish in climbing, were to say: 'This must be due to the *weight* of my engine; I must get rid of it, or at least get a lighter one!'—would this expedite his flight? And is it likely that the Church would, by simply jettisoning or even by reducing its organisation, wing its way more speedily towards heaven? What the Church needs is, not necessarily *less* organisation, but one that

[17] *Rev.* xxi, 2, 9; xxii, 17.

will be the most *effective* instrument available for the activity of Christ. Some kind of visible, organized Church is not only 'a necessity,' but a necessity which there is no need for us to 'regret.' A completely disembodied Church would be as ineffective as a completely disembodied spirit, floating in the air without means of self-expression.

2. *Not by lowering our ideal of the Church.*

Most of us, I expect, are at times so exasperated by the claims for 'Divine Authority' made on behalf of some section of the Church, or some particular formula or rite, that we are tempted to say: 'Away with all such claims! Let us deal with the Church simply as a human society!'

But this, I believe, would be a mistake. It is only when ideals are so high as to be inaccessible that they are of permanent value. The mariner knows that this is true of the stars. For while beacons that *can* be reached cease, as soon as reached, to be of any further use to him as guides, the stars remain, ever remote, but ever reliable. So the ideal of the Church, as the Body of Christ, and the Bride of Christ, though never fully attained by any Christian community, remains as a permanent inspiration, beckoning us ever onward and stirring us with 'divine discontent' at our failures.

3. *Not by claiming final Divine Authority for any institution here on earth.*

This is one of the commonest and most serious errors that we have to combat to-day. In the past, it was made universally and without hesitation. All types of Christians — Roman, Orthodox, Anglican, and Puritan — used to claim Divine Authority for their own particular polity, creed, or ritual without any hesitation. Even to-day we are often told from pulpit or Church-press that this or that is 'the Voice of the Church,' when it is really only an echo of the voice of the *Church Times*. But some of our wisest leaders to-day are warning us to remember that in the present divided state of Christendom no *one* Church is in fact 'the Body of Christ,' and no existing ministry or sacrament is perfect or 'fully valid.'[18] William Temple clearly recognized this. Some of you will remember how he used (at least in his pre-episcopal days) to stimulate the fervour of High Anglican audiences by pronouncing in stentorian tones, 'I BELIEVE IN THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH!' and then, as the murmurs of approval

[18] See Bishop Bell, *Christian Unity*, p. 178; and Bishop Rawlinson of Derby, at the Chichester Conference on Unity, 1949. (Report, § 7.)

subsided, he would mischievously add: '*But* — I regret that it does not exist!' Zealous Churchman as he was, he realized that there is no existing Christian body (or group of bodies) on earth to which we can directly apply the fourth verse of Newman's fine hymn, 'Firmly I believe and truly':

> 'And I hold in veneration
> For the love of Christ alone
> Holy Church as his creation,
> *And her teachings as his own.*'

That last line cannot be said without reservation of Rome, nor of Canterbury, nor of the World Council of Churches — nor even of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

But let us turn now from negative criticism to more constructive considerations, and in particular to one field in which practical action is urgently called for.

4. *The Reformation of Christian Disunity.*

(*a*) *The Need for Unity.* If the Church is the Body of Christ, it *must* be a unity. For unless the several parts of a body are held together, it is not a 'body' at all, but a mere mass of matter; and that which holds a body together is always life, or spirit. So the first essential for the Body of Christ is not unity of organization or creed, but unity of spirit. I believe that in our schemes of Reunion, we have often tended in this matter 'to put the cart before the horse';—to concentrate all our energies on securing unity in system and doctrine, and to assume that unity of spirit will then follow. Is it not possible that we should have achieved a greater spiritual unity if we had been content at first to aim at some kind of Federation of Churches, mutually recognizing each other as true parts of the Body of Christ; seeking within that looser framework to foster real unity of spirit and mutual understanding, but allowing each to retain for the present its own organization and independence?

Undoubtedly there has been in recent years a wonderful recovery of the spirit of unity between separated denominations, largely through the influence of the Oecumenical Movement; and for this we thank God. But Christian unity must be expressed in certain outward forms, particularly in the ministry of the Word and Sacraments; and so long as some Churches (including our own) refuse to share with other Churches in these two great manifestations of the Christian spirit, unity at the deeper levels is bound to be gravely impaired.

I believe that the scandal of this refusal is felt much more deeply by the average Christian layman than by most of the clergy. Indeed, the bulk of the laity find it hard to understand

ecclesiastical scruples in this matter. A few weeks ago I was taking part in a conference of some 200 Christian laymen, of whom (I was told) some 20 or 25 per cent. were Anglicans. The only ordained men present were myself and a Presbyterian minister, who celebrated the Holy Communion for us on the Sunday morning, after the Use of the Church of Scotland. With a very few exceptions, all the Anglican laymen partook of the Sacrament without any hesitation; nor did I afterwards hear any comment or controversy on this. To them, it seemed so natural that no comment was necessary.

I am sure that there are many clergy who would be glad to do the same; but there are very few who ever actually do so. They fear that such action would be disloyal to the Church, and that it might engender controversy, or even schism. Now no sincere Christian can contemplate lightly the possibility of another rent in the already much-torn Body of Christ. Yet the time may come when we shall have to choose between some risk of this, or the certainty that the principles for which we stand will be slowly eliminated from our Church.

(*b*) *The Situation to-day.* For the present position, as I see it, is this. On the basis of the New Testament doctrine of the Church, the differences that separate us from the major non-episcopal Churches in our land are not essential or fundamental. If so, there is no reason why we should not, on occasion, share mutually with them in the ministration of the Word and Sacraments, just as they now do, among themselves. We need no longer be troubled by some of the scruples which weighed upon our Anglican forefathers a century ago. They, honestly believing, as they did, that our Lord himself had directly ordained the three-fold ministry, and that our Church had always forbidden communion with any non-episcopal Church, were quite *rightly* exclusive in their claims and policy. But we, who can read our Lightfoot on *Philippians*, our Hunkin or our Norman Sykes on English Church History, can see that the Tractarian attitude was not based on sound historical foundations, and was, in fact (as the Bishop of Chichester has said), 'a novelty' in the main Anglican tradition.[19]

As for the recent attempt by the Bishop of Oxford and his colleagues, in *The Apostolic Ministry*, to rivet upon us what the Bishop himself describes as 'the awful rigidity of the doctrine of

[19] G. K. A. Bell, *Christian Unity*, p. 22. The Bishop notes that both Keble and Darwell Stone admitted frankly that the early Tractarians were *mistaken* in their view of the post-Reformation tradition and practice of our Church; but they consider the mistake to have been 'providential'; as otherwise the Tractarians would have lost heart. (pp. 20-22.)

apostolic succession,'[20] I commend to you Bishop Stephen Neill's description of it as 'learning uncontrolled by scholarship,' or Dr Manson's, as 'bad logic allied with unrestrained fantasy.'[21] To me at least it reads like a desperate attempt, by men who realize that the old defences of High Church exclusiveness are untenable, to justify, by means of fantastic theories based on precarious guesses, their continued refusal to adopt a more generous policy towards the non-episcopal Churches. As far as I can judge, it has failed to convince any, except those whose minds were already committed to its thesis.

Moreover, its conception of God Almighty, as one who is bound, 'even against his will,'[22] to endorse the decisions of his human *shaliachs*, seems to me to be irreverent to the verge of profanity, and fully warrants Bishop Neill's severe comment that the doctrine therein implied is fundamentally 'not Christian.'[23]

Thus the road towards fellowship in worship with the non-episcopal Churches is freer from historical and theological obstacles to-day than it has been in the past. But *is* our Church moving forward along that road? My own mind goes back to 1920, when our bishops sent out their truly prophetic 'Appeal to all Christian People,' and when the Mansfield Conference Resolutions, openly advocating mutual Inter-Communion, were signed by such leaders as William Temple, Percy Dearmer, and Oliver Quick. What real advance has been made from our side since then? I can think of no case in which even the most distinguished Nonconformist minister has been officially permitted to perform any function in our Church which has not also been entrusted, on occasion, to an Anglican layman. Every concession made has been cautious, guarded, not to say niggardly.

Or take the Anglican attitude towards the Church of South India. In 1930, the Lambeth Encyclical 'rejoiced in this venture,' hailed the Anglicans taking part in it as 'pioneers,' and assured them that 'the whole Anglican Communion would stand by them with generous loyalty.'[24] In 1950, the bishops nad presbyters of the Church of South India are told that they may preach in our churches in England only 'on suitable occasions,' and

[20] *The Apostolic Ministry*, p. 25.

[21] Neill, *The Ministry of the Church*, p. 8; *Manson, The Church's Ministry*, p. 64.

[22] So Dom Gregory Dix, in his defence of the *Shaliach* theory, in *Theology*, Oct., 1948, p. 386.

[23] Neill, in *The Ministry of the Church*, p. 28: 'We cannot recognize as Christian the doctrine of God which seems to underlie this imposing theological edifice.'

[24] Lambeth (1930) Report, p. 26.

when invited by the bishop'; and that if ex-Anglicans among them wish to celebrate Holy Communion in our churches, they must give an assurance that they will not do so in the other churches with which they are in communion in India.[25] Hardly a cordial welcome!

What lies behind all this compromising caution? Not, I am sure, any general conviction among English Church people (nor even among the majority of our bishops) that a more generous attitude would be *wrong*; but simply the fear of offending, and perhaps alienating, the determined minority which threatens schism if its demands are not met. Are we for ever to abstain from action on their account? Certainly we ought not ruthlessly to override the conscientious scruples of 'weaker brethren'; but can we permit them indefinitely to hold up advance which the general mind of the Church feels to be right? To agree to this would be to postpone for ever the hope of a Reformation based on the principles of Christ in the New Testament, and to allow only such changes as give encouragement, at least implicitly, to doctrines which most of us here believe to be neither Scriptural nor true.

(*c*) *Some Practical Suggestions.* To put forward concrete suggestions is always more dangerous than to point out needs, or to analyse a situation; but to abstain altogether from such, in this case, would seem almost cowardly. Here, then, are one or two:

(i) Has not the time come when some of our leading clergy, whose names are known and respected in the Church, should meet together for conference and prayer on this matter; and if they become convinced that God is so calling them, they should say publicly that, *on certain occasions*,[26] they propose, on their own responsibility, and without asking for express episcopal permission, to practise mutual exchange of pulpits, and mutual inter-communion, with the non-episcopal Churches; and that they believe that in so doing they are in no way disloyal to the principles of the Church of England? This may, of course, involve them in trouble with the authorities of our Church — (I doubt if it will, for our bishops already have troubles enough, and seem generally anxious above all things to *avoid* controversy) — but if

[25] Report of the Joint Committee; accepted by the Houses of Convocation, May, 1950.

[26] For myself, I certainly should not wish to encourage 'promiscuous inter-communion.' What is needed, in order to restore the confidence of our Free Church brethren, which has been gravely shaken by our recent procrastinations, is freedom to communicate with each other on special occasions, as Free Churchmen themselves now do among themselves. *One-sided* admission of them to our altars will not meet the present situation.

it does, I hope that such bodies as the Modern Churchmen's Union and the newly-formed Evangelical 'Church Society' will give them whole-hearted support. In such action there would certainly be some risk; but risks are sometimes worth taking, and fears often prove unfounded.

(ii) Here is another practical suggestion. It may seem trivial, but I think it is not unimportant. In many of our church porches notices are hung up — mostly emanating from Mowbrays — defining 'the Holy Catholic Church' as consisting *only* of those bodies which retain the episcopal succession, and expressly 'unchurching' — often in contemptuous terms — all other Christian bodies. Several times lately I have found these notices in churches where the incumbent (I felt sure) did not hold the views thus expressed; and on my pointing this out to him, the reply has been: 'Oh, well, it has always been there, and I haven't troubled to remove it!' These notices are read by large numbers of visitors, of all denominations, to our churches, and I know that often they cause very real resentment. May I urge my brethren here to see that such notices do *not* survive in their churches, and to use what influence they have with their clerical brethren to expedite their removal — except, of course, where the incumbent *really* holds the antiquated views therein expressed.

There are many other aspects of a Christian Reformation in the Church to-day; but the time would fail me to tell of them, and some of them — such as Reformation in Doctrine and Worship — have already been dealt with at this Conference. But this matter of the Reformation of Disunity seems to me the most urgent of all.

D. Conclusion

Will you forgive a brief closing word of exhortation? It is often said that liberal Churchmen are more interested in things intellectual than in things spiritual. The charge may not be wholly true; but it brings us a needed warning. Let us remember that no reformation of the Church in organization, doctrine, or worship will make it effective as the Body of Christ, unless the Spirit of Christ pervades and indwells its whole life. And the life of the Church *is* the life of its individual members. That brings a searching challenge to you and me. No amount of zeal for reformation in things outside ourselves will serve as a substitute for reformation of character and heart in our own lives. It is only in so far as we Christians—men and women, clergy and laity—clearly and distinctively reflect in our lives something of the Spirit of Christ, that the world at large is likely to admit the truth of the Church's claim to be, in reality as well as in name, THE BODY OF CHRIST.

THE OUTLOOK FOR CHRISTIANITY

By T. Wigley, M.A., Chairman, Union of Modern Free Churchmen

THESE are changeful days, and men divided in mind appear the groping victims of 'Daimonia' rather than the masters forces of which they are largely unconscious. The chairman of company informs an annual general meeting that conditions at me and abroad being topsy-turvy and the future obscure, it uld be futile to attempt a forecast of the coming year. The cretary of a Christian Union in a famous school writes in the hool magazine:

> 'Our membership has become a matter of anxiety, not so much for the present, as we still have an active core to tide us over all embarrassments, but unless we have renewed support during the next school year, there will not be enough Christians to unite.'

wo years ago the Headmaster of Aldenham, Mr. Riding, told aders of the *Church Times* that 'the Church's stained glass' emed to his boys to 'obfuscate the light.' No wonder he asked:

> 'What would be thought of a schoolmaster whose text books remained substantially unaltered for nearly three centuries—and who used the same book for boys of all ages and stages, who never went outside the lesson structure suggested to his predecessors by, say, Roger Ascham in the sixteenth century?'

erhaps the protest of the boy wrought beyond endurance by the petitive drone of morning prayer, who shouted at the top of his ice, 'For God's sake, do shut up!' was not without warrant. he same lack of thrust and relevance in the presentation of hristianity would appear to be present in our universities as well in the world at large. The father of an undergraduate at xford studying philosophy and economics recently gave the litor of *The Observer* some interesting examples of changed ligious attitudes; where there was not open antagonism to reli- on, he said, the general attitude throughout the university to- ards matters of religious belief was practically one of sheer difference. The fact that these symptoms are so widespread is vidence of a general sickness which cannot be ignored; hristianity is on trial. Can it be said that the Churches are aking the mistake against which Lord Salisbury warned his con- mporaries? 'There is no more common error in politics than at of tying ourselves to the corpses of dead policies.' In the case religion these bonds which tie up the living present to the dead ast are sentimentality and superstition. Reverence for what has een can so easily become a worship of decay. The difficulty, of ourse, is that many people are unable to recognize the approach

of death when they see it, and confuse the immobility of paralys with the stillness of contemplation.

In the meantime, the old bobbin man is still with us. You re member A. N. Whitehead's description in his *Essays in Scienc and Philosophy* of the man, dressed in ancient corduroys, wh with his worn-out cart horse went through the villages of Eas Kent in the 1870's selling wood for kindling called 'bobbins Slowly he journeyed, passing through scenes of English histor unthinkingly and unknowingly. He could, says Whitehead appreciate neither the past from which he sprung nor the force of the present which so soon were to sweep away folk like him The age of a vast subject population, deaf and dumb to th values belonging to civilization, has gone. Also the old civilizin influence of the Church has passed. And yet the bobbin man i still with us, and the former deaf and dumb have still to learn t discriminate between the slogans which now fill their ears an mouths. The light is blown out, and unreason is worshipped in th darkness.

Existentialists in all their variety, atheist, calvinist and Roma Catholic, are apparently agreed that what-is is, and what-is is bad We must go on grimly, each chewing with aching jaws his ow morsel of experience, however bitter the taste, with Anguish Forlornness and Despair as our companions. We are at a loss t think clearly, for 'nothing,' according to Heidegger, becomes verb and 'The Nothing nothings.' One wonders why Sartre, wh declared 'Existentialism is the opposite of nausea,' should neve theless use it as the favourite and recurrent theme of his nove and plays. It is a sign of sanity that although for the existe tialist 'life has no meaning *a priori*,' he must compel himself t choose, if he is to live at all and prove himself a man in a worl with no sense in it. This may be heroic, but it is mental foolis ness which refuses to draw the implications of its own assump tions; it must go forward or commit suicide. The schizophren Kierkegaard would be staggered at his spiritual progeny. A n utterly dissimilar reaction to life and its problems is found in mar Roman Catholic novelists with their stress on man's feeling of i adequacy, of sin and guilt, the sole cure for which immaturity to compensate by falling backwards into the arms of grac Mauriac, who is less mythological than some other French nove ists, writes these words as an epigraph to *The Unknown Sea*:

> 'The life of the majority of mankind is a dead road and leads nothing. But others know, from childhood, that they are making for unknown sea. Already the bitterness of the wind surprises them, alrea the taste of salt is on their lips — until, the last dune passed, this infin passion whips them with sand and spray. It remains for them either plunge in or to retrace their steps.'

is not particularly easy, as Rayner Heppenstall has pointed out, distinguish sin in the context either of Mauriac or Graham eene from what in a pagan novelist would pass for neurosis, cept in so far as the author, in his manner of speech, betrays eater agitation.

The emphasis is, however, significant of the frustration which day besets so many minds, and with which any reformed ristianity will have to deal. It is such frustration which pro-des the conditions out of which Communism springs and is intained, and many people could make a similar entry in their aries (except for the first word) to that of Somerset Maugham in s *Writer's Notebook*:

> 'Capri. I wander about alone, forever asking myself the same questions: What is the meaning of life? Has it any object or end? Is there such a thing as morality? How ought one to conduct oneself in life? What guide is there? Is there one road better than another? And a hundred more of the same sort. . . . I stopped suddenly, in confusion, my head buzzing with all the thoughts that seethed in it. I could make nothing out of it all; it seemed to me one big tangle. In desperation, I cried out: I can't understand it. I don't know, I don't know.'

hese are the questions to which men are giving different answers. ssentially these questions divide into three, *viz.* whether truth n be won by honest thinking, whether a person is distinguishable om a thing, and whether in community a unity of selves is ossible. Totalitarianism and authoritative traditionalism give ie answer, and liberalism gives another. We must clearly recog-ze that the present-day wars of ideologies are as unfriendly to e liberal mind as our former wars of religion, since in cold or t wars not a doubt can be permitted, and with an increasing gidity of belief in politics the inquisition has again made its pearance, by means of which an orthodoxy can be enforced. If talitarianism spreads, it will engulf every department of men's ves, and the slave mentality will reign supreme. In such environ-ent there can be no outlook for Christianity as a religion of the irit and of the free mind. Not even an authoritative traditional-n in religion will be tolerated, since there can be no room for o Authorities. Hence, the only hope of defeating such enslave-ent lies in the cultivation and defence of an environment in ich the free mind can flourish. This is the first condition of the rvival of any form of living Christianity, and we shall win rough only in so far as we embody in ever increasing numbers e liberal mind, and to do that we must believe in it and ex-ess it.

In this warfare we shall be on our guard against confusing hat is true with what we find it convenient to believe. The

capacity of the human mind to rationalize itself into irrationalit makes it more and more amazing that man should ever have bee designated *homo sapiens*. Complete absurdity is reached whe irrationalism expanded becomes suprarational, but that is what w are now witnessing. This is far from that Christian-Greek syn thesis which Edward Sackville West in his *Inclinations* declare has never been even approximately realized; 'its realization,' h adds, 'would mean the millenium.' Modifications are, of course possible up to a point, and Christianity has proved itself repeatedl open to modification by apocalypticism, Hellenism, feudalism nationalism and democracy, but the situation to-day is quit another challenge, and to meet it we may need not so much furthe modifications, as a radically new type-structure less specialize than the Churches present. Whatever we think about that, liberal at any rate will agree with Schweitzer that 'only as we agai succeed in attaining a strong and worthy theory of the univers and find in it strong and worthy convictions shall we again becom capable of producing a new civilization.' And we cannot to often remind ourselves that it is only from the knowledges an experiences of our own day, in and for ourselves and from wha ever source they may be drawn, that such strong and worth convictions can emerge. It is not for us to match an atheistica gospel of renunciation with a Christian passivity bending its bac to kiss the hand it has no teeth to bite. The recent resurgence o the denial of the will-to-live, instilled by Schopenhauer, is symptom of a diseased mind and spirit with no healthful promis for the modern world.

Can we be surprised that Christianity thus misrepresented i more and more ignored? The issue is plainly theological an practical, or, if we prefer it, ideological and practical, and th acid test is truth in practice. No one can deny Lin Yutang' criticism in his *Importance of Living* that Christianity in its his torical development has got mixed up with a number of thing strictly outside religion's moral realm. E. W. Barnes makes th same complaint in his *Scientific Theory and Religion*, but Li Yutang protests especially against the curious Christian dicho tomy of the spirit and the flesh, and that apparently you can make a man a Christian unless you first make him believe he is sinner; 'the great question that bothers theological minds is n human happiness, but human "salvation" — a tragic word.' Th student of Christian doctrine will regretfully echo his sigh. A for the future, for Lin Yutang,

> 'What religion is left in our lives will be a very much more simplifie feeling of reverence for the beauty and grandeur and mystery of lif

with its responsibilities, but will be deprived of the good, old glad certainties and accretions which theology has accumulated and laid over its surface.'

This protest is warranted, for modesty in affirmation has not generally been characteristic of theological utterances, and it has been left to the modern scientist to exemplify that virtue. Often the Churches have been so busy manufacturing sins and feelings of guilt in their adherents, and then offering their cure-all, that they have had no time to encourage any growing-up into fullness of life. Taboos still linger, prejudice is baptized in the name of principle, and the negation 'Thou shalt not' has become associated with certain presentations of Christianity to the almost complete exclusion of any joyous affirmation of the will-to-live. The prophets have been killed by the infantile and their tombs built by the traditionalists to make them respectable. Mental, moral, social and political progress has been anathematized by Churches claiming to be 'the pillar and ground of the truth.' The claim would be laughable, if the results had not been so tragic. Like Macaulay's Hindoo, convinced of the sin of destroying animal life and shown his vegetable diet under a microscope, the Churches have settled many an argument not by changing their diet or their exhortations, but by smashing the microscope. The method is a favourite one not only of the stupid and inert, but of the alert and self-interested, and it is not confined to religious circles. The almost ubiquitous 'boss' has for his motto, 'By this craft we have our wealth,' or power, or place, and his *status quo* is sacred. Truth is a constant quantity given and unalterable in self-chosen sacred book, ranging from Hebrew Scriptures to *Das Capital*. Tolerance and honesty would have remembered the old scholastic maxim, 'Whatever is received, is received according to the nature of the receiver.'

In the end, we are brought face to face with the fact of the responsibility of each for his own understanding, appreciation and doing, as we consider the disastrous results, personal and international, which the imposition of outworn traditions and customs has brought about. Logan Pearsall Smith in his *Unforgotten Years* writes of

> 'the lava stream of evangelical revivalism into which my parents were swept away, the notion of Hell formed a fiery background to my childish thoughts; I was always expecting, half in terror, half in thrilled anticipation, to hear the blast of the Last Trumpet, to see the earth and heavens collapse and the sinners led off to their abodes of Eternal Torment. The old doctrines of the corruption of man and his inevitable doom unless he finds salvation in the conviction of sin, the gift of grace, and a sudden catastrophic, miraculous conversion — this evangelical theology though I was nourished on it in my youth, and tasted its joys and terrors, has now become utterly alien and strange to me.'

So much for the personal effects of traditionalism; examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but we must not overlook the influence of, say, the Neo-Calvinist movement in South Africa. A *Manchester Guardian* correspondent on September 12th, 1949, described the new Citizenship Bill as the expression of an elaborate and integrated body of ideas clearly set forth in authoritative books, which sought to build up a completely Calvinist picture of the universe from which every trace of Greek thought will be purged, with an 'Archimedes point' for all branches of knowledge found in divine ordinances lying entirely outside the created cosmos. One of its most noteworthy apologists, H. G. Stoker, naturally begins by attacking all forms of political liberalism: they all commit idolatry by putting the human individual, with his reason and conscience, in the central place of the Godhead. What such Calvinist notions may mean for South Africa and elsewhere we can only imagine. At least they give point to Lin Yutang's criticism, and we can but hope that for such an alleged Christianity wherever declaimed there is no outlook at all. For ourselves, we refuse to indulge in looking for new ways of despairing and feeling sorry that we are human; nor can we be content to live for ever on the religious capital of our ancestors; the modern Christian can evade no longer the need for convictions of his own, the product of his own experience, enquiring in mind and courageous in practice.

We must avoid using ancient words while giving them a meaning totally different from their traditional connotation; such adaptation may give peace for a time, but it is a form of appeasement which leads only to confusion and a charge of dishonesty in some cases justifiable. Better be a seeming iconoclast than a seeming humbug. What the sciences have done the Christian must learn to do as his experience widens and deepens. Such radical restatement may not prove to be wholly possible, since we are dealing with historical problems and vocabulary is limited; it will certainly not be easy, but it should not be utterly impossible as a working ideal. As Joyce Cary remarks in *To be a Pilgrim*, 'history does not move in one current, like the wind across bare seas, but in a thousand streams and eddies, like the wind over a broken landscape, in forests and towns.' If, however, new content and new form were more common in theological statement, it would have been impossible for Mr. Hoyle to speak as he did in his last broadcast lecture on 'The Nature of the Universe' concerning what he imagined were the beliefs of the Christians. 'What the Christians offer me is an eternity of frustration,' he said, but what are we to think of those who have given him this impression?

Can we not take for granted that faith is an attitude of confidence towards reality which in all its manysidedness is responsive to man's questionings and repeatedly proves itself intelligible? This is a basal assumption made in science and religion. It is when we express our assumption in a statement of beliefs that different views begin to emerge in a process of selection according to the terms of prevailing contemporary ideas of truth, which ideas are in constant change. There is, however, no escape from making our yardstick human personality in its integrity both in science and in religion, always keeping in mind Bertrand Russell's warning, 'the method of "postulating" what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil.' Fortunately the love of truth in action has always been represented among Christians in spite of opposition from those who permit no change, and more and more people are realizing to-day that they cannot afford to have their religion even remotely associated with such wonders as turning water into wine or curses on those who differ from them.

The condition of survival in the world of social organisms, of ideas as of bodies, is adaptation. Organism, function and environment, who can say where any one of them ends and another begins, since they are one in action, whichever seems dominant at any given moment? This unity is proved to be a fact by all our knowledge of the origin and growth of religion, the nature of the universe, the ways of life, no less than of the history of sacred writings, the development of creed and rite. We cannot continue to speak and to act as if this knowledge were non-existent. It was a good word which Bishop Westcott spoke years ago, 'Have faith in criticism, have faith in science, and have faith in God.' With such a faith there can be no room for ignorance or prejudice; it commits us to a religion of the spirit operative here and now in man as he meets the challenge of succeeding ages in the realms of truth, personality, and community. The outlook for Christianity will depend on whether, in W. P. Montague's words, it can commend

> 'the possibility that what is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature, that the ideal and the real are at least to some extent identified, not merely evanescently in our own lives, but enduringly in the universe itself.'

Or, as C. H. Dodd puts it:

> 'The most fundamental question for religion is that of the nature of God and His relation to ourselves. If we want to preserve the integrity of our thought, and are not satisfied with any kind of pious pragmatism, we must make the attempt to answer that question in a way that not only interprets and justifies the religious life of faith, prayer, and worship, but also fits into some sort of philosophy of life and the world as a whole.'

Such a philosophy must, I repeat, be worked out in terms of our own knowledge, experience and needs, and for me at any rate it takes shape in an entheistic humanism or personalism, since these are the highest terms man can conceive in a world in which meaning shows itself at many levels and in different degrees of significance.

The idea of God as creative spirit in a process of incarnation saves us from the dualism which has distorted Christian thought through the centuries. Latent from the start, the distinction between this life and the next, the Church and the world, the religious and the secular, made escapism the practical clarion call which went ill with the building up of ecclesiastical worldly power. On such lines it was inevitable that the natural became separated from the spiritual, the temporal from the eternal, knowing from being, the finite from the infinite; as if the finite could fall outside the infinite, and not within it. We are not surprised that W. R. Matthews finds in the unresolved dualism of the Early Church 'the real crux of the ancient theology.' The gulf between the universal and the particular bequeathed by Plato still haunted men's minds, and we should again note that the results of this demarcation have been very practical indeed. The two great commandments did at least stress the unity of God, the self and others, in an organic whole in personal terms, and their acceptance would involve a true being for self and a respect for every similar self in a freedom of spiritual harmony. The prayer to be made whole is very far-reaching, for, as l'Anson Fausset has observed, 'in learning partially to know himself, Western man has lost the secret of being more than himself.' I would stress the word 'partially,' and the coherence and charm of a thinker like Santayana are due to the fact that he plants spiritual things 'unequivocally on natural ground.' On this ground man's moments of discovery become revelations of the nature of things within his ordinary life, here is something strange yet not different; we feel after a word to describe it and often fail, yet we understand, as Amiel profoundly said, 'a man only understands what is akin to something already existing in himself.' For a moment we shed our mortality like Rupert Brooke in his poem, 'Dining-room Tea,' 'I saw the immortal moment lie,' or Julian's absolution at the end of Charles Morgan's *The River Line*, and we feel, as J. C. Powys says he felt when thinking of St. Francis's Hymn to the Sun,' or of William Blake's 'Songs of Innocence,' or of Alyosha Karamazov's weeping upon the earth, 'a heightening of happiness till it thrills through body and soul with a quivering absoluteness that passes understanding.' All this mutual immanence is included in our entheistic personalism, and imagination proves to be 'Reason

in its most exalted mood.' For such a philosophy there can be no finality. Why should we expect it when knowledge is growing, personality developing, experience enlarging? I like Macneile Dixon's pungent remark, 'God has not ceased to think. And when a God thinks he thinks to some purpose.' But for a thorough discussion of this problem I would commend an article on 'Finality in Theology,' in *Philosophy*, July, 1945, by John Laird. I cannot refrain from quoting one sentence: 'The conviction, the passionate conviction of exclusiveness and finality is scarcely enough. It may suffice for religion but not for theology.'

The outlook for Christianity is fair if in content and form it can prove itself contemporaneous, comprehensive, progressive and practical. Even modern man needs a faith by which to live, expressed in terms credible and relevant to his world. So far as I can see, this faith can be found in an incarnational process essentially spiritual in nature, expressed in, but not limited to, the religion of Jesus or the religion about Jesus as the Christ; it will include these as embodiments of such a universal spiritual process in personal regard, but without any suggestion that they are beyond criticism and are incapable of adaptation to changing needs and knowledge. From our understanding of the nature of the process and man's place in it we shall gradually find new significance in common living, new sympathies in the present, and new hopes for the future based, as these may be, on the firm conviction of God as creative spirit, the ground of all Being and Becoming. In this faith fellowship may be discovered in a community of selves, in which each finds fulfilment within the organic whole of a life shared and of infinite variety. Here there can be no room for dogmatism or negativism. Not only in the beginning was Reason; it was, is, and shall be the very soul of reality. We do not claim for any opinion or way of life in the past or the present that it alone is truth full-orbed. To love truthfulness is more important than to possess a truth, and a fragment magnified into the whole destroys man's vision even as he makes the claim. Liberal Christianity will demand the devotion of our whole personality, feeling, imagination and logical construction. The way forward is not the *a priori* of Scholasticism, but the empirical way, daring, experimental and endless, with man the spiritual wayfarer finding in self-transcendence his own fulfilment. In all simplicity this is the childlike way to maturity commended by Jesus of Nazareth, and what more do we need than to seek to understand and to put into practice the two great commandments with their explanatory pendants of the lost son and the loving father, and the good Samaritan, and to have in our hearts and heads, as well as on our lips, his prayer?

CONFERENCE SERMON

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., F.B.A., K.C.V.O.

'Jesus said, It hath been said to them of old time, but I say unto you.'
Matthew v, 33.

NEARLY a quarter of a century ago the Modern Churchmen's Union circulated in card form the following creed:

We believe:

God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.
God is Light, and if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another.
God is Love, and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God.
Jesus is the Son of God, and God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son.
We are children of God, and He hath given us of His Spirit.
If we confess our sins He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins.
The world passeth away and the lust thereof, but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.

This is Christianity as understood by an inspired genius in the first quarter of the second century.

This could not be the official creed. In order to be intelligible to simple folk the Church had to humble itself. We must not complain. We clergy, as I told the Worshipful Company of Spectacle-makers, are in their trade. We have to provide spectacles for people with every degree of myopia, to help them to see the invisible. But we claim the right to think and say what we believe ourselves, and to pretend that the educated man knows no more than the clodhopper is simply inverted snobbery. Learned and simple alike, we all see as in a mirror by means of symbols, while we live here. '*Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*' was Newman's epitaph for himself; but to despise the intellect, as some do now, is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit of truth.

Let us cast our eyes back upon the history of religion. The most important event in human history is the almost simultaneous appearance, all over the civilized world, of a higher form of religion in the middle of the first millennium before Christ. In China, Confucius; in India, the Buddha; in Persia, Zarathustra; in Palestine, the later prophets; in Greece, Orphism. Prophetic Judaism culminated in the Gospel of Christ, which inevitably broke with Caiaphas and the priestly caste.

Do we realize that prophetic Judaism and Christianity are different religions from that of the nomad invaders of Palestine,

preserved for us in the early books of the Old Testament? Origen says so very plainly, but Origen, like Erasmus, two men whom we should like to canonize, has been roundly cursed both by Catholics and Protestants. Do we realize that it was either under Persian influence or by a parallel development of thought that the later Judaism came to believe in a future life, a resurrection, a last judgment, heaven and hell, a cosmic duel between light and darkness, and a divine Saviour? A cynic might even say that we owe more to Zarathustra than to Moses!

Christianity, as we all know, is a syncretistic religion. 'Though Jewish in form, it is Hellenic at bottom,' says Havet. 'It is a Graeco-Roman phenomenon in a Jewish mask,' says Bruno Bauer. I think this is exaggerated, when we remember how stiffly the Church refused to tolerate the hospitable Pagan mystery religions. But even the Church has had to bend her stiff backbone. December 25th is the birthday, not of Christ, but of Mithras the invincible Sun. Isis of many names has acquired a new one as the Madonna. I should like to see the church of *Panagia Aphroditissa*, the Blessed Virgin Aphrodite, in Cyprus.

St. Paul says that the Jews want miracles, the Greeks theosophy. But Ovid, thinking of the Orphics, blames the Greeks for sacramental magic.

Graecia principium moris fuit; illa nocentes
Impia lustratos ponere facta putat.
A nimium faciles qui tristia crimina caedis
Fluminea tolli posse putatis aqua.

At the Reformation the composite elements flew apart. The Latin countries at the Renaissance became conscious of their Graeco-Roman ancestry. The northern barbarians had no respect for imperial or priestly Caesars. The Catholic became two-thirds a Pagan, the Protestant, at least in England, two-thirds a Jew.

Martin Luther — my detestation of that man grows. How utterly he misunderstands St. Paul, the founder of Christian mysticism! 'Justification by faith only.' Faith for Luther is confidence — *fides* is *fiducia*. Confidence in the imputed merits of Christ. 'Nothing in my hand I bring, Simply to thy cross I cling'; we still sing these hymns. 'Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid,' says St. Paul. '*Pecca fortiter*,' sin boldly, says Luther. And this spiritual father of Adolf Hitler says that the State can do no wrong. 'It is God that hangs and beheads men and breaks them on the wheel.' Has any doctrine caused more human misery than this? Calvinism is a fine manly creed; it is simply baptized Stoicism. But as it worships a God

who is neither just nor merciful, we can hardly call it Christian. It has driven some people mad, like the amiable poet Cowper. It is really pantheistic, since it acknowledges only one Will in the universe.

As for Roman Catholicism, it is a very successful method of mind-cure; and though you will not all agree with me, I can read the neo-Thomists with pleasure and profit. But arrogant exclusiveness, and the submission of the intellect to authority — this totalitarian religion, formidable as it is, can never win the sympathy of any Liberal.

What of other religious sects? Have the Quakers got the root of the matter in them? I think they have, and they are the smallest of all religious bodies.

Do you agree with me that our services are terribly clogged with Judaism? If you are clergymen, do you not hate having to read many of the Old Testament lessons? Some of them are frankly unedifying, others are unintelligible. Do we really expect the working man to come to church to sing, 'I will think upon Rahab and Babylon,' or 'Behold ye the Philistines also, and them of Tyre with the Morians'; or such gibberish as the verse of the 68th psalm beginning 'When, the company of the spearmen'? I am told that the correct translation of these words is 'Rebuke the hippopotamus.' (So Moffatt.) Our church-goers would sing this with equal unction if they had it before them, as fashionable ladies cheerfully sing the Magnificat, which is more violent than the Red Flag.

Christianity is a way of living, not a way of talking or even of thinking. There are some traditional beliefs which, though they are not formally rejected, lie bedridden in some dormitory of our minds, and are really otiose. I will not speak of these, but in matters of conduct are we quite content with traditional morality? I hope you will not misunderstand me when I say that though Jesus Christ was strict in dealing with the temptations of the flesh, He was gentler with these sinners than Puritanism. The three sins which He really hated were hypocrisy, hard-heartedness and covetousness. The wave of asceticism, which was not, I think, Christian in origin, submerged the Church, and still has traces in our formularies, like the sentence about those who have not the gift of continence in our marriage service. The ideal Christian is not the monk or hermit; nor is he, as was sometimes thought in the nineteenth century, the respectable man. These one-sided opinions always produce reactions, which are part of the harm they do.

There is one thing which I think you must have noticed. In sermons to educated congregations we seldom hear references to future rewards and punishments. This is partly because we are ashamed to use this plea. Many saints have wished that there were no heaven and hell, so that we might love God for Himself alone. Some non-Christians have said the same, Spinoza, for example, and Plotinus, who writes: 'If a man desires the good life for any reason outside itself, it is not the good life that he desires.' But this is not all. Can there be any direct revelation of past or future events? Did not our Lord own to ignorance of the time of the expected Divine intervention? Did He not plainly use the current beliefs about the last things? If He used material fears and hopes, may it not have been 'because of the hardness of your hearts'? To put it plainly, did He as man *know* more about future events than is given to man to know?

If we were asked bluntly, 'Do you believe in a future life for individuals?' we might answer indignantly, 'Of course I do.' But when we think it over, the question includes two rather terrible words—'future' and 'individuals.' Do we know what is the relation of the time-series—past and future—to eternity? Do we know what is the relation of the 'old man,' which St. Paul says we have to put off and have done with, and the 'new man,' which we are trying, not too successfully, to win or to become? Which of the two is immortal? And if it is the spiritual man who is immortal—if, as the Greek Fathers dared to say, God became man in order that we might be partakers in theDivine nature—is that transfigured self a Leibnizian monad, or may we think, with the Indians, of an infinite self, all 'members one of another'? It is useless to say we know the answers to these questions: we do not. They have baffled the deepest thinkers. 'What is Time?' says St. Augustine. 'If I wish to explain it to another, I do not know.' 'On personal identity,' says Hume, 'the matter is too hard for my understanding.' 'If Time be taken for the continuation of existence or duration in the abstract,' says Bishop Berkeley, 'it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.' Must we be content with our Lord's words, 'God is the God of the living, for all live unto Him,' with St. Augustine's '*Quod Deo non perit sibi non perit*,' and with St. Thomas Aquinas' '*non est potentia ad non esse*'? Nothing that really *is* can ever cease to be.

Of one thing we may be thankful, that the hideous hell-fire theology is heard no longer in our churches. Think of Whitefield, rending a congregation into convulsions by repeating, 'O the wrath to come, the wrath to come.' Think of Dr. Watts, with his

'Hark the shrill outcries of the guilty wretches.' Think of Jonathan Edwards: 'You cannot stand before an infuriated tiger. What will you do when God rushes upon you in His wrath?' Think of the appropriately named Father Furniss,[1] a Roman Catholic, who after gloating on boiling blood and brains, pictures a little girl in a red-hot oven, the door of which is half opened, and then shut for ever. 'Oh that you could hear the fearful scream of that girl.' '*Questi non hanno speranza di morte.*' Can there be greater blasphemy than this devil-worship? Have you ever noticed that cruelty is not one of the deadly sins? How could it be, if God is like that?

I have read to you a Johannine creed as the kind of thing which we ourselves might like to substitute for the ancient symbols in our prayer books. I have advocated a drastic purge of our services. Is that the way to fill our churches? No, it is not. But we have nothing to do with majorities. We are at present fighting a losing battle. Our way may even be, as Amiel and Berdyaeff the Russian says, the way back to the Church of the persecutions, to the Church of the Catacombs. Churchill said at the beginning of the late war, 'I can promise you nothing except blood, tears, and sweat.' And what said our Master? 'Strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.' 'The prince of this world cometh and hath nothing in me.' 'In the world ye shall have tribulation; but' (He adds) 'be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.' Yes, we are more than conquerors through Him that loveth us. 'I will not leave you orphans, I will come to you.' 'I will see you again and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you.' St. Paul and the writer whom we call St. John had found Him in the inner temple of their hearts, and they knew that 'neither death, nor life, nor things present, nor things to come, can separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.' As for the identification of the indwelling Spirit with the historical Jesus, I can only say that in my opinion the divine honours accorded to the Crucified are absolutely unintelligible unless during His ministry He made a unique and overwhelming impression on those who knew Him.

[1] From Wingfield Stratford's *The Victorian Sunset.*